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A B S T R A C T
A remarkable gap exists between the financial impact of fraud
in the B2C e-commerce mail order business and the amount
of research conducted in this area — whether it be qualitative
or quantitative research about fraud prevention. Projecting pub-
lished fraud rates of only approx. one percent to e-commerce
sales data, the affected sales volume amounts to $ 651 million
in the German market, and in the North American market, the
volume amounts to $ 5.22 billion; empirical data, however, indi-
cate even higher fraud rates. Low profit margins amplify the
financial damage caused by fraudulent activities. Hence, com-
panies show increasing concern for raising numbers of internet
fraud.
The problem motivates companies to invest into data ana-
lytics and, as a more sophisticated approach, into automated
machine learning systems in order to inspect and evaluate the
high volume of transactions in which potential fraud cases can
be buried. In other areas that face fraud (e.g. automobile insur-
ance), machine learning has been applied successfully. How-
ever, there is little evidence yet about which variables may act
as fraud risk indicators and how to design such systems in the
e-commerce mail order business.
In this research, mixed methods are applied in order to in-
vestigate the question how computer-aided systems can help
detect and prevent fraudulent transactions. In the qualitative
part, experts from fraud prevention companies are interviewed
in order to understand how fraud prevention has been conven-
tionally conducted in the e-commerce mail order business. The
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quantitative part, for which a dataset containing transactions
from one of the largest e-commerce firms in Europe has been
analyzed, consists of three analytical components: First, fea-
ture importance is evaluated by computing information gain
and training a decision tree in order to find out which fea-
tures are relevant fraud indicators. Second, a prediction model
is built using logistic regression and gradient boosted trees.
The prediction model allows to estimate the fraud risk of fu-
ture transactions. Third, because risk estimation alone does not
equal profit maximization, utility theory is woven into prioriti-
zation of transactions such that the model optimizes the finan-
cial value of fraud prevention activities.
Results indicate that the interviewed companies want to use
intelligent computer-aided systems that support manual inspec-
tion activities through the use of data mining techniques. Fea-
ture analysis reveals that some features, such as whether a ship-
ment has been sent to a parcel shop, can help separate fraud-
ulent from legitimate orders better than others. The predictive
model yields promising results as it is able to correctly identify
approximately 86% of the 2% most suspicious transactions as
fraud. When the model is used to optimize the financial out-
come instead of pure classification quality, results suggest that
the company providing the dataset could achieve substantial
additional savings of up to 87% through introduction of ex-
pected utility as a ranking measure when being constrained
by limited inspection resources.
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It is of the highest importance in the art of detection to be able to
recognize, out of a number of facts, which are incidental and which
vital. Otherwise your energy and attention must be dissipated
instead of being concentrated.
— Sherlock Holmes in “The Reigate Puzzle”
by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle
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PA RT O N E
This part contains three chapters: In the introduc-
tion, the research problem is discussed and the struc-
ture of this thesis is explained. In the following chap-
ter, the literature review and the introduction of a
data mining framework form the theoretical founda-
tion of the thesis. In the third chapter, methodology
is discussed, covering the research paradigm, limita-
tions and delimitations of the research, and ethical
aspects. These chapters serve as the basis for the sub-
sequent qualitative and quantitative analyses.
1
O V E RV I E W O F T H E T H E S I S
1.1 introduction
When criminals commit a theft by ordering products online
without paying (called buyer fraud or just fraud in the fol-
lowing), the merchant is hurt financially. With the rise of on-
line shopping in Germany, which has grown by 11.3% from
2016 ($ 58.52 billion) to 2017 ($ 65.13 billion) and is predicted to
keep growing (eMarketer, 2017), criminals witness new oppor-
tunities to commit fraud. In 2016, the federal office of crimi-
nal investigation in Germany counted 183,529 cases of internet-
related crimes (Bundeskriminalamt, 2016), and 52,000 cases of
buyer fraud have been registered (Brendel, 2017). Projecting
published fraud rates of only approx. 1% to e-commerce sales
data (CyberSource, 2017; Quah and Sriganesh, 2008), the af-
fected sales volume amounts to $ 651 million in the German
market (eMarketer, 2017). The empirical transaction data used
in this thesis, however, indicate even higher fraud rates (be-
tween 1% and 19%, cf. Chapter 4). In addition, inventions like
parcel boxes are convenient but the accessibility and anonymity
these services provide open up new ways of committing fraud
(Brendel, 2017). Low profit margins amplify the financial dam-
age caused by fraudulent activities. The problem is not new
(Schmidt and Verbeet, 2004), and companies show increasing
concern for rising numbers of internet fraud (Gassmann, 2015).
These statistics are not complete, though, because they only
cover cases that were officially reported and companies some-
2
1.1 introduction 3
times hesitate to file claims because they do not want to risk
their customers’ loyalty if they mistakenly regard a legitimate
transaction as a fraud case (Anon, 2015a). Hence, internal data
retrieved from companies show higher fraud rates than official
statistics. Phua et al. (2010, p. 1) even state: “In a competitive
environment, fraud can become a business critical problem if
it is very prevalent and if the prevention procedures are not
fail-safe.”
Fraud is an important issue in many areas, and it can oc-
cur in various forms. In the Oxford Dictionary, it is defined as
the “crime of deceiving someone to gain money or personal ad-
vantage” (Waite, 2012, p. 286). Consequently, e-commerce mail
order fraud describes the practice of buying products online
without the intention to pay for them, often communicating
fake data to the online merchant. A detailed discussion of the
definition will be presented in Chapter 2.
In order to protect themselves against fraud, companies can
employ a variety of measures (CyberSource, 2017). In the liter-
ature, three terms, which summarize these activities, are men-
tioned: fraud detection (Torgo and Lopes, 2011), fraud preven-
tion (Hinneburg, 2006), and fraud management (CyberSource,
2017). Due to a lack of semantic standardization, the following
terminology is proposed: The sole purpose of fraud detection
is to find out which e-commerce transactions are fraud cases.
Fraud prevention aims at stopping delivery of such cases be-
fore financial damage occurs. Fraud management contains de-
tection and prevention activities but also addresses the business
problem. Decision makers must face a trade-off between maxi-
mizing the fraud detection rate and minimizing the amount of
incorrectly blocked transactions. In particular, when fraud pre-
vention is guided by economic principles, the damage caused
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by fraud cases should be minimized and sales revenue should
be maximized (cf. Chapter 8).
Some companies have established fraud prevention depart-
ments where employees identify and examine suspicious trans-
actions (cf. Chapter 4). However, large companies process thou-
sands of transactions per day and it would be economically
infeasible to inspect every transaction manually. Therefore,
computer-aided systems that analyze the high volume of trans-
actions in which potential fraud cases are buried can support
the fraud prevention work (Carneiro, Figueira, and Costa, 2017).
According to the fraud report published by CyberSource (2017),
which is part of the credit card company Visa, companies rely
on validation services, analysis of customer data — sometimes
they even share data with other retailers —, and device track-
ing techniques. The fraud report shows that simple techniques
such as verification of the credit card number (used by 88%
of the surveyed companies) or verification of addresses (82%)
are most popular. Even though most companies employ fraud
detection tools, automated scoring models that estimate the
fraud risk are used in only approximately one out of two com-
panies (CyberSource, 2017). Through the use of data mining
techniques, these systems compute fraud risk scores of trans-
actions automatically, searching for suspicious patterns (Phua
et al., 2010). In general, data mining deals with examining large
databases for generating new information (Stevenson, Pearsall,
and Hanks, 2010) and will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
Surprisingly, with regard to academia, the financial impact of
fraud in the B2C e-commerce mail order business is not appro-
priately reflected by the amount of research conducted in this
area regarding both qualitative and quantitative research. Phua
et al. (2010) mentioned a general lack of research with regard
to fraud detection in all industries seven years ago, and only
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two quantitative studies have focused on the e-commerce mail
order business in particular until now: Brabazon et al. (2010)
and Carneiro, Figueira, and Costa (2017) analyzed the use of
machine learning techniques for fraud detection but solely con-
sidered credit card fraud. As such, there is no existing quanti-
tative approach which is concerned with e-commerce transac-
tion data in general, regardless of the specific payment method.
Yet, this would be interesting because some companies heavily
rely on payment per invoice (cf. Chapter 4). In the last years,
data mining techniques have been used successfully in related
areas, for example in insurance fraud (Bermúdez et al., 2008).
The data mining methods used in such publications served as
inspiration for this thesis. However, it is important to under-
stand the conceptual differences between these related areas
and the e-commerce mail order business (Carneiro, Figueira,
and Costa, 2017). For example, which variables (also called fea-
tures in the following) can act as effective fraud risk indicators
depends on the context of application. Features used in auto-
mobile insurance fraud detection — such as whether a rental
vehicle was involved in an accident (Viaene, Dedene, and Der-
rig, 2005) — are not helpful at all. In contrast, areas closer to e-
commerce, such as credit card fraud, can be consulted; Chung
and Suh (2009) included the amount of purchases and the du-
ration of the customer relationship as variables in their analy-
sis; these variables exist in the e-commerce mail order business
as well. Nevertheless, it remains uncertain whether such fea-
tures turn out to be valuable with regard to the e-commerce
mail order business even if they do in other areas. In addition,
it is unclear in how far variables which are only available in
online retailing can be used for fraud detection, e.g. whether
a parcel shop is used as the shipment address; such variables
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have only partially been discussed by Hinneburg (2006) and
Carneiro, Figueira, and Costa (2017).
In order to contribute to closing the research gap, the central
research question is raised: How can automated data mining
support profit-oriented B2C e-commerce mail order companies
in dealing with fraud? The question is broken down into mul-
tiple parts: How is e-commerce mail order fraud prevention
currently conducted? What are indicators of fraud? In how far
can machine learning models be used to detect fraud cases?
How can and should manual and automated inspection work
together? How do economic interests shape fraud prevention?
How should the performance of fraud prevention techniques
be measured?
In order to answer the research questions, the thesis contains
both a small qualitative part and a larger quantitative part di-
vided into multiple steps. For the former, interviews with a
few fraud prevention experts have been conducted. The latter
is based on a dataset that contains e-commerce transactions
from one of the interviewed companies, which is also one of
Europe’s largest online retailers.
Other publications have only touched aspects of the research
problem: Hinneburg (2006) solely conducted interviews in or-
der to investigate fraud prevention in the e-commerce mail or-
der business twelve years ago; Carneiro, Figueira, and Costa
(2017) developed a fraud detection model for online retailing
but only considered credit card fraud. A holistic perspective
that covers understanding the fraud prevention process, ana-
lyzing the relevance of potential fraud risk indicators, building
a prediction model, and applying utility theory for profit max-
imization has not been taken yet. Therefore, after having fitted
in the missing parts, this thesis aims at combining the individ-
ual pieces of the puzzle into a single consistent research work
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in order to contribute to closing the research gap and to provide
a link between the existing but conceptually different publica-
tions.
In the next section, the structure of the thesis is described.
Extending the brief overview of the main components above,
motivation for each chapter is provided and the methods used
in the thesis are mentioned.
The thesis contains five components in order to address the
research question, which are presented in the list below. For
each component, a brief overview of results and contributions
is provided.
• The literature review explores the current state of research
regarding fraud detection in the e-commerce mail order
business. Although comparative studies about data min-
ing in fraud detection exist (Phua et al., 2010), the e-
commerce mail order business has not yet received suf-
ficient attention. The literature review provides a starting
point for researchers and practitioners interested in fraud
detection, prevention, and management (Chapter 2).
• The fraud prevention process in two of Europe’s largest
e-commerce mail order companies is investigated in or-
der to find out how manual inspection is accomplished
(Chapter 4). Results of the interviews show that such com-
panies find it difficult to face the large number of transac-
tions that by far exceeds their available manual inspection
capacity. The interviewed companies also use other strate-
gies for fraud prevention than mentioned in the literature,
such as requiring identification of the customer on deliv-
ery. In general, they are interested in using data mining
more strongly in order to support their fraud prevention
work.
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• Feature analysis (Chapter 6) aims at determining how use-
ful individual features are for fraud detection. Analysis of
information gain and a decision tree reveal that a handful
of features may serve as promising fraud risk predictors,
and combinations of feature values can represent specific
patterns associated with extraordinarily high fraud rates.
For example, amongst other insights, it is revealed that
the fraud risk is increased if there exists a considerable
distance between the invoice and the shipping address.
Such insights can allow companies to focus their inspec-
tion activities on the most important features, regardless
of whether they perform fraud prevention only manually
or with a computer-aided system.
• Based on the previous insights, a predictive fraud detec-
tion model is developed for which two methods are used
(Chapter 7): While the use of logistic regression is jus-
tified by its popularity regarding financial fraud detec-
tion (Ngai et al., 2011), tree-based models (such as gra-
dient boosted trees) deal well with data of mixed type
(Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman, 2013) such as found in
the transaction dataset. Results show that the prediction
model achieves satisfying performance and could be used
to support existing fraud prevention work.
• Following the request of Carneiro, Figueira, and Costa
(2017) to further research more appropriate evaluation
techniques and to develop cost-based models, a utility-
based model is proposed as an alternative to traditional
methods purely based on the number of detected cases,
which aim at maximization of detection rates (cf. Chap-
ter 8). Torgo and Lopes (2011) demonstrated the eco-
nomic superiority of utility-based fraud detection mod-
1.2 thesis structure 9
els with artificial and foreign trade data, and their ap-
proach is transferred to and modified for the e-commerce
mail order business for the first time. When working with
computer-aided systems and facing limited manual in-
spection resources, substantial savings can be achieved
by using a utility-based model for identifying suspicious
transactions.
1.2 thesis structure
The thesis consists of the following nine chapters: introduc-
tion, theoretical foundation, methodology, modeling fraud,
data preparation, feature analysis, prediction model, utility ap-
proach, and conclusions. In the following paragraphs, the con-
tents of these chapters are briefly described.
The theoretical foundation is presented in Chapter 2 and cov-
ers a range of aspects: First, approaches to fraud prevention in
the e-commerce mail order business and — due to the scarcity
of such publications — in related areas are discussed. Second,
a conceptual framework taken from existing research on finan-
cial fraud detection is introduced and developed further in or-
der to build a foundation for choosing the methods that are
used in this thesis. Third, research about a utility-based ap-
proach to fraud detection is introduced and transferred to the
e-commerce mail order business.
Chapter 3 focuses on methodology and contains four com-
ponents: a justification of logical positivism as the research
paradigm, a brief overview of methods, a discussion of the de-
limitations and limitations of the research design, and a discus-
sion of ethical aspects. In order to keep the method explana-
tions close to their actual application, methods are described in
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detail in their respective chapters and not in the methodology
chapter.
In Chapter 4, interviews with fraud prevention experts are
presented in order to answer essential questions about fraud,
including but not limited to the following questions: How are
fraudulent transactions identified? What actions are taken if
fraud is detected? How can fraud be distinguished from low
creditworthiness?
A quantitative analysis can only be as good as the data fed
into it. Thus, even though the thesis focuses on quantitative
research, the qualitative part is an essential component of the
research in order to understand how the transaction dataset
was generated and which restrictions it is subdued to.
Data preparation is an important part of data mining, which
is why the steps conducted to collect, select, and transform the
data are described in Chapter 5. It may be considered an ex-
tension of the methodology chapter: The dataset is introduced,
available features to identify fraud are described, and the data
transformation steps — including handling of missing values
and discretization of numeric features — are explained.
Feature analysis is conducted in Chapter 6 and aims at ex-
ploring to what extent the available features can help detect
fraud cases. Two methods are applied: information gain and a
decision tree. The former yields a value per variable, and the
latter assigns a fraud risk estimate to combinations of feature
values.
In Chapter 7, a prediction model is developed that can be
used to forecast the fraud risk of future transactions. The
quantitative dataset contains fraud reference labels (i.e. a flag
whether a transaction is fraudulent or legitimate) from which
the prediction model can learn. In this thesis, two techniques
are used: logistic regression and gradient boosted trees.
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For determining which transactions should be selected for in-
spection — more precisely: the order in which they should be
inspected until inspection resources are exhausted —, expected
utility is proposed as a ranking strategy in Chapter 8. This is
an alternative to simply maximizing the detection rate. The
estimated fraud probabilities, which are taken from the mod-
els built in the previous chapter, margins, and sales prices are
used to compute expected financial utility, which transactions
are sorted by. Then, the new, utility-based approach to ranking
transactions is compared to the existing approach that consid-
ers the estimated risk only.
2
T H E O R E T I C A L F O U N D AT I O N
2.1 introduction
In this chapter, the literature review is presented, which aims
at describing the current body of knowledge related to e-
commerce mail order fraud prevention, and a conceptual frame-
work is introduced that lays the theoretical foundation for the
following empirical parts of the thesis. This chapter is orga-
nized as follows: First, it is explained how literature was se-
lected and an overview of the literature relied upon is given.
Second, publications that focus on fraud prevention in similar
areas are presented and related to the research problem. Third,
the act of fraud prevention is expressed as a decision-theoretic
problem and data mining is proposed as an approach to the
research problem. Both a conceptual data mining framework
and methods most commonly used for fraud detection are pre-
sented. Fourth, utility theory is introduced in order to view
the research problem from an economic perspective. Finally,
the chapter closes with conclusions concerning the literature
review itself and the contents of the presented literature.
To start with, however, it is discussed how the term fraud is
defined and interpreted in this thesis. Ngai et al. (2011) point
out that no universally accepted definition for fraud exists. Ac-
cording to Hinneburg (2006), fraud occurs when criminal intent
and opportunity appear together. Most definitions contain the
element of intentional deception and financial damage: “In the
broadest sense, fraud can encompass any crime for gain that
12
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uses deception as a principal modus operandi” (Spann, 2014,
p. 1). In the Oxford Dictionary, fraud is defined as the “crime
of deceiving someone to gain money or personal advantage”
(Waite, 2012, p. 286). Coderre describes fraud as “a variety of
acts characterized by the intent to deceive or to obtain an un-
earned benefit” (Coderre, 2009, p. 3), and the German law states
that a fraudulent act must show certain characteristics includ-
ing intention, deception, and financial harm (Hinneburg, 2006).
For a transaction to be considered fraudulent, financial dam-
age is insufficient evidence because, if a customer faces an un-
foreseen financial bottleneck and is unable to clear his or her
debts, the problem rather originates from a low creditworthi-
ness than a criminal intention. These cases should not be tar-
geted. Therefore, financial damage alone does not imply fraud.
Thus, fraud is defined as the practice of buying products
online without the intention to pay for them, often communi-
cating fake data to the online merchant. Using this definition,
transactions can be analyzed for suspicious patterns that might
indicate such an intention.
2.2 literature selection
The context of the thesis can be described with the three pil-
lars mail order business, fraud management, and data mining,
shown in the Venn diagram in Figure 1. The reader is invited
not to view the model as an unquestionable truth but rather as
an illustration supporting an understanding for the position of
the research problem in the literature.
In order to identify the existing body of knowledge, re-
sources were searched online and offline. Regarding internet
searches, LibrarySearch and Google Scholar were used. Both
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Figure 1: Visualization of the thematic focus of the thesis, which is lo-
cated at the intersection of the three areas e-commerce mail
order business, fraud management, and data mining.
services allow to search multiple digital and physical databases
at once. Individual databases such as ScienceDirect, Emeraldin-
sight, and Springer Link were used. In addition, a set of jour-
nals related to e-commerce has been worked through directly,
among them Decision Support Systems, Electronic Commerce
Research, Expert Systems with Applications, the International
Journal of Electronic Commerce, the International Journal of
Electronic Business, the Journal of Electronic Commerce in Or-
ganizations, and the Journal of Electronic Commerce Research.
Regarding offline search, local libraries in Hamburg and in Ed-
inburgh were consulted.
Almost all searches contained at least one of the three terms
fraud detection, fraud prevention, and fraud management. At the
beginning, statistics about the e-commerce sector in Germany
were looked through; then, the search was narrowed down to
statistical data about fraud in the e-commerce mail order busi-
ness. Regarding the theoretical foundation, literature about de-
cision theory, utility theory, and risk management was searched
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for applications in fraud detection. It was investigated what
fraud risk indicators exist, both from a qualitative and a quan-
titative point of view. From the latter perspective, finding such
fraud risk indicators is accomplished as part of feature analysis
or feature selection in data mining. In terms of fraud classifi-
cation and prediction models, unsupervised, supervised, and
semi-supervised machine learning techniques were searched.
The conceptual differences between these approaches are ex-
plained in the data mining part of this chapter. Supervised ma-
chine learning is the most obvious choice in this thesis because
high quality fraud labels (i.e. fraudulent or legitimate) are avail-
able as part of the quantitative dataset, and supervised methods
use such labels for learning which transactions are fraudulent.
Approximately half of the resources considered in the thesis are
journal articles and conference proceedings, and the other half
mostly consists of specialized textbooks about data mining and
economics.
Research about e-commerce mail order fraud prevention is
still scarce. Therefore, the next sections move from the general
to the specific in order to derive the research gap from the cur-
rent body of knowledge.
2.3 fraud prevention in related areas
Phua et al. (2010) state that fraud detection in general has re-
ceived little attention. Ngai et al. (2011) explain that insurance
fraud has been most popular, but other fraudulent activities
deserve to be researched more deeply. However, the majority
of the academic papers considered in this thesis has been pub-
lished within the last ten years, indicating that the awareness of
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Figure 2: Overview of the areas for which publications about data
mining methods used for fraud prevention have been re-
trieved (number of publications).
the importance of fraud detection has risen — at least in related
areas.
Accompanying the rise of machine learning and big data in
various industries (McAfee and Brynjolfsson, 2012), there are
many publications that investigate the use of data mining for
fraud prevention. Some of these areas are close to the research
problem, such as dealing with credit card fraud, and others are
farther apart, such as detection of management fraud. These
related areas can serve as an orientation and inspiration for the
design of the thesis, and in this section, an overview of them
is presented. Later in this chapter, a data mining framework
with fraud detection in mind will be introduced, providing a
taxonomy for the approaches presented.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of publications which use
data mining techniques for fraud prevention across different ar-
eas. The overwhelming majority of papers focused on financial
fraud (i.e. credit card fraud, bank account fraud etc.), includ-
ing but not limited to Halvaiee and Akbari (2014), Hartmann-
Wendels, Mählmann, and Versen (2009), Jha, Guillén, and West-
land (2012), Krivko (2010), Mahmoudi and Duman (2015),
Sahin, Bulkan, and Duman (2013), Sánchez et al. (2009), Van
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Vlasselaer et al. (2015), and Yeh and Lien (2009). Another well
documented area is automobile insurance fraud (Bermúdez et
al., 2008; Brockett, Xia, and Derrig, 1998; Brockett et al., 2002;
Caudill, Ayuso, and Guillén, 2005; Viaene, Dedene, and Derrig,
2005; Viaene et al., 2002, 2007). Note that a couple of authors
contributed to multiple of such publications. Telecommunica-
tion fraud (Hilas, 2009; Hilas and Mastorocostas, 2008), health
care fraud (He et al., 1997; Li et al., 2008), and online auction
fraud (Chang and Chang, 2014; Dong, Shatz, and Xu, 2009;
Zhao et al., 2016) are each the focus of a couple of papers. Other
papers include management fraud (Fanning, Cogger, and Sri-
vastava, 1995), accounting fraud (Durtschi, Hillison, and Pacini,
2004), and ATM fraud (Li et al., 2012). Credit assessment was
the focus of four papers and could be of interest as well (Chen,
Ma, and Ma, 2009; Shi, Liu, and Ma, 2011), although not directly
a problem related to fraud, as low creditworthiness alone does
not suffice for a transaction to be considered a fraud case. In ad-
dition, some resources provide pragmatic advice: Mena (2003)
discusses data mining in the context of crime detection, Spann
(2014) introduces guidelines for fraud analytics, and Coderre
(2009) focuses on online payment security and fraud preven-
tion.
Applicability of such resources to the research problem is lim-
ited, however, because the contexts, i.e. features and processes,
are often too dissimilar from the e-commerce mail order busi-
ness. Carneiro, Figueira, and Costa (2017, p. 92) note that it is
difficult to transfer fraud detection strategies from other areas,
such as banking, to the e-commerce mail order business: “An
important difference to the banking sector is that a single online
retailer has very limited information about the customer it is do-
ing business with. Moreover, few authors have dealt with the
discussion of practical aspects such as which data to use.” Such
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resources have mostly been used to provide motivation for the
choice of supervised machine learning methods presented in
Chapter 7.
2.4 e-commerce fraud prevention
2.4.1 Overview of Literature
In the previous section, it has been concluded that fraud pre-
vention approaches from other areas cannot be transferred to
the e-commerce mail order business without restrictions. There-
fore, it is important to consider fraud prevention literature that
focuses on this particular area. Yet, it is found that such litera-
ture is much scarcer than fraud prevention literature in general.
Among the searched literature, only three studies focus
on fraud prevention in the e-commerce mail order business.
Carneiro, Figueira, and Costa (2017) investigated the use of
data mining for partial automation of e-commerce mail order
fraud prevention and refer to Brabazon et al. (2010) as the only
existing source prior to their own research. Hinneburg (2006)
undertook a qualitative study based on interviews to research
e-commerce mail order fraud prevention in Germany.
Each of these studies has its limitations, though. Hinneburg
(2006) researched fraud prevention from a rather descriptive
point of view and did not explore computer-aided systems. In
addition, her results were published more than ten years ago.
Hinneburg (2006) mentions that the share of orders made on-
line lies between 9 and 20 percent but the internet has become
the dominant sales channel: With regard to the company that
provided the dataset for the quantitative analyses, online sales
represent more than 90% of total revenue (Anon, 2015a). Nev-
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ertheless, Hinneburg (2006) provides insights about motivation
and demographic patterns of e-commerce fraudsters, which are
referred to in Chapter 6. Official statistics about e-commerce
mail order fraud are generally available (Bundeskriminalamt,
2016), but statistics about fraud prevention efforts are rare.
Carneiro, Figueira, and Costa (2017) research the use of mul-
tiple supervised machine learning techniques for fraud preven-
tion in the e-commerce mail order business but limit their re-
search to credit card fraud. More importantly, none of these
publications addresses economic utility.
Therefore, from a business perspective, the aforementioned
studies cover only parts of the problem. Companies usually
strive for profit maximization — besides other possible aims
such as sustainability. Understanding fraud (Hinneburg, 2006)
is the first step to successful fraud prevention, and automating
fraud detection (Brabazon et al., 2010; Carneiro, Figueira, and
Costa, 2017) helps deal with the high volume of transactions
large online retailers face every day. Yet, the total financial im-
pact of fraud matters more than the pure number of fraud cases.
Even fraud prevention departments usually measure their per-
formance with revenue-based numbers (cf. Chapter 4). There-
fore, fraud prevention should also be optimized with the fi-
nancial outcome in mind. Torgo and Lopes (2011) have demon-
strated the value of this perspective with artificial and foreign
trade data. It seems obvious to transfer this approach to the e-
commerce mail order business, but this has not been done so
far.
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2.4.2 Approaches to Fraud Prevention
Fraud prevention in the e-commerce mail order business is a
difficult task for a number of reasons: Hinneburg (2006) states
that detecting fraud poses a major challenge because only a
fraction of the transactions that lead to payment default are
actually fraud, and identifying the fraudulent transactions as
such requires a substantial effort, leading to a conflict between
effortless customer service and fraud prevention. The reason
is that the two interests collide when transactions of honest
customers are investigated and possibly stopped by mistake.
Therefore, companies strive for pragmatic solutions, and the
companies that have many years of experience in dealing with
fraud have an advantage over those that do not (Hinneburg,
2006). In addition, “[f]raud detection is a challenging problem
because fraudsters make their best efforts to make their behav-
ior look legitimate” (Carneiro, Figueira, and Costa, 2017, p. 91).
E-commerce businesses can try to reduce the impact of fraud
in a variety of ways — automated fraud detection systems are
one of them. For example, they can insure themselves against
fraud (Carneiro, Figueira, and Costa, 2017). Of course, this does
not prevent fraud from happening and only works when there
is little fraud because insurance fees would explode otherwise.
Another approach is to require safe payment methods such as
prepayment. Yet, since many honest customers appreciate or
even demand payment via invoice, such actions could deter
them from ordering as well (Anon, 2015a).
Among more sophisticated approaches are two-factor phone
authentication, address verification services, and payer authen-
tication (CyberSource, 2017). Yet, many of these methods heav-
ily increase friction, i.e. they make the e-commerce experience
less pleasurable for the customer. Companies therefore hesitate
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to implement such methods (CyberSource, 2017). In contrast,
fraud scoring models operate in the background, which makes
them less intrusive and therefore more attractive. In order to
determine whether the transaction is legitimate or fraudulent,
they focus on gathering and evaluating data about the cus-
tomer, the transaction, or technical information about the de-
vice from which the transaction has been issued, called device
fingerprinting (Boda et al., 2012).
Often, suspicious transactions are inspected manually. How-
ever, due to the high throughput of orders large e-commerce
companies face, it would be economically infeasible to inspect
all transactions manually. Hinneburg (2006) refers to the use of
data mining as a supporting element, but her research dates
back to 2006. Today, data mining is a growing area due to
the rapid advancement of technology (Witten, Frank, and Hall,
2011). Most transactions are processed without further action
and only a small share is inspected by hand; CyberSource
(2017) published an average review rate of 25% and even lower
rates for larger companies — such as the one that provided
the dataset used in this thesis. The smaller the fraction of man-
ually inspected transactions, the more important automation
through algorithms becomes. Algorithms can help detect fraud
cases and, as experts state that active fraud prevention compli-
cates the work of criminals, could also help deter criminals in
general (Anon, 2015a).
According to Torgo and Lopes (2011, p. 1517), “[f]raud de-
tection usually involves two main steps: [. . . ] decide which
cases to inspect, and [. . . ] the inspection activity itself”. The
first step is important because inspection resources are limited
and should be allocated in the best possible way. The strat-
egy of automated scoring and manual inspection of suspicious
cases is also presented by Carneiro, Figueira, and Costa (2017).
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However, only few studies about fraud detection systems are
actually implemented, and “none of them has considered the
combination of data mining and manual revision in the whole
system” (Carneiro, Figueira, and Costa, 2017, p. 92).
Of course, this is only one strategy how human experts and
automated systems can interact with each other. For example,
computer-aided analyses could as well support the manual in-
spection process itself instead of being prepended to it, or there
could be applications in which no manual inspection exists at
all and the process is fully automated. The fraud prevention
process will be investigated as part of the empirical work in
Chapter 4.
Also, fraud detection software can make mistakes which
might harm the customer relation, and customers might be
concerned about data privacy because algorithms can easily
scan large datasets. Thus, such algorithms should be well-
understood and monitored. In Germany, “[c]oncerns regarding
confidentiality and security of online payment are slowly di-
minishing as more and more people use this channel on a reg-
ular basis” (Euromonitor International, 2014, p. 63). This devel-
opment could lead to a broader acceptance of fraud prevention
if consumers were less concerned about the use of their data
for protection against crime. It could even be possible that fraud
prevention measures which are communicated to the customers
lead to an increase in customer trust and loyalty, as indicated
with regard to credit card fraud (Carneiro, Figueira, and Costa,
2017) and in the banking sector (Hoffmann and Birnbrich, 2012).
Although not concerned with fraud prevention in particular,
Ahrholdt (2011) found that consumer trust is positively influ-
enced by data privacy and security measures communicated by
mail order companies. The negative consequences of fraudulent
activities are more critical, though, and affect both companies
2.4 e-commerce fraud prevention 23
and customers, for example when accounts are stolen from hon-
est customers in order to commit a fraud or legitimate sales are
rejected as fraud by mistake. The trade-off faced in fraud pre-
vention has been described regarding credit card fraud: “Fraud
detection involves a fundamental trade-off. On the one hand,
the company has to minimize the level of fraud, maximizing
the detection of fraudulent transactions, thus avoiding charge-
backs. On the other hand, it must provide high payment accep-
tance rates in order to convert as many sales as possible and
minimize the number of customer insults (i.e. the number of le-
gitimate transactions refused)” (Carneiro, Figueira, and Costa,
2017, p. 92).
In general, McAfee and Brynjolfsson (2012) emphasize that
data-driven analyses allow to make better decisions and should
override or at least support gut feelings and intuition. Fraud of-
ficers face the same conflict when their own knowledge contra-
dicts predictions based on data mining (as pointed out in Chap-
ter 4). Acknowledging this issue is one of the reasons why the
empirical part of this thesis contains both qualitative and quan-
titative analyses.
2.4.3 Implications for the Research Problem
The research problem has been developed through the follow-
ing line of argument so far: Having pointed out the finan-
cial impact of fraud in the e-commerce mail order business
in Chapter 1, it has been shown in this chapter that numer-
ous research articles have been published with regard to fraud
prevention in related areas. However, it has been argued that
such resources cannot be applied to the e-commerce mail order
business without limitations and are therefore of limited use.
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Only three studies were found which focus on fraud preven-
tion in the e-commerce mail order business, and only two of
them follow quantitative approaches in order to provide prag-
matic solutions to the problem. None of these publications ad-
dress that automated fraud prevention using data mining could
and should be guided by economic principles. Alternative ap-
proaches to fraud prevention have been discussed, but using
data mining for supporting manual fraud detection is consid-
ered the most appropriate one, which is not intrusive and still
offers a pleasurable e-commerce experience to the customer.
Therefore, in the next three sections, important concepts are
going to be presented that will be referred to throughout the
thesis: Decision theory provides a conceptual model for ex-
pressing the fraud prevention problem in a formal way; a data
mining framework is going to be introduced in order to pro-
vide an overview of methods and concepts that could be used
for fraud prevention; lastly, it will be explained how economic
goals can shape fraud prevention.
2.5 decision-theoretic representation
In the e-commerce mail order business, fraud prevention de-
partments of large companies process thousands of transactions
every day. For every transaction, it has to be decided whether
the transaction should be accepted or rejected (other possible
actions are going to be investigated in the qualitative part of
this thesis) and, in order to make this decision, the transac-
tion has to be analyzed either automatically, manually, or both.
This thesis aims at both finding out how fraud prevention is
accomplished at the companies which provided the transaction
data and, assuming a rational decision maker, deriving how it
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should be accomplished. Both aspects can be related to decision
theory. The former aspect relates to descriptive decision theory,
and the latter relates to normative decision theory. “Descrip-
tive decision theories seek to explain and predict how people
actually make decisions. [. . . ] Normative theories seek to yield
prescriptions about what decision makers are rationally required
— or ought — to do” (Peterson, 2009, p. 3).
Decisions are “rational if and only if the decision maker
chooses to do what she has most reason to do at the point
in time at which the decision is made” (Peterson, 2009, p. 5).
The assumption of rational behavior seems reasonable in the
context of fraud management as a business problem, and it
supports the objectivist approach to the research problem.
The presence of uncertainty is an essential part of the fraud
prevention problem. Obviously, if there were no ambiguity
about the truth, companies would stop all fraudulent transac-
tions and limit their services to honest customers. Yet, criminals
rely on deception, and thus companies have to make decisions
with incomplete or erroneous data. Peterson (2009) defines two
categories for decisions under uncertainty: decisions under risk
and decisions under ignorance. For the former, the probabilities
of the possible outcomes are known. For the latter, probabilities
are not known.
The fraud prevention problem can be decomposed into two
steps: estimating the probability that a transaction is fraud (or
generally guessing its label, i.e. classifying the transaction) and
deciding how to deal with the transaction based on the esti-
mate, facing a problem under uncertainty. The first problem is
a data mining problem, while the second is a decision problem.
Decision problems can be described using three components:
states, acts, and outcomes (Peterson, 2009). In fraud prevention,
there are two states: fraudulent and legitimate. This essential
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reject accept
fraudulent correctly reject accept by mistake
legitimate reject by mistake correctly accept
Table 1: Decision matrix for fraud prevention.
information is unknown, and thus the decision maker has to
guess the state. In a simple model, the two possible acts are ac-
cept or reject, based on the guess. Then, considering all possible
combinations of states and acts leads to one out of four out-
comes. This is shown in Table 1 (columns are acts and rows are
states). In an optimal scenario, all fraud cases are rejected, all
legitimate transactions are accepted, and no mistakes are made.
Of course, this is difficult to achieve. The simple model is used
by Torgo and Lopes (2011), while Carneiro, Figueira, and Costa
(2017) introduce calling the customer as an additional action
in order to verify the fraud status of transactions the status of
which is unknown.
This simple decision-theoretic model shall serve as a foun-
dation throughout the thesis. It will be discussed in Chapter 4
based on the interviews. The concepts of utility and expected
value, which will be introduced in Chapter 8, build upon the
model. First, however, a conceptual framework about data min-
ing for fraud detection is presented.
2.6 data mining framework
2.6.1 Introduction
In this section, a conceptual framework is presented according
to which the methods used in this thesis are categorized. First,
however, the term data mining requires a closer inspection. The
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distinction between data mining, statistics, and machine learn-
ing will be discussed in Chapter 7.
In data mining, the data is stored electronically and the
search is automated — or at least augmented — by com-
puter. Even this is not particularly new. [...] What is new
is the staggering increase in opportunities for finding pat-
terns in data. The unbridled growth of databases in recent
years, databases for such everyday activities as customer
choices, brings data mining to the forefront of new busi-
ness technologies (Witten, Frank, and Hall, 2011, p. 4).
Ngai et al. (2011) present a classification framework for data
mining methods in fraud detection, and they define two di-
mensions, application classes and data mining methods. Appli-
cations classes describe conceptual categories for solving data
mining problems; data mining methods represent approaches
to solving such problems. The following two sections present
the two categories and corresponding literature. Other studies
that provide an overview of fraud detection literature study are
presented by Bhattacharyya et al. (2011) and Phua et al. (2010).
2.6.2 Application Classes
According to Ngai et al. (2011), application classes are clas-
sification, regression, prediction, clustering, outlier detection,
and visualization. Although they are presented as alternatives,
these classes are not generally interchangeable. For example, if
a problem requires classification or prediction, choosing one of
the two classes is almost always sufficient. In contrast, visual-
ization can enhance an analysis and help understand results.
In this section, the application classes are explained briefly, and
they are referred to e-commerce mail order fraud literature.
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The term classification refers to assigning a variable a nomi-
nal value (Ngai et al., 2011). In fraud detection, the two classes
are usually fraudulent and legitimate. In the majority of the pub-
lications regarding both the literature of this thesis and the re-
search of Ngai et al. (2011), classification is the primary goal
and has been used in a number of studies (Brockett et al.,
2002; Fanning, Cogger, and Srivastava, 1995; Humpherys et al.,
2011; Phua, Alahakoon, and Lee, 2004; Sahin and Duman, 2011;
Sahin, Bulkan, and Duman, 2013). However, instead of only
guessing whether a transaction is fraudulent or not, sometimes
the fraud risk, i.e. a probability estimate, is preferred in order
to calculate risk-based measures (Yeh and Lien, 2009), such as
shown in Chapter 8 when expected value is computed for rank-
ing transactions according to an estimated utility value.
The aim of regression is to “determine the relationship be-
tween two (or more) variables so that we can gain information
about one of them through knowing values of the other(s)” (De-
vore and Berk, 2012, p. 613). Regression, in contrast to classifi-
cation, relies on continuous inputs and outputs. Logistic regres-
sion is one of the most popular data mining methods and will
be explained and referenced in the next subsection. In Chap-
ter 7, logistic regression and gradient boosted trees are trained
to estimate fraud probabilities of transactions using historical
data. Their performance is tested with historical data as well
but their purpose is to predict the fraud status of future trans-
actions. Since their output is continuous-valued, both methods
are used in the sense of regression. However, tree-based mod-
els can be used for both regression (Torgo and Lopes, 2011)
and classification (Sahin and Duman, 2011). Zhou and Kapoor
(2011) review classification and regression approaches used for
detecting financial statement fraud.
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Regarding prediction, the values of continuous variables are
estimated based on past experience. From a conceptual perspec-
tive, prediction resembles regression except that prediction is
based on a temporal relation while regression is often based
on a causal one. In this research and in contrast to Ngai et al.
(2011), the term prediction shall not be limited to forecasting
continuous-valued attributes. Thus, a classifier may be used to
predict (categorical) future values. This is merely a semantic
preference, which has no technical implications.
Clustering differs from the above terms as it “is used to parti-
tion objects into previously unknown conceptually meaningful
groups” (Ngai et al., 2011, p. 562). In contrast to classification
and regression, unlabeled data are used for the process. Groups
(or classes) are defined within the clustering process, and each
data point is assigned to one of the groups. Clustering does not
allow to detect fraud directly; instead, it aims at exploring data
and detecting new relationships. Even if the fraud status were
already known, clustering could yield additional insights about
patterns in the data. Combining such unsupervised techniques
with supervised approaches leads to semi-supervised machine
learning (Chapelle, Schölkopf, and Zien, 2010). Clustering is
used in Chang and Chang (2014) and Hilas and Mastorocostas
(2008).
Similar to clustering, outlier detection does not utilize data
about group membership. Instead, it identifies values that are
different from most of the data. In contrast to clustering, which
separates data into groups, regarding outlier detection, it is
rather assumed that there are two types of behavior, normal
and anomalous. For example, Aggarwal (2013, p. 2) refers to
the use of outlier detection in detecting credit card fraud, where
“unauthorized use may show different patterns, such as a buy-
ing spree from geographically obscure locations. Such patterns
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can be used to detect outliers in credit card data” (Aggarwal,
2013, p. 2). Ngai et al. (2011) state that outlier detection repre-
sents only 2.0% of the articles and conclude that this powerful
method should be used more often. In e-commerce mail order
fraud detection, most variables are categorical (see variable de-
scriptions in Chapter 6). Outlier detection methods are natively
designed for numeric attributes as they often rely on distance
measures, but they can be adjusted to work with categorical
data, even though a couple of challenges are faced; for example,
dummy coding becomes infeasible when the attribute holds too
many different unique values (Aggarwal, 2013). Outlier detec-
tion is performed by Torgo and Lopes (2011).
Finally, Ngai et al. (2011) introduce visualization as a term
for presenting data in a comprehensible way. A slightly more
demanding definition could include that visualization in data
mining aims at generating value through presentation. Edward
Tufte is an American statistician who pioneered the field of data
visualization, and his work, The Visual Display of Quantitative
Information, has influenced the design of this thesis in order to
create meaningful data visualizations (Tufte, 2001).
Chapter 7 describes the use of two prediction methods for
estimating the fraud risk as a probability value. Prediction is
preferred to classification due to two reasons: First, the esti-
mated fraud risk is used to derive a list for manual inspection
that shows the most suspicious cases at the top of the list. Sec-
ond, the estimated fraud probability will be used to compute
expected value in Chapter 8. Probability estimates can not only
be achieved through prediction methods, though; Torgo and
Lopes (2011) computed similar scores through outlier rankings.
However, prediction methods use the fraud labels of historical
data in order to distinguish between fraudulent and legitimate
transactions, which outlier detection methods do not.
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Figure 3: Overview of the most popular methods for fraud detection
(number of publications).
2.6.3 Data Mining Methods
In this subsection, the most popular methods in financial
fraud detection are described. Figure 3 shows how often these
methods were used in the literature. In the next paragraphs,
Bayesian methods, neural networks, regression, and tree-based
models are introduced briefly.
“Bayesian reasoning provides a probabilistic approach to in-
ference. It is based on the assumption that the quantities of
interest are governed by probability distributions and that op-
timal decisions can be made by reasoning about these proba-
bilities together with observed data” (Mitchell, 1997, p. 154).
While Bayesian belief networks and naïve Bayes are two dif-
ferent methods (Sharma and Panigrahi, 2012), both share the
concept mentioned above. However, as Mitchell (1997) points
out, naïve Bayes requires a fundamental assumption of condi-
tional independence of the input variables, which is loosened in
Bayesian belief networks. Bayesian models are used for credit
scoring (Antonakis and Sfakianakis, 2009), automobile insur-
ance (Bermúdez et al., 2008; Viaene, Dedene, and Derrig, 2005),
and ATM fraud (Li et al., 2012). With Bayesian networks, it is
possible to model complex relationships between variables, and
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it is possible to obtain estimates for the states of all the nodes
in the network. In fraud prevention however, one is only inter-
ested in the fraud risk. Therefore, because Bayesian networks
address more complex problems from the perspective of causal
inference, they are not used in this thesis. Naïve Bayes, in con-
trast, seems to have no essential benefit over logistic regression,
and thus it is also not employed in this thesis.
Artificial neural networks mimic the human brain. A network
consists of interconnected units that each take a real-valued in-
put and produce a real-valued output (Mitchell, 1997). Ngai
et al. (2011, p. 563) state that “[neural networks] are adaptive;
second, [they] can generate robust models; and third, the clas-
sification process can be modified if new training weights are
set. Neural networks are chiefly applied to credit card, automo-
bile insurance[,] and corporate fraud.” Neural networks come
up in Antonakis and Sfakianakis (2009), Bose and Mahapatra
(2001), Burge and Shawe-Taylor (2001), Fanning, Cogger, and
Srivastava (1995), He et al. (1997), Lei and Ghorbani (2012), Rav-
isankar et al. (2011), and Serrano et al. (2012). Unfortunately,
neural networks are difficult to interpret (Mitchell, 1997). How-
ever, when a transaction is considered fraudulent in particu-
lar, it is important to understand what led to that assessment.
Because neural networks cannot provide such an explanation,
they are not employed in this thesis.
Within the area of regression, various models exist, such as
linear and logistic regression (Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman,
2013). Logistic regression relies on a linear model as well, but
nonlinear models exist that are far more complex (Backhaus
et al., 2011). Both regarding the literature collection of this the-
sis (Antonakis and Sfakianakis, 2009; Artís, Ayuso, and Guil-
lén, 2002; Bell and Carcello, 2000; Bhattacharyya et al., 2011;
Ravisankar et al., 2011) and the systematic review by Ngai
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et al. (2011), logistic models are among the data mining tech-
niques employed most often. Logistic regression is one of the
techniques presented in Chapter 7 because it allows to reduce
method-induced bias when comparing results with those of
other studies.
A variety of tree-based models exists, the simplest of which
are decision trees. “Decision tree learning is a method for
approximating discrete-valued target functions, in which the
learned function is represented by a decision tree. [Learned
trees] have been successfully applied to a broad range of tasks
from learning to diagnose medical cases to learning to assess
credit risk of loan applicants” (Mitchell, 1997, p. 52). Trees are
composed of if-then rules, increasing the method’s compre-
hensibility. Decision trees rank fourth in the review of finan-
cial fraud detection methods (Ngai et al., 2011) and appear in
various studies (Antonakis and Sfakianakis, 2009; Chang and
Chang, 2012; Sahin and Duman, 2011; Sahin, Bulkan, and Du-
man, 2013; Viaene, Dedene, and Derrig, 2005). Gradient boosted
trees, which depict the second technique described in Chap-
ter 7, are ensembles of decision trees and can overcome some
of the drawbacks that individual trees have. They can handle
data of mixed types well, have high predictive power, and are
robust to outliers (Pedregosa et al., 2011). Random forests, a
similar method, have been used for fraud detection in the e-
commerce mail order business (Carneiro, Figueira, and Costa,
2017) and for credit assessment (Shi, Liu, and Ma, 2011). De-
pending on the metrics used for evaluation, gradient boosted
trees and random forests were shown to achieve results of sim-
ilar quality (Caruana and Niculescu-Mizil, 2005).
The list of data mining methods is not exhaustive. Ngai et al.
(2011) described only the most frequently used techniques in
their framework; other techniques include support vector ma-
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chines (Bhattacharyya et al., 2011; Chen, Ma, and Ma, 2009), ex-
pert systems (Hilas, 2009; Leonard, 1995), and association rule
mining (Li et al., 2012; Tackett, 2013). In Chapter 7, a fraud
detection model will be built using logistic regression and gra-
dient boosted trees. At that point, these two methods will be
explained in detail, including motivation for choosing them.
2.6.4 Degree of Supervision
The following aspects extend the classification framework intro-
duced by Ngai et al. (2011), distinguishing between supervised,
semi-supervised, and unsupervised learning.
First, supervised learning algorithms are fed historical data
that contain a reference label (also called just labels in the fol-
lowing) such as whether a transaction is fraudulent or legiti-
mate, i.e. a ground truth. Then, the algorithm learns to infer
the fraud status of new cases from the patterns extracted from
the historical data by awarding correct predictions and punish-
ing mistakes. “Supervised methods have dominated the fraud
detection literature” (Carneiro, Figueira, and Costa, 2017, p. 93).
However, the authors add:
Often we do not know which class an observation belongs
to. For example, take the case of an online order whose
payment was rejected. One will never know whether this
was a legitimate order or whether it had been correctly
rejected. Such occurrences favor the use of unsupervised
methods, which do not require data to be labeled [i.e. to
contain a ground truth]. These methods look for extreme
data occurrences or outliers. In order to get the best of
two worlds, some solutions combine supervised and unsu-
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pervised techniques (Carneiro, Figueira, and Costa, 2017,
p. 93).
Such a combination of both approaches is semi-supervised
learning, which can be appropriate when both techniques
would not lead to the best results individually (Chapelle,
Schölkopf, and Zien, 2010).
In this thesis, supervised machine learning is employed be-
cause reference labels of high quality are available. Including
unsupervised methods through a semi-supervised approach
could provide additional value to the analyses but is beyond
the scope of this thesis since unsupervised methods form their
own research area.
The above framework has been introduced in order to offer
an overview of data mining and how it is used in fraud detec-
tion. As pointed out earlier, fraud detection is only one compo-
nent of fraud management. Therefore, an economic perspective
on fraud prevention is proposed in the next section.
2.7 economic perspective
In almost all literature about data mining for fraud detection —
including Carneiro, Figueira, and Costa (2017) —, performance
of fraud detection models is measured with metrics based on
the number of correct and incorrect classification (traditional
evaluation metrics are presented in Chapter 7 and in the ap-
pendix). Antonakis and Sfakianakis (2009), who are concerned
with credit risk estimation, refer to the percentage of correctly clas-
sified cases, which is the accuracy (Witten, Frank, and Hall, 2011).
This is the amount of true negative (correctly labeled legitimate)
and true positive (correctly labeled fraudulent) cases divided
by the total number of transactions. In addition, Antonakis and
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Sfakianakis (2009) introduce the bad rate among accepts, which is
the ratio of undetected fraud cases in relation to accepted cases.
Some sources use a different name for the same metric, false neg-
ative rate (Aral et al., 2012). Others focus on the detection rate,
i.e. the share of fraud that is identified as such (Wheeler and
Aitken, 2000; Wong et al., 2012). Bell and Carcello (2000) refer
to a confusion matrix (similar to Table 1). In fact, all of these
metrics can be constructed by calculating ratios of parts of the
confusion matrix. Viaene, Derrig, and Dedene (2004) show that
various other metrics exist for evaluation.
Yet, strictly speaking, companies run fraud prevention de-
partments to reduce financial damage, which they achieve
through detecting and stopping fraudulent transactions. There-
fore, it might make sense to develop algorithms that try to
maximize the financial impact of fraud prevention activities in-
stead of the detection rate. An example shows the difference
between the two approaches: It is financially more attractive to
find one fraud case in which an expensive smartphone was or-
dered than to find five fraudulent transactions through which
pairs of socks were stolen. In general, the higher the value of
a transaction is, the more important it is to investigate prop-
erly because both an undetected fraud case and a missed sales
opportunity (i.e. rejecting a legitimate transaction by mistake)
lead to a reduction of profit.
In data mining, the utility-based perspective is not new
(Chawla and Li, 2006; Friedman and Sandow, 2011; Yao, Hamil-
ton, and Geng, 2006), and the idea of expected utility has been
used for automobile fraud detection (Artís, Ayuso, and Guillén,
1999), for credit card assessment (Chung and Suh, 2009), and
for fraud detection in general (Torgo and Lopes, 2011). How-
ever, according to the present knowledge, no literature exists
regarding its application to fraud prevention in the e-commerce
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mail order business. This is surprising because the cost of fraud
and the benefit of legitimate sales are clearly imbalanced. The fi-
nancial damage caused by a fraud case is much higher than the
benefit of a successful sale because profit margins are usually
below 50% (U.S. Census Bureau, 2014).
Generally, expected value is the sum of all possible outcomes
of an experiment weighted by their probabilities (Fahrmeir et
al., 2007). If a decision problem can be repeated arbitrarily, ex-
pected value indicates how favorable a decision is in the long
term. When expected value refers to estimating utility values,
it is called expected utility. Regarding fraud detection as a busi-
ness problem, it makes sense to assume that utility resembles a
financial measure.
In their research, Torgo and Lopes (2011) deal with artificial
data and with foreign trade data. The authors propose that,
when inspection resources for fraud detection are limited —
an appropriate assumption regarding the e-commerce mail or-
der business as well —, a utility-based perspective is financially
more attractive than a traditional approach. In order to prove
their point, Torgo and Lopes (2011) compare the achieved util-
ity of two models with each other. The first is based only on the
outlier ranking, and the second uses a combination of the out-
lier score as a probability and the expected cost and benefit of
the fraud prediction activity. The authors show that the utility-
based approach is superior to the traditional strategy. In partic-
ular, Torgo and Lopes (2011) demonstrate that, when inspection
resources are limited, expected utility can lead to much better
results than using traditional approaches. Chapter 8 focuses on
building upon the ideas of Torgo and Lopes (2011) and trans-
ferring them to the e-commerce mail order business.
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2.8 conclusion
At the beginning of the chapter, fraud and related terms were
defined in order to agree on basic vocabulary: Fraud has been
defined as the practice of buying products online without the
intention to pay for them, often communicating fake data to the
online merchant.
Then, the strategy used for literature selection was explained.
Literature has been collected about the e-commerce mail order
business, about fraud detection (or detection and prevention, re-
spectively), and about data mining techniques. Literature con-
sidered most important covers each of these aspects, i.e. data
mining techniques for fraud management in the e-commerce
mail order business.
In the following, publications that focus on fraud detection in
similar areas were presented and related to the research prob-
lem. Even though the interest in fraud detection in general has
increased, other areas like insurance fraud are conceptually dif-
ferent from online retailing and therefore insights cannot easily
be transferred to the e-commerce mail order business. In addi-
tion, although the financial damage caused by fraud is substan-
tial, few scientific publications deal with the e-commerce mail
order business in particular, and they only cover parts of the
problem. In particular, it has been shown that an economic per-
spective on e-commerce mail order fraud prevention has not
been taken yet.
Furthermore, approaches to fraud prevention were intro-
duced. Companies protect themselves by employing fraud pre-
vention techniques such as manual inspection and computer-
aided systems — because the high volume of e-commerce trans-
actions often makes it impossible to inspect every transaction
manually. The question was raised which techniques are ap-
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propriate for the e-commerce mail order business, also given
how manual inspection and automated processing typically in-
teract. It was shown that decision theory was consulted in or-
der to express the decision problem in a structured way. Then,
a conceptual data mining framework was presented, consisting
of data mining application classes and data mining methods.
Both were used to guide the reader through the data mining
concepts used to deal with fraud.
Finally, fraud prevention was described as a utility maximiza-
tion problem. The value of such a perspective has been shown
in related areas, encouraging to apply utility theory to fraud
prevention in the e-commerce mail order business as well.
Altogether in this chapter, it has been shown that the research
question focuses on a scientific gap, and the thesis aims at ad-
dressing that gap from multiple points of view. In the next chap-
ter, methodology will be discussed, including research philoso-
phy, limitations, and ethical considerations.
3
M E T H O D O L O G Y
3.1 introduction
In this chapter, the methodology on which the thesis resides
is presented. “A methodology is an approach to the process
of the research, encompassing a body of methods.” In contrast,
“[a] method is a technique for collecting and/or analysing data”
(Collis and Hussey, 2014, p. 59). In other words, the methodol-
ogy sets the frame for which an appropriate set of methods has
to be chosen. Note that, although the methods used in this the-
sis have already been mentioned in the previous chapters, they
were derived from the methodology.
This chapter is composed of the following parts: First, the re-
search philosophy is explained, followed by a brief excursion
about a philosophical perspective on probability. Second, impli-
cations for the research approach are discussed. Third, delim-
itations and limitations of the research are introduced. Finally,
ethical limitations are addressed.
The choice of methods is not discussed in this chapter, which
may be unusual. Because mixed methods are applied in the
thesis — including quantitative and qualitative research —,
it seemed more appropriate to present the methods close to
where they are used. Therefore, interviewing theory is found
in Chapter 4, a discussion of data preparation is discussed in
Chapter 5, theory about feature analysis is presented in Chap-
ter 6, machine learning theory is approached in Chapter 7,
and theory about utility-based decision making is discussed
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in Chapter 8. This way, the empirical chapters can be read as
rather self-contained units, and theory is presented in their re-
spective chapters, which might offer a more pleasant reading
experience.
3.2 philosophy
3.2.1 Philosophical Stance
The point of this section is to show that the choice of methods
is justified given the author’s philosophical stance. Therefore,
first, the chosen epistemology is presented, and second, the on-
tology is derived from it. Then, the chosen philosophy is com-
pared with other, similar concepts.
In this thesis, logical positivism is chosen as an epistemol-
ogy and objectivism is chosen as the ontology (Reichenbach,
2013). In the following evaluation it is assumed that the choice
of a research philosophy is rooted in one’s personal view of
what shapes our conception of the world. Researchers might
try to keep an objective distance to their research, but they are
never truly objective because their personal philosophical as-
sumptions, their perception of the world, and their values in-
fluence the way they approach it.
Two questions mark the starting point: Is there a real world
that exists independently of one’s perception of it (ontology)
and how is knowledge gained (epistemology)? It may seem that
the former question should precede the latter, but in this elabo-
ration, epistemology is discussed first, and the chosen ontology
will become the obvious conclusion of the logical assumptions
associated with the epistemological point of view.
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To answer any question, we must think. Dewey (2013, p. 6)
defines reflective thought as the “[a]ctive, persistent, and care-
ful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge
in the light of the grounds that support it, and the further con-
clusions to which it tends.” But what supports a belief?
Dewey (2013) declares “past experience” and “prior knowl-
edge” as the “sources of suggestion”. In addition, “the scien-
tific genius has never felt bound to the narrow steps and pre-
scribed courses of logical reasoning” (Reichenbach, 2013, p. 5).
Accordingly, Benton and Craib (2011) emphasize that mathe-
matical and logical arguments do not provide new knowledge
since they are true by definition. “They are statements in which
we make explicit the implications of the way we define certain
words, or mathematical operations” (Benton and Craib, 2011,
p. 4). Logic cannot create new knowledge but only reshape it by
deriving consequences from prior assumptions (Dewey, 2013,
p. 12). Other sources of knowledge become necessary, such as
experience.
But can past experience be trusted? From a philosophical
perspective, it possibly cannot. Pyrrho, an ancient philosopher,
was one of the first skeptics who kept challenging the conse-
quences of even the most basic of his actions (Warburton, 2011).
Although Pyrrho’s level of skepticism may not have been sen-
sible, and even though Kant developed arguments that suggest
an innate understanding beyond empiricism (Benton and Craib,
2011), the question whether a world independent of one’s con-
ception exists still remains unresolved.
Reichenbach (2013) suggests to logically build our perspec-
tive on the world from the ground up by accepting certain pos-
tulates. As a logical positivist, he proposes that nothing is cer-
tain but that there are different degrees of probability regarding
the truth. He concludes that, given an internally consistent set
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of assumptions, a real world seems more probable than a sub-
jective world.
Therefore, an objectivist ontology is derived from logical pos-
itivism. The line of argument and the associated assumptions
are explained and supported with examples in Reichenbach
(2013). A remarkable feature of logical positivism is that the
latter is not a necessary consequence of the former, because
the ontological implications depend on the logical assumptions
made. Thus, logical positivism could — given a different set of
assumptions — as well lead to a subjectivist ontology. However,
Popper (1997, p. 210) strongly criticizes subjective approaches
to science due to their unconfined applicability (translated by the
author). The importance of an objectivist ontology will be ex-
plained later in this chapter.
3.2.2 Comparison of Philosophies
The philosophical stance described above shares important
ideas with postpositivism and critical realism (Benton and
Craib, 2011; Collier, 1994; Phillips and Burbules, 2000). Besides
logical positivism, postpositivism as well addresses issues con-
nected with positivism. While logical positivism uses pure logic
to explain the limits of reasoning, postpositivism takes a more
practical stance and lists the common pitfalls and problems
with positivism, allowing the researcher to consider them in his
or her research. Phillips and Burbules (2000) state that, regard-
ing his reasoning, Hans Reichenbach — whose understanding
of logical positivism forms the basis of this chapter — moves
from logical positivism to non-foundationalist postpositivism.
Regarding the methodical consequences, besides postposi-
tivism, critical realism resembles logical positivism as well. Col-
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lier (1994) states that everybody is devoted to some kind of
“realism”. He or she may be “realistic” about sensations, a real
world, or other things. According to Collier (1994), propositions
of stronger critical realism are objectivity, fallibility, transphe-
nomenality, and counter-phenomenality, which are all concepts
that logical positivism can generally support. In essence, reality
is not directly accessible, or even if it is, one cannot observe it
directly. Therefore, conclusions drawn from observations might
be wrong; they might be the consequences of invisible forces,
or they might even contradict the rules that have been derived
from other observations.
From a practical point of view — and regarding the conse-
quences for this thesis — both critical realism and postposi-
tivism could have been appropriate alternatives. Logical posi-
tivism is preferred to them because it provides an elegant ap-
proach to research philosophy. With logical positivism, any in-
ternally coherent set of assumptions can be chosen as a basis
for deriving epistemological and ontological implications.
3.3 concept of probability
Probability is an essential component of the models developed
in this thesis. Hence, a few thoughts should be given to what it
really means. Neapolitan (2004, p. 17) presents two approaches
to probability, the relative frequency approach and the subjective
probability approach. The relative frequency approach states that
if a random experiment is conducted a number of times, and
that number approaches infinity, then the fraction of trials in
which a certain outcome occurs will approach the probability of
the outcome to occur. Thus, “if we tossed [a] thumbtack 10,000
times and it landed heads 3373 times, we would estimate the
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probability of heads to be about [33.73%]” (Neapolitan, 2004,
p. 18). The author points out that the probability of such an
event is a physical property of the object.
In contrast to the relative frequency approach, subjective
probabilities are based on beliefs. Neapolitan (2004, p. 18) men-
tions that, for example, a sequence of numbers can appear
more or less random, such as 101110110 and 1010101010. In this
case, intuition can contradict pure combinatorial mathematics.
In fraud detection, this aspect could be important when hu-
mans decide what looks suspicious. For a frequentist, it would
not be possible to include such personal beliefs in a calculation.
Neapolitan (2004) states that relative frequencies are an ideal-
ization, and even a coin’s physical composition changes when
it is tossed. Therefore, he points out, an interpretation of prob-
abilities as physical properties can be difficult.
In conclusion, Neapolitan (2004) uses relative frequencies as
if they were objective, but he acknowledges their subjective
component. In this thesis, the same point of view on probabili-
ties is taken. Chapter 7 shows how machine learning algorithms
are trained to estimate fraud probabilities using historical data.
It is important to acknowledge that even a quantitative analysis
purely based on data — avoiding subjectivity through personal
experience about the topic in question — produces probability
estimates that are still based on the choices made by the per-
sons who conducted the analysis.
3.4 research implications
In fraud management, it is assumed that an objective truth ex-
ists, i.e. that a transaction is either legitimate or fraudulent, but
that this objective truth is unknown to the observer. Evidence
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can be utilized to estimate the fraud risk of a transaction. For a
thesis that aims at providing recommendations on how to con-
duct fraud prevention in the e-commerce mail order business
— partially through automation —, the existence of an objec-
tive truth, and thus an objectivist ontology, is essential. This
might favor the positivist paradigm, but it does not restrict the
research to the use of quantitative methods as the work of Hin-
neburg (2006) and the qualitative parts of the work of Carneiro,
Figueira, and Costa (2017) illustrate.
Often, quantitative and qualitative research form two disjoint
areas, and academics prefer one of the two branches of sci-
ence to the other. However, “it must be emphasized that one
cannot decide whether qualitative or quantitative studies are
better or more useful. It is important to note that there are
no pre-determinates for the appropriateness of either a qualita-
tive or a quantitative study.” (Blumberg, Cooper, and Schindler,
2014, p. 148) Therefore, “[m]any problems in business and man-
agement research can be researched both ways, qualitative and
quantitative, although the answers obtained may have a differ-
ent nature as the research questions asked depend often on the
perspective.” (Blumberg, Cooper, and Schindler, 2014, p. 148)
Yet, most of the literature that exists about fraud detection is
of quantitative nature as shown in Section 2.3 in Chapter 2. This
may be the case because often companies face large amounts
of data, and businesses are not only interested in gaining in-
sights but also in creating pragmatic solutions. With data min-
ing, computer-aided systems can be developed that are able to
analyze the high volume of transactions.
In order to research the problem in a holistic way, the the-
sis relies on mixed methods (Collis and Hussey, 2014) and in-
cludes both a small qualitative study — in order to understand
the transaction data and the fraud management processes as
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a preparatory step — and a more complex quantitative part.
Knowledge can not only be gained through statistical evalua-
tion of technical data but also through conversations with ex-
perts in the field; both are variants of the sources of sugges-
tion Reichenbach (2013) refers to. This is not to be mistaken
with triangulation: With the help of triangulation, validity of
research results of the same phenomenon can be increased (Blum-
berg, Cooper, and Schindler, 2014). However, the qualitative
and the quantitative part answer different questions each and
the latter builds on top of the former.
3.5 delimitations and limitations
The thesis focuses on e-commerce mail order fraud prevention,
but fraud occurs in many other areas, such as insurance fraud
or credit card fraud. Therefore, other areas have been consulted
for inspiration due to the lack of literature in the field of inter-
est, as pointed out in Chapter 2.
In order to explore the fraud prevention process, practition-
ers from the e-commerce mail order companies which provided
the quantitative transaction data were interviewed (the inter-
view setup will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4). The aim of
the interviews is not to explore indicators of fraud risk; this
is achieved through feature analysis in Chapter 6. It would
not have been feasible to approach other companies’ experts
as well, because the quantitative core of the thesis relies on the
transaction data that are available. Thus, the fraud prevention
processes modeled in this thesis may differ from those at other
companies, and results may only be generalizable with regard
to e-commerce mail order companies of similar structure. In
particular, a major assumption made in Chapter 7 and Chap-
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ter 8 is that inspection resources are limited, which is why au-
tomation through machine learning models is explored in order
to deal with large amounts of orders.
The thesis does not aim at providing a representative
overview of fraud prevention in the e-commerce mail order
business, and it does not aim at extending results beyond the
questions faced in this particular area. Moreover, as mentioned
by Carneiro, Figueira, and Costa (2017), data mining is only one
strategy with which the problem of fraud in the e-commerce
mail order business can be approached; examples for other
strategies have been mentioned in Chapter 2. In addition to
this brief overview, limitations of the research are discussed in
each of the empirical parts of the thesis and in Chapter 9.
3.6 ethical considerations
“The use of data — particularly data about people — for data
mining has serious ethical implications, and practitioners of
data mining techniques must act responsibly by making them-
selves aware of the ethical issues that surround their particular
application” (Witten, Frank, and Hall, 2011, p. 33).
For fraud detection and prevention, transaction data are regu-
larly analyzed both manually and through automated systems.
In this thesis, such data are used to find out which features
(variables) may serve as fraud risk predictors and are used to
train models that classify transactions as fraudulent or legiti-
mate. Because the results of this thesis may influence the fraud
prevention process — and therefore how customers are treated
—, it is important to consider ethical problems that may arise
as part of the analyses.
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Mingers and Walsham (2010) provide an overview of the eth-
ical issues connected with information systems and mention
three perspectives on ethics and morality: consequentialism, de-
ontology, and virtue ethics. In consequentialism, the results of
an action are what define its value; the deontological approach
focuses on whether the act itself is good or bad, i.e. what the
intentions were; and virtue ethics emphasize on the attitude of
the actor (Mingers and Walsham, 2010).
Regarding this thesis, ethical aspects should be evaluated
from a consequentialist perspective because people who suffer
from the consequences of an unethical act (e.g. accusing an hon-
est customer of trying to commit fraud) are probably neither
interested in the act itself nor in the intentions behind it. Thus,
even though crime prevention is considered a virtuous aim that
justifies the use of data in general, it is essential to deal with the
data in an ethically acceptable way. In this section, possible eth-
ical challenges are brought up and it is discussed how they are
dealt with.
In the context of fraud management, there are three main
issues: First, fraud analysis requires the use of possibly sensi-
tive customer data. Although the German data privacy law is
strict about when it is allowed to use such data (Recht, 2017),
its ethical appropriateness is not necessarily implied. There-
fore, a question to deal with is to which degree the socially ac-
cepted goal of crime prevention justifies the means of working
with personal information. Second, discrimination could take
place: Patterns in the data could possibly discriminate certain
socio-demographic groups. Third, data from the interviews, e.g.
about fraud officers’ performance, could be held against them.
In order to deal with the first issue, the ethical use of sensi-
tive customer data, all data are encrypted and anonymized to a
degree that seems sensible; note that more anonymization also
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reduces the information value of the data for fraud detection.
Most importantly, no personal information is published.
The second issue relates to inductive reasoning through data
mining; patterns found through data mining could discrimi-
nate certain groups of people. Two aspects address this pos-
sible issue: First, the dataset is composed of various kinds of
features (see Chapter 5); thus, customer-related features repre-
sent only a small fraction of the data. Second, an approach to
fraud detection based on data mining is usually regarded as
more objective than judgments based on personal experience.
According to the German data privacy law, scoring requires a
scientifically acknowledged mathematical/statistical procedure
(Recht, 2017). Thus, the issue of discrimination might even be
reduced through data mining compared to the status quo.
Regarding the third issue, both the names of the interviewees
and the companies are kept confidential, and guidelines from
Edinburgh Napier University regarding informed consent have
been followed. The interviews were transcribed in a summa-
rized form in order to obscure the use of common terms which
could be traced back to individual persons.
PA RT T W O
This part contains the empirical analyses: First, the
results of interviews with fraud experts are pre-
sented. Second, the transaction dataset is prepared.
Third, possible fraud risk factors are examined from
a quantitative point of view in the form of fea-
ture analysis using information gain and a decision
tree. Fourth, two supervised machine learning al-
gorithms, logistic regression and gradient boosted
trees, are trained. Fifth, in the last empirical chapter,
the estimated fraud risks taken from the previous
chapters are fed into a utility-based model in order
to minimize the financial impact of fraud. Finally,
the thesis closes with conclusions.
4
M O D E L I N G F R A U D
4.1 introduction
Understanding the context which surrounds the quantitative
transaction data is essential, because the results of any algo-
rithm can only be as good as the quality of the input data, but
not only that: Processes must be thoroughly understood in or-
der to arrive at meaningful conclusions.
Two large e-commerce mail order companies and one com-
pany specialized in fraud prevention solutions have been in-
terviewed in order to investigate their fraud prevention work.
First, the interviews aim at determining the status quo of fraud
prevention: Which kinds of transactions are considered suspi-
cious? Which actions can be taken to identify fraud? Once a
transaction is believed to be fraud, how can it be validated?
Second, opportunities for improvement of the status quo are
discussed: What is the role of machine learning in fraud preven-
tion? Are there particular requirements regarding the choice of
data mining algorithms? Do economic goals guide the fraud
prevention work? Third, since one of the interviewed compa-
nies provided the quantitative dataset, limitations of the dataset
are discussed. How the fraud labels of the transaction data have
been created is an essential information because it determines
what they can be used for and how analyses that are based on
them can be interpreted.
This chapter is organized as follows: First, the company that
provided the data for both the qualitative and the quantitative
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part is introduced. Then, a theoretical overview of interviewing
as a research technique is given and the interview setting is
described. In the next step, results are presented. Following a
discussion of limitations, the chapter closes with a summary.
4.2 company overview
The company later referred to as company A of the two in-
terviewed companies is of particular importance for this thesis
because it was not only involved in the interviews but also pro-
vided the transaction dataset used in all quantitative analyses.
This company is one of Europe’s largest e-commerce retail-
ers, selling mostly clothing but also electronics, furniture, and
white goods (e.g. refrigerators and washing machines). Offering
millions of articles, the company faces up to 10 transactions
per second and had a turnover of e 3 billion in the fiscal year
2017/18, of which 90% were generated online. The company
employs about 4,500 people. For these data, no references are
given in order to maintain anonymity of the company.
The company’s customers are mostly middle-aged (42 years
on average), and the distribution is right-skewed, meaning that
there are many customers slightly below the average age as
well and there is a long tail of quite old customers. Recently,
the company has started to target a younger customer base in
order to maintain its share in a competitive market.
4.3 interview setup
Although personal interviews produce rather subjective results,
which cannot easily be generalized, they were considered most
appropriate to explore the fraud prevention process:
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The greatest value [of personal interviews] lies in the
depth of information and detail that can be secured. It far
exceeds the information secured from telephone and self-
administered studies, such as mail surveys or web sur-
veys. The interviewer can also do more things to improve
the quality of the information received than with another
method (Blumberg, Cooper, and Schindler, 2014, p. 213).
Conducting personal interviews allowed to ask the company
that provided the quantitative dataset detailed questions about
it. Due to this opportunity, personal interviews were preferred
to any other research method.
Helfferich (2011) presents a list of decisions which need to be
made when planning to conduct an interview. In the following
paragraphs, these decisions are introduced and commented on
with regard to the research context.
The first task is to define the object of research (Helfferich,
2011). As the first of four empirical analyses, the interviews are
supposed to lay a cornerstone for the subsequent parts. The
quantitative dataset consists of transactions, which are labeled
either fraudulent or legitimate. These fraud labels are set manu-
ally by the employees in the fraud prevention department, and
they are essential to all quantitative analyses. Hence, it is im-
portant to thoroughly understand under which circumstances
transactions have been labeled. The act of labeling is the conse-
quence of a process chain, and that process chain is supposed
to be investigated in the interviews. Only if it is understood
how the fraud prevention process works, it will be possible to
develop methods which improve it. Thus, the interviews aim at
providing the foundation upon which the quantitative research
can be built.
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This aim leads to the next aspect mentioned by Helfferich
(2011), which is whom to interview. In order to be able to relate
results of the qualitative to the quantitative part, three intervie-
wees were chosen from two e-commerce mail order companies,
both of which work with similar datasets, and one of which
provided the dataset for the quantitative part in this thesis. In
this chapter, in order to ensure anonymity, these two companies
are referred to as A and B. At the time of the interviews, it had
not been clarified which of the two companies would allow the
use of their data. Therefore, the heads of the fraud prevention
departments from both companies who have extensive experi-
ence in the field were interviewed under the same premises. In
the interview with company B, one of the fraud prevention em-
ployees who perform the actual inspection work attended as
well in order to provide a more hands-on perspective on the
questions asked. The interviewees know the practical problems
related to fraud prevention but, at the same time, have a broad
view on the departments and their roles within the companies.
Collis and Hussey (2014) refer to this sampling method as natu-
ral sampling, because sometimes “only particular employees are
involved in the phenomenon being investigated” (Collis and
Hussey, 2014, p. 132). In addition, in a third interview, two ac-
count managers at Risk Ident were consulted. This company
at which the author is employed sells software for device fin-
gerprinting and fraud prevention. This interviewed aimed at
providing a bird’s eye view of the results from the two main in-
terviews, as Risk Ident serves companies from different areas,
and the account managers have a broad overview of the issues
related to fraud prevention. In qualitative studies, it may be
common to conduct a much higher number of interviews; Helf-
ferich (2011) mentions that restricting factors are mostly time
and money. However, the qualitative part of this thesis aims at
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investigating the specific setting of the company that provided
the dataset. From this perspective, a single interview would
have been sufficient; in order to possibly put statements made
by that particular company into perspective, two other parties
were interviewed.
The third aspect addresses the type of interview (Helf-
ferich, 2011). The interviews in this thesis aim at obtaining
rather objective information. Of course, a notion of subjec-
tivity always resonates with statements based on experience,
but the research question does not deal with extremely per-
sonal views or challenging social constructs. Hence, problem-
centered, semi-structured interviews seemed most appropri-
ate, which are characterized by a dialogic form of communi-
cation. Helfferich (2011) states that, in problem-centered inter-
views, a set of prepared questions is used to guide the inter-
views, but spontaneous questions and discussions are appre-
ciated. “Semi-structured interviews have two main objectives:
on the one hand, the researcher wants to know the informant’s
perspective on the issue but, on the other, they also want to
know whether the informant can confirm insights and infor-
mation the researcher already holds” (Blumberg, Cooper, and
Schindler, 2014, p. 307). This approach is deemed appropriate
in order to explore the fraud prevention process.
The last main aspect Helfferich (2011) mentions focuses on
how to evaluate the interviews: The fraud prevention process
is outlined and populated with the retrieved insights. In the
quantitative part of the thesis, this process documentation can
be referred to where appropriate.
A remark should be given with regard to the relationship be-
tween the interviewer and the participants: Blumberg, Cooper,
and Schindler (2014, p. 213) state that “[Interviewer and par-
ticipant] are typically strangers [. . . ]. The consequences of the
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event are usually insignificant for the participant, who is asked
to provide information but has little hope of receiving any im-
mediate or direct benefit from this cooperation.” However, Risk
Ident is in a business relationship with both of the interviewed
e-commerce mail order companies. The companies are inter-
ested in an improvement of the software Risk Ident sells to
them, so it can be assumed that the heads of the fraud pre-
vention departments were motivated to participate in the inter-
views. However, the participants had been informed before that
the interviews were part of a research work independent of the
business relationship.
The questions are aligned with the fraud prevention process
and include: general ideas of fraud prevention, definitions of
essential terms, inspection techniques, post-inspection actions,
and evaluation measures. The questions are listed below, and
each question is commented on in order to explain the motiva-
tion behind it.
Question
1. What is fraud?
As the literature review in Chapter 2 has shown, various
definitions of fraud exist. It is essential to share a com-
mon understanding of this central term. In addition, this
thesis does not cover payment default which is related
to creditworthiness. Thus, it is important to understand
in how far — or whether at all — the companies dis-
tinguish between fraud and low creditworthiness. The
dataset contains the labels fraudulent, legitimate, and not
creditworthy.
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Question
2. How is the fraud label of transactions determined?
The fraud label of a transaction is the result of a man-
ual inspection process. Thus, it is crucial to understand
which actions lead to the decision whether a transaction
is considered fraudulent or legitimate.
3. What kind of information is considered?
Extending the previous question, it should be discussed
which parts of the quantitative data are used to investi-
gate the fraud status.
4. How are transactions prioritized?
In e-commerce fraud prevention, the amount of transac-
tions most likely exceeds available inspection resources
of fraud prevention departments. If this is the case, then
how are transactions prioritized?
5. Which actions follow the classification?
If a transaction is labeled fraudulent, which measures are
taken? The question aims at exploring possible effects of
the classification, including classification errors.
6. How much time does it take to inspect a transaction?
The feasibility of some of the actions may depend on the
time invested into the inspection process. Hence, it may
be helpful to know how time-consuming the inspection
of transactions is.
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Question
7. Until when can a transaction be stopped?
In order to successfully stop a transaction that is consid-
ered fraudulent, the fraud prevention process has to be
finished before delivery of the parcel at the latest. There-
fore, it is to be found out until when the e-commerce
companies can intervene in the delivery process. In addi-
tion, cancellation of a transaction becomes more difficult
the further the delivery process has progressed.
8. How are the fraud department’s decisions validated?
This question aims at evaluation of the labeling quality,
i.e. how can reliability and validity of the labeling process
be ensured?
9. Is there a difference between legitimate and not inspected?
Only a fraction of the total transaction data is labeled. In
how far differ cases considered legitimate and cases that
have not at all been inspected from each other? For ex-
ample, does an inspected legitimate transaction increase
credibility of the customer more than a transaction that
has not been checked?
10. How is the performance of the fraud prevention department
evaluated?
In Chapter 8, it will be argued that expected value is
probably the most appropriate measure. This question
aims at finding out the status quo.
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Question
11. Is A/B testing used in the fraud prevention department?
A/B testing might be a valuable tool in order to evaluate
the fraud prevention process. If a transaction believed to
be fraud is blocked, it becomes impossible to find out
whether financial damage would actually have occurred.
Therefore, it could make sense to let a fraction of trans-
actions marked fraudulent pass nevertheless. Then, the
value of fraud prevention could be measured more easily
— at the cost of voluntarily allowing a defined amount of
fraud cases, though. The applicability and acceptance of
this concept shall be discussed in the interviews.
Since the interviews were semi-structured, the conversations
were not tied to the list of questions. Instead, the questions were
woven into a free-flowing dialogue.
Anonymity not only of the interviewees but also of the names
of the companies was a prerequisite in order to be allowed to
both conduct the interviews and to analyze the quantitative
datasets. The interviews were conducted in accordance with
the ethical guidelines of Edinburgh Napier University. The in-
terviews were recorded, but the audio files were deleted upon
request after transcription. The interviews lasted between one
and two hours each.
In the findings section, the insights from the interviews are
organized in four categories: fraud risk factors, investigation
process, classification errors, and impact evaluation. In order to
extract the information the transcribed interviews contain in a
structured way, the interviews were coded. “A code in qualita-
tive inquiry is most often a word or short phrase that symbol-
ically assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing and/or
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evocative attribute for a portion of language-based or visual
data” (Saldan¯a, 2009, p. 3). Such codes, for example rule com-
binations, detection strategies, and fraud vs. creditworthiness were
assigned to the statements made in the interviews. The codes
were then assigned to the four categories mentioned above.
4.4 findings
4.4.1 Introduction
Because the interviews were semi-structured and contain more
information than the initial set of questions, findings are not
presented in the order of the list of questions shown above. In-
stead, the process-related concepts discussed in this thesis are
presented and supported with evidence from the interviews.
References to the questions are given when they are answered.
First, however, a shared understanding of the central terms
used in fraud prevention has to be established. The nature of
fraud depends on the area in which it occurs. Thus, it is essen-
tial to define the terms used in the interview and to understand
what meaning the interviewees attach to them.
Hinneburg (2006) states that fraud has to show certain charac-
teristics: For example, the orderer has to have a criminal inten-
tion, and a financial damage has to occur. In contrast, the inter-
viewed companies choose more practical definitions of fraud.
According to company A, the intention itself already suffices
for a transaction to be marked as fraud; fake data are consid-
ered an attempt to commit a fraud. Company B distinguishes
between fraud and fraud suspicion. The former refers to just
those cases that have been handed over to the police because
financial damage has occurred, and the latter covers all cases
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in which the company has only found evidence for a criminal
intention, such as obviously faked data or customer data that
are related to past fraud cases (question 1).
Although fraud and low creditworthiness are not the same,
they are two different causes that share the same symptom (pay-
ment default), and thus they are hard to tell apart from each
other. However, the distinction between fraud and low cred-
itworthiness becomes particularly important when the com-
pany’s business model relies on invoice and deferred payments
(Anon, 2015a). Since this is the case for both interviewed e-
commerce mail order companies, payment default should not
be used for training algorithms to detect fraud.
On busy days, fraud prevention employees sometimes face
up to 1,000 orders per person, but they inspect approximately
12 orders per hour, i.e. one inspection takes 5 minutes. Legiti-
mate orders are usually identified quickly, but indistinct cases
can consume hours or even days (Anon, 2015b). Therefore, it
is crucial to work with a subset that consists of the most suspi-
cious transactions (question 6).
4.4.2 Fraud Risk Factors
Based on the interviews, the author proposes to distinguish
three types of risk factors: static data, connection data, and
change-related data (question 3).
static data In all interviews, it is mentioned that the distinc-
tion between new and old customer accounts plays a cru-
cial role with regard to estimating the fraud risk (Anon,
2015a,b,c). In addition, the most promising questions to
answer are: Is a parcel shop used? Does the shipment
address deviate from the payment address? Is there a
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Schufa entry available (Schufa is a private German credit
bureau)? Moreover, company B mentions that the risk de-
pends on the article group as well. In particular, in ac-
cordance with Hinneburg (2006), company A states that
small, valuable items are associated with a higher fraud
risk because they can be resold easily.
connection data Transaction connection data focus on
connections between orders: Is the device connected to
multiple customer accounts or are multiple devices used
with the same customer account? Is the customer account
connected to fraud cases already known (Anon, 2015a,c)?
change-related data Have the data changed recently, e.g.
has the phone number changed (Anon, 2015a)? Was there
an unexpected increase of the order frequency (Anon,
2015c)?
4.4.3 Investigation Process
In the e-commerce mail order business, or at least in the compa-
nies that were interviewed, the fraud prevention process can be
modeled as shown in figure 4. They face thousands of transac-
tions per day but have only limited inspection resources, similar
to the conditions described by Torgo and Lopes (2011).
Thus, the first step 1 is to decide whether a transaction shall
be manually inspected at all or whether it is processed auto-
matically. Without any manual interference, all transactions are
processed automatically. Fraud prevention employees select in-
dividual transactions using filters based on transaction proper-
ties, such as price ranges, address areas, etc. At the time of the
interviews, no data mining techniques were used for guidance;
the selection process was purely driven by experience and in-
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Figure 4: Fraud prevention process model.
tuition. Company A stated that a fraction of the transactions is
also selected randomly (questions 2 and 4).
In the second step 2 , inspected transactions may either be
classified as fraudulent or legitimate. If the data available do
not suffice in order to make a sound judgment, it may be inves-
tigated further in order to find stronger evidence for or against
fraud (Anon, 2015a). In particular, the following scenarios have
been mentioned (question 2):
1. When the legitimate customer is called and denies his or
her order, the account may have been compromised. If the
suspected fraudster answers the call and does not know
the answer to a test question, such as what the date of
birth registered with the account is, evidence strengthens
the fraud hypothesis. The phone can be used for a couple
of techniques to better assess the situation (Anon, 2015a).
Calling the customer as an action to find out whether a
transaction is fraud is mentioned by Carneiro, Figueira,
and Costa (2017).
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2. Further research on the customer can be conducted. For
example, the fraud prevention officer can look up the
name in social media (Anon, 2015a) or use Google to find
out more (Anon, 2015b).
3. If available, a Schufa entry provides additional informa-
tion regarding the creditworthiness of the customer. How-
ever, it is expensive and therefore only occasionally re-
quested (Anon, 2015a). A negative entry leads to an im-
mediate block of the transaction, even though low cred-
itworthiness is not considered fraud as discussed above
(Anon, 2015b).
If a transaction is considered fraudulent, multiple reactions
are possible. The fraud model proposed here only distinguishes
between accept and reject — as seen in step 3 — because, ulti-
mately, fraud shall be blocked and legitimate orders shall pass.
Yet, as the truth is sometimes nebulous, there are many shades
of gray (question 5):
1. The order can be deleted either without further notice
(Anon, 2015b) or the customer is informed that his or her
order has been canceled (Anon, 2015a). Whether the cus-
tomer is contacted depends on the reasons behind dele-
tion (Anon, 2015b). At least, an incomprehensible risk es-
timate by a fraud detection software would not suffice for
deletion (Anon, 2015b).
2. In extreme cases, i.e. when organized crime is faced, the
police is contacted and charges are filed (Anon, 2015b).
3. If an order has been sent to the customer but not yet ar-
rived, the logistics service can still try to stop delivery
(Anon, 2015a), but the process becomes more expensive
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(Anon, 2015b). Therefore, although a late cancellation is
possible, detecting fraud before the delivery process has
begun is clearly preferred (question 7).
4. The customer is offered only a safe payment method, such
as prepayment, or a partial payment has to be made in
advance (Anon, 2015a,b).
5. The delivery method can be changed to delivery requires
identification. It is illegal to require an uncensored copy of
personal documents (Anon, 2015b), but at least the post-
man can be asked to check the identification at delivery
(Anon, 2015a,b). However, the process is time-consuming
and expensive (Anon, 2015b).
6. If a transaction seems legitimate, it is marked as such and
no other action is taken (Anon, 2015a). This also means
that transactions labeled legitimate have been subjected to
the same detailed inspection as transactions labeled fraud-
ulent — in contrast to unlabeled transactions that have
not been inspected at all (question 9). In machine learning,
both types, fraudulent and legitimate transactions, will be
needed to train the model.
4.4.4 Classification Errors
It can be difficult to find out whether the decision to accept or
reject transactions was correct. This section deals with problems
associated with the overall fraud prevention process.
Figure 5 shows four rows: Row 1 states whether the trans-
action is actually fraud, i.e. the truth value; F stands for fraud-
ulent, and L stands for legitimate. Row 2 represents whether
the transaction has been chosen for inspection (I), or has been
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4 collection
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Figure 5: Possible sources of classification errors.
skipped (S). Row 3 depicts the officer’s action, which is to
reject (R) or accept (A) a transaction. 4 describes the financial
outcome, i.e. whether a transaction was paid for (P) or whether
it led to payment default (D). The different paths in the graph
represent possible outcomes of the fraud prevention process.
For example, the path F  I  R, or shorter notated as FIR,
means that a fraudulent transaction has been preselected and
the fraud officer regarded the order as fraud and blocked it. Of
course, the collection step only exists for transactions that were
not blocked, i.e. transactions that have either not been selected
for inspection or have explicitly been accepted by the officer.
The critical paths are described below.
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Path Description
?IR A transaction should only be rejected if sufficient
evidence exists. If transactions were falsely rejected,
there would be no safe method to find out the truth
afterwards. For example, an honest customer whose
transaction was rejected by mistake could be disap-
pointed that the promised service was not provided
and just did not complain.
F?P These paths should be impossible, because a transac-
tion cannot be fraud if the products are fully paid for.
FIAD If debt collection fails, reasons other than fraud may
exist. For example, low creditworthiness could also
lead to payment default. Thus, it is difficult to find
out whether an accepted transaction should have been
rejected as fraud.
FSD Due to resource constraints, a transaction not selected
for inspection in the first place is usually not brought
up again even if it turned out to be fraud. This, how-
ever, would sometimes be worthwhile, because new
patterns may emerge that would otherwise remain un-
recognized (Anon, 2015a,b). In addition, transactions
are rarely reinspected once a decision has been made
(Anon, 2015a). In contrast to company A, company
B checks whether the transactions inspected (and not
blocked) appear in debt collection. In addition, as in
the previous path, it is not possible to infer that a
transaction is fraudulent only because of payment de-
fault.
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The above paths show that, with regard to the fraud pre-
vention process as the interviewed companies run it, multiple
paths exist for which it is difficult to find out the truth retroac-
tively. Therefore, the quality of the labels in the quantitative
dataset heavily depends on the energy the fraud officers invest
into inspection of cases (question 8). This is an important lim-
itation that applies to how results of quantitative analyses can
be interpreted. Due to the distinction between fraud and other
forms of payment default, payment data alone cannot solve this
issue.
Both companies state that A/B testing could alleviate the
problem and help estimate the labeling error by letting a frac-
tion of suspicious transactions pass. These methods are expen-
sive, though, since letting fraud cases pass leads to immedi-
ate financial damage, and inspecting low-risk transactions is a
waste of resources, at least in the short run. Therefore, the com-
panies would expect a substantial improvement of their own
fraud prevention activities as a compensation for the cost re-
sulting from A/B testing (question 11).
4.4.5 Impact Evaluation
It is difficult to estimate the impact of the fraud prevention
department. The most obvious reason are the classification er-
rors mentioned above, but another problem requires attention
as well. This section discusses how the impact of fraud preven-
tion can be evaluated (question 10).
Sales and fraud prevention seem to create tension as their in-
terests collide: Sales are supposed to increase, but fraud should
be decreased; in particular, this is problematic when legiti-
mate transactions are blocked by mistake that would normally
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increase revenues (Anon, 2015a). The companies justify their
work with revenue-based numbers, even though financial dam-
age is not reflected by the sales prices but rather by the pur-
chase prices plus operational costs (logistics etc.).
Instead, transactions could be preselected based on expected
utility. This concept is described in detail in Chapter 8, and al-
though it is not an evaluation measure, it shall be mentioned
briefly. Both companies consider sorting transactions not based
by perceived risk but by expected utility a valuable approach,
even though the possibilities have not been explored yet (Anon,
2015a,b). Possibly, the concept of company-wide profit maxi-
mization contrasts with the department-focused view of fraud
minimization.
Two years ago, an information bureau offered its services
to company B, delivering data on-demand, i.e. the company
would pay for additional information per transaction. The of-
fer which included an implementation of expected utility was
rejected because data protection issues arose and the benefits
seemed intransparent (Anon, 2015b). Company B does not have
product-related margins but holds approximately 1,000 group-
related margins for more than 100,000 products. The company
explicitly regards the concept as interesting if margins become
more diverse, especially since some fraud risk scores already
exist per article group. New customers are assigned a margin-
like weight, because various costs associated with them, such
as marketing costs, decrease the initial profits.
4.5 limitations
In this section, possible limitations of the interviews are dis-
cussed and it is explained how they have been dealt with.
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In general, measures commonly used in quantitative studies
— such as reliability, validity, and generalizability (Collis and
Hussey, 2014) — are not applicable when evaluating personal
interviews because qualitative research is always subjective and
depends on the context. Therefore, Helfferich (2011) argues, ob-
jectivity cannot be the goal of qualitative research; instead, one
should aim at dealing with subjectivity in an appropriate way.
This perspective guides the discussion of limitations.
First, in order to deal with subjectivity, a couple of strategies
to support methodical control shall be mentioned (Helfferich,
2011): methodical control through openness, through reflexiv-
ity, and through traceability. Methodical control through open-
ness aims at forcing as little structure as possible in order to
let the interviewees unfold themselves without restrictions. In
expert interviews, however, sometimes specific questions are of
particular interest and it may make sense to ask them or to steer
the interview into a certain direction if the interviewees do not
bring them up by themselves. Considering expert interviews,
more structure is possible when rather fact-based knowledge
is to be obtained. The semi-structured interviews which have
been conducted are considered a trade-off between the two po-
sitions. Methodical control through reflexivity focuses on ac-
tively thinking about how the assumptions the interviewer and
the interviewee make and the values they hold influence the
course of the interview. For example, the author of the thesis is
employed in the company funding the research; thus, answers
of the interviewees might have been confined to what seemed
appropriate with regard to the business relationship. In order to
deal with this possible issue, it was stated that the interviewees
remain anonymous. Nevertheless, since in the interviews with
company B and Risk Ident there were two interviewees in a sin-
gle interview, they could have withheld information that might
4.6 conclusion 72
have been divulged had they been alone. Methodical control
through traceability focuses on using standardized procedures,
e.g. how to act in the interview and how to deal with difficult
situations. Before each interview, interviewing guidelines pro-
vided by Edinburgh Napier University were discussed.
Second, time constraints required to focus on the most impor-
tant questions, although the explorative character might have
allowed even more detailed insights into the process. However,
being at all able to interview fraud prevention experts with the
aim to support the quantitative analyses was a great opportu-
nity.
Third, the retrieved statements may contain mistakes or
might become outdated. In particular, the interviews were con-
ducted in 2015, and the quantitative dataset is from 2016. Thus,
if the meaning of the features in the dataset changed systemat-
ically within one year after the interviews had been conducted,
there would be a mismatch between what has been said in the
interviews and what is concluded from the quantitative analy-
ses. Given that the structure of the data did not change in the
past years, this is unlikely, though.
4.6 conclusion
This chapter aims at laying a foundation for the following anal-
yses by exploring the fraud prevention process and the quan-
titative dataset via interviews. The essential aspects which the
following chapters build upon are summarized in this section.
First, a process model was developed. It was discovered that
the fraud prevention process offers a variety of investigation
mechanisms and that shades of gray between accepting and re-
jecting transactions exist. In Chapter 7, machine learning mod-
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els will be trained that learn to detect fraud, and in Chapter 8,
a utility-based perspective on fraud prevention will be taken.
Both chapters build upon the simple process model developed
through the interviews.
Second, it was discussed which feature values — and com-
bination of feature values — fraud prevention employees con-
sider particularly important. In Chapter 6, a mathematical ap-
proach to evaluating (static) features will be presented, build-
ing upon the statements about feature importance made by the
fraud prevention experts.
Third, payment default was identified as an inappropriate
representation of fraud. Instead, the manually set labels pro-
vide a promising basis for the quantitative part of the thesis.
In all subsequent analyses, the fraud labels will be used as the
ground truth.
Finally, the interviewed companies consider fraud an impor-
tant problem and have developed countermeasures. However,
e-commerce mail order fraud prevention seems to lack the ap-
plication of scientific methods common in data mining. Thus,
the next chapters focus on analyzing how such methods can
support the fraud prevention process.
5
D ATA P R E PA R AT I O N
5.1 introduction
In this chapter, the dataset which is used for the quantitative
analyses presented in chapters 6 to 8 is prepared. It contains
hundreds of thousands of transactions from one of the largest
e-commerce mail order companies in Europe — referred to as
company A in the interviews. Data preparation is an essential
step of the data mining process: “Before the data can be ana-
lyzed, they must be organized into an appropriate form. Data
preparation is the process of manipulating and organizing data
prior to analysis” (Webb, 2010, p. 259). “Preparing input for a
data mining investigation usually consumes the bulk of the ef-
fort invested in the entire data mining process” (Witten, Frank,
and Hall, 2011, p. 51).
The chapter is organized according to the data preparation
steps described by Webb (2010): First, a general overview of
the dataset is provided, including the steps sourcing, selecting,
and auditing of the data. Second, a complete list of e-commerce
transaction features (order details, customer data, and technical
data) is presented, and each feature is briefly discussed. Then,
transforming data is explained in detail, covering discretization,
and dealing with missing values through imputation. Finally,
the chapter closes with a discussion of limitations and conclu-
sions of the dataset itself and the data preparation process.
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5.2 overview of the dataset
“It is necessary to review the data that are already available,
assess their suitability to the task at hand, and investigate the
feasibility of sourcing new data collected specifically for the
desired task” (Webb, 2010, p. 259). This is reflected by the three
aspects sourcing, selecting, and auditing.
Sourcing is the process of obtaining data, possibly from mul-
tiple sources (Webb, 2010). The raw dataset is stored in a non-
relational database (Elasticsearch), and the documents are un-
structured. This means that the data are not only composed
of atomic key-value pairs (e.g. total price: e199) but con-
tain nested elements as well, such as lists of order items or as-
sociated devices (e.g. order items: [item 1, ..., item n]),
where each item may contain key-value pairs itself. Such a for-
mat is impractical for data analysis, and thus the first step is
to reshape the data into a matrix, i.e. tabular form, where each
column is a feature and each row is an observation (transaction)
as described by Wickham (2014).
inspected other
fraud legitimate
∑ ∑
count in % 0.56 2.42 2.98 97.02 100
value in % 0.71 4.12 4.83 95.17 100
Table 2: Breakdown of one month’s transactions into the count of
transactions and the order value with regard to the fraud
label.
The dataset consists of the e-commerce orders placed within
a single month of early 2016, containing hundreds of thou-
sands of transactions. 2.98% of such transactions (approxi-
mately 10,000 cases) have been manually inspected and la-
beled as fraudulent or legitimate, and this subset is selected
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for the quantitative analyses in the following chapters. The re-
maining 97.02% of the transactions were either unlabeled or
related to low creditworthiness. For each label (fraudulent, le-
gitimate, other), Table 2 shows the relative amount and the rel-
ative value of transactions according to their total price (also
called order value). Since the 2.98% of the transactions that have
been inspected represent 4.83% of total revenue, the statement
made in the interviews can be confirmed that fraud officers are
more likely to inspect high-valued transactions. Interestingly,
the difference between the relative share and the associated
value of transactions is largest with regard to legitimate trans-
actions (2.42% of transactions represent 4.12% of total value).
This might indicate that fraud is not necessarily confined to
expensive goods.
Table 3 shows the complete list of features, including basic
descriptive analytics. Each feature used for analysis will be ex-
plained in detail in the next section. Three features — order ad-
dress, customer name, and phone number — were not processed in
the analysis due to concerns regarding data privacy and ethics.
Auditing aims at ensuring data quality. The data are com-
posed of three sources: technical information, user-provided
data, and the fraud labels. Technical data can be considered free
of errors because their collection is automated. User-provided
data does not always indicate the truth, since erroneous data
might be provided accidentally or intentionally. However, the
quantitative analyses still benefit even from fake data because
not the truth is the determining factor but the pattern that the
data show. For example, if criminals used fake phone numbers,
that information could even provide additional value. Thus,
fake user data are not considered a conceptual problem. Finally,
the label quality is essential to all quantitative analyses. In or-
der to evaluate it, the interviews presented in Chapter 4 were
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Feature Mean Median Used
Account Age 6.36d 2.95d Y
Address Distance 63.33km 2.04km Y
Customer Age 42y 41y Y
Number of Articles 1.94 1.00 Y
Order Hour 12pm 12pm Y
Total Price 759.85e 589.00e Y
(a) Continuous Features
Feature Distribution Used
Browser • 34% Google Chrome
• 25% Mozilla Firefox
• 14% Safari
• 27% other
Y
Country • 98% Germany
• 2% other
Y
Customer Name n/a N
ISP undisclosed due to data privacy
reasons
Y
Operating System • 61% Windows
• 19% Android
• 14% iOS
• 6% other
Y
Order Address n/a N
Order Origin • 85% internet
• 15% telephone
Y
Known Address 94% known addresses Y
New Device 40% via unknown device Y
Parcel Shop 26% sent to a parcel shop Y
Payment Type • 98% invoice
• 2% other
Y
Phone Number n/a N
Shipment Type 32% express orders Y
Smartphone 33% via mobile/app Y
(b) Discrete Features
Table 3: Overview of features with basic descriptive metrics. Features
used in the following analyses are marked with Y and fea-
tures discarded are marked with N.
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conducted and it has been shown that the investigation process
ensures high label quality: Once a transaction is considered sus-
picious, it will be inspected manually with care.
5.3 feature overview
5.3.1 Introduction
Information about features used as fraud predictors has been
published with regard to credit card fraud (Bahnsen et al., 2016;
Jha, Guillén, and Westland, 2012; Krivko, 2010), medical fraud
(Aral et al., 2012), automobile fraud (Artís, Ayuso, and Guil-
lén, 2002), and online auction fraud (Chang and Chang, 2012).
Regarding the choice of features, it is difficult to draw inspi-
ration from other areas of fraud because the raw data differ
so strongly. For example, Carneiro, Figueira, and Costa (2017)
mention that features used for fraud detection in the banking
sector can barely be transferred to credit card fraud in the e-
commerce mail order business because banks usually know
much more about their customers than e-commerce businesses
do, and thus the available data are quite different.
The features used in the quantitative analyses can be divided
into two groups: The first group consists of features which
fraud experts have declared as important fraud risk predictors,
e.g. whether the order has been sent to a parcel shop, or which
have been mentioned in the literature (called evidence-based
features in the following). The second group contains features
which simply were available as part of the dataset, e.g. the op-
erating system from which the order has been placed (called
discovery features in the following). Even though there is no
empirical foundation that discovery features help detect fraud,
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they might support the fraud detection process nevertheless.
Philosophically, evidence-based features represent a deductive
approach, i.e. theory comes first and is tested using real-world
data (Benton and Craib, 2011), and discovery features represent
an inductive approach because the data are used to identify pat-
terns that might lead to new theory about fraud risk indicators
(Cussens, 2010). Induction is often viewed from a critical per-
spective, referring to the problem of induction as described by
David Hume (Phillips and Burbules, 2000).
5.3.2 Evidence-Based Features
account age The account age feature represents the time
in days since the account’s creation. Most accounts have
been created within the last decade as frequent online
shopping is a newer purchasing channel than the tradi-
tional mail order business. In order to face fraud with a
long existing account, either the account had to be care-
fully set up by criminals years ago, or the account was
stolen. Therefore, one can suspect that fraud occurs more
often with recently created accounts. The interviewed
companies confirm that the distinction between new and
old customer accounts is crucial (Anon, 2015a,b,c), and
the time since the first order — similar to the account age
— is the most important feature according to Carneiro,
Figueira, and Costa (2017).
country The country feature indicates from which country
an order has been issued. Some e-commerce shops do not
allow products to be ordered from other countries in or-
der to protect themselves against fraud (Hinneburg, 2006).
Carneiro, Figueira, and Costa (2017) use the country fea-
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ture as well but do not mention it as one of the most im-
portant features.
customer age The customer age feature is a metric variable.
According to Hinneburg (2006), criminals are mostly be-
tween 17 and 70 years old — which refers to most of the
customers and, thus, the information seems to be of lim-
ited value.
order origin The order origin is a categorical attribute and
can be either internet, phone, or other (shop, physi-
cal mail, etc.). According to Hinneburg (2006), criminals
switch between channels in order to disguise their inten-
tion.
order hour The order hour describes when the transaction
has been issued. Literature states that some criminals pre-
fer to work from internetcafés at night (Hinneburg, 2006).
It may be concluded that features which identify a device
as a public computer, such as the IP address — which has
not been disclosed, though —, are generally of interest as
well. Carneiro, Figueira, and Costa (2017) list the order
time as one of the most important features.
shipment type Shipment types cover standard and express
delivery. According to Hinneburg (2006), criminals prefer
express delivery in order to quickly obtain the products,
but Carneiro, Figueira, and Costa (2017) do not confirm
this statement.
parcel shop This feature indicates whether a parcel shop
has been used as a shipment address. A parcel shop is
a usually small retail shop that receives and stores the or-
derer’s parcel until it is picked up. In the interviews, it is
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mentioned that orders which are sent to parcel shops are
more likely to be fraudulent (Anon, 2015a).
payment type Payment types include payment via invoice —
which is the most popular option regarding the dataset
—, cash transfer, and credit card. Invoice payments are
regarded as the simplest way to commit a fraud as no
payment information at all is required. According to Hin-
neburg (2006), criminals usually choose payment per in-
voice, but if this leads to significant restrictions, they will
switch to direct debit. Deferred payments are associated
with a higher risk because companies set higher secu-
rity standards for such transactions. Hinneburg (2006) re-
gards payments via credit card as unimportant, but its
importance has increased during the last decade as multi-
ple research articles show (Bahnsen et al., 2016; Carneiro,
Figueira, and Costa, 2017; Dal Pozzolo et al., 2014; Duman
and Ozcelik, 2011; Van Vlasselaer et al., 2015).
total price The total price is the sum of the prices of all in-
dividual order items. Company A states that small, valu-
able items are associated with a higher risk because they
can be resold easily, which accords with Hinneburg (2006).
The total order price is the second most important feature
according to Carneiro, Figueira, and Costa (2017).
5.3.3 Discovery Features
address distance This feature is a metric value describing
the distance between the shipping and the invoice ad-
dress. If the two addresses are the same, it is set to zero.
Large address distances could possibly indicate a stolen
5.3 feature overview 82
account because an order is sent to an address far away
from the initial account owner.
browser The browser feature indicates which internet
browser has been used to place the order. The initial at-
tribute contained the exact browser version, but it was
simplified in order to only state the browser type such as
Chrome, Firefox, and Internet Explorer.
internet service provider The ISP feature is a categorical
variable that states from which internet service provider
the transaction has been issued.
known address An address is considered reliable if the ad-
dress has been used before. In most cases, a new address
is provided. Note that the condition does not imply suc-
cessful delivery or even payment.
new device This feature states whether the orderer’s com-
puter has been registered before, and it is based on a
digital fingerprint that considers a large set of technical
variables (Boda et al., 2012).
number of articles This feature is an integer counting the
number of articles per transaction.
number of devices If the account from which the transac-
tion at hand was issued has been used online, either in
the current or a previous transaction, one or more devices
are registered. The number of devices denotes the device
count associated with the transaction’s customer account.
operating system This feature is a categorical variable that
states from which operating system (e.g. Windows, Linux,
OS X) the order has been placed.
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smartphone The categorical smartphone feature states
whether the orderer used a smartphone. This can only be
true if the order has been placed online.
The above-mentioned features have mixed types like categor-
ical or metric ones. However, some analyses require discrete fea-
tures. In addition, some features contain missing values. These
issues are addressed in the next section, which focuses on trans-
formation of features into an appropriate representation (Webb,
2010) through discretization and imputation.
5.4 transformation
5.4.1 Discretization
Discretization turns metric features into discrete ones. For ex-
ample, the customer age can be converted to a list of intervals.
Although metric data contain more information than discrete
data, the information gain analysis following in Chapter 6 can-
not deal with the former. Thus, feature values are (optionally)
discretized such that metric data are used where possible and
discrete data are used where needed.
Yang (2010) introduces dimensions with which discretization
techniques can be described: In this thesis, all discretization
techniques are global (vs. local), eager (vs. lazy), disjoint (vs.
non-disjoint), and univariate (vs. multivariate). They are global
because they use the full dataset in one single step. They are ea-
ger because discretization is performed before the application
of data mining techniques (instead of being part of them). They
are disjoint because the resulting value ranges do not overlap.
Finally, they are univariate because each attribute is analyzed
individually, which is important in order to conduct the analy-
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sis in Chapter 6 on a per-feature basis. The following discretiza-
tion techniques were used in order to provide results:
entropy Cutpoints are set by minimizing entropy (Fayyad
and Irani, 1993). Entropy is a measure for information un-
certainty and will be explained in detail in Chapter 6. This
technique is a supervised technique because the fraud la-
bels are used to compute entropy values.
fixed-width Fixed-width discretization splits the data into k
equally wide intervals.
equal-sized In equal-sized binning, the number of intervals
is determined by the number of bins. As a special case,
√
n determines both the number of intervals and the bin
size (Yang and Webb, 2001).
chi-squared Chi-squared discretization uses the χ2 statistic
to find out whether adjacent intervals should be merged
(Liu and Setiono, 1995).
In the following chapter, entropy-based,
√
n (fixed-width and
equal-sized), and Chi-squared discretization are applied alter-
natively prior to computing information gain values. Regarding
the dataset, entropy-based discretization creates about two to
five cutpoints, and Chi-squared discretization yields hundreds
of cutpoints.
Of course, the thesis does not aim at exploring the differ-
ences between discretization techniques. However, they influ-
ence the results of the information gain analysis, and being
aware of the conceptual differences between the discretization
techniques helps better understand the results of the analysis.
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5.4.2 Missing Values
Most datasets found in practice contain missing values, and one
has to think carefully about why they occur and how they can
be interpreted (Witten, Frank, and Hall, 2011). The dataset used
in this thesis is first inspected with regard to missing values and
then strategies to deal with these missing values are presented
according to Bruha (2010).
Missing values are filled by performing imputation, which
simply means that they are replaced by more appropriate ones.
Consider this example in which rainfall is measured: “[A] miss-
ing value may mean there was no rain recorded on that day,
and hence it is really a surrogate for 0mm of rain. Alternatively,
perhaps the measuring equipment was not functioning that day
and hence recorded no rain.” (Williams, 2011, p. 161).
Three variables were found to contain missing values: ad-
dress distance (65.10%), parcel shop (59.61%), and customer age
(0.04%). Regarding the first two variables, the fraction of miss-
ing values is alerting. However, there are simple explanations,
and the missing values can be replaced with meaningful ones.
The address distance field is missing if there is no shipment
address at all — the shipment address is an optional field, be-
cause by default, an order is shipped to the invoice address —
or if there is a shipment address but it is identical to the invoice
address. Therefore, missing values can safely be set to 0km.
With regard to the parcel shop, since customers do not live
inside them, it can safely be assumed that an order is not sent to
a parcel shop in case the value is missing, i.e. when no shipment
address is provided. Therefore, the value can be set to false if a
missing value is encountered.
The customer age variable is related to another kind of miss-
ing values. There is no truly correct replacement value such
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as for missing values of the previous variables. The customer
age variable contains missing values simply because the date
of birth is an optional field (or was years ago). In this case,
median-based imputation seems most appropriate. This means
that, if a value is missing, it is replaced with the median as
the best guess. The median is preferred to the mean because it
produces stabler results when facing outliers (Fahrmeir et al.,
2007), which is the case for many of the features (e.g. address
distance and total price).
5.4.3 Feature Interdependence
Metric features were tested for correlations between them us-
ing the Pearson correlation coefficient (Fahrmeir et al., 2007). In
Table 4, the correlation matrix is shown. The strongest correla-
tions of r = 0.38 and r = 0.35 were found for the pair account
age and customer age and for the pair total price and number
of articles — which might be expected. Detailed scatter charts
and histograms of variable pairs have been computed but are
not included in the thesis because from them demographic data
about customers can be inferred, endangering the anonymity of
the company which provided the dataset.
5.5 limitations
It is often difficult to obtain real-world e-commerce transaction
data due to their confidentiality. Therefore, the value of being
able to do so is not being questioned. Nevertheless, it is impor-
tant to name possible limitations.
First, the data do not contain payment information. If fraud
cases remained undetected, they would eventually be recog-
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PAR 100
AAG -22 100
ADD -9 2 100
NOD -4 -3 5 100
TOP -25 15 2 2 100
SMP -13 -6 -8 4 -2 100
OHO -8 -4 -11 -6 3 -4 100
NOA -9 9 -2 0 38 -1 5 100
NEW 2 -15 0 -15 -3 15 0 -5 100
KAD -1 8 -9 20 2 4 -1 6 -8 100
CAG -5 35 5 -6 6 -21 -7 4 -9 1 100
PAR AAG ADD NOD TOP SMP OHO NOA NEW KAD CAG
Table 4: Correlation table using Pearson correlation coefficient (PAR:
parcel shop, AAG: account age, ADD: address distance, NOD:
number of devices, TOP: total order price, SMP: shipment type,
OHO: order hour, NOA: number of articles, NEW: new customer,
KAD: known address, CAG: customer age).
nized as payment default. Thus, despite the problems associ-
ated with payment information, which have been mentioned
in the previous chapter, it could still be interesting to consider
such information in future research.
Second, only a small fraction of the data is labeled. Therefore,
although the labels were assigned carefully, scaling results to
the size of the full dataset may be difficult. In particular, the
experience-based inspection process may lead to selection bias.
For example, fraud officers probably do not label transactions
that are obviously legitimate. This might explain the surpris-
ingly high average fraud ratio.
Third, data are provided by one e-commerce company only.
Considering other datasets as well — for example from compa-
nies that sell different products or from companies of different
size — could increase generalizability of results.
Fourth, the dataset contains one month’s data. Thus, it is dif-
ficult to identify suspicious changes in behavior. In order to
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achieve that, a longer time span would have had to be avail-
able.
5.6 conclusion
In this chapter, data preparation was presented. First, an
overview of the dataset was given, features were presented, and
data transformation steps were explained.
The overview of the dataset covered the aspects sourcing, se-
lecting, and auditing. The dataset was provided by one of Eu-
rope’s largest e-commerce mail order companies and contains
the transactions of one month. Only a fraction of the data is la-
beled fraudulent or legitimate, but the labels are of high quality.
Then, features were divided into two groups, evidence-based
features and discovery features, and each feature was presented
briefly.
In the data transformation part, discretization was motivated
and different techniques were introduced. In addition, it was
explained how missing values were dealt with and which fea-
tures were constructed from the raw data. Feature interdepen-
dence was tested, but no strong or unexpected correlations
were found.
Finally, limitations of the dataset were discussed. Challeng-
ing aspects of the dataset could relate to the question of gener-
alizability and to possible selection bias regarding the distribu-
tion of labels.
The data preparation lay the foundation for subsequent anal-
yses. For every quantitative analysis, proper understanding of
the input data is essential. In particular, the information gain
analysis in the next chapter heavily depends on the discretiza-
tion performed as a preparatory step.
6
F E AT U R E A N A LY S I S
6.1 introduction
The feature analysis chapter is the first of the three analyses
which are based on the quantitative dataset. In this chapter,
the question is examined to what extent the available features,
i.e. properties of a transaction, can help detect fraud cases.
Knowing what to look out for is not only helpful for a more
focused manual inspection but can also improve the prediction
quality of statistical models. Thus, the chapter has two pur-
poses: On the one hand, it aims at being self-contained in the
sense that its results can already be used to support the manual
search for fraud. On the other hand, its findings are supposed
to be used for fine-tuning machine learning algorithms such as
those implemented in Chapter 7.
Besides the term feature, other names are commonly used as
well: In the context of a statistical model where these properties
are used as inputs to an algorithm, features are often referred to
as predictors, “and more classically the independent variables. In
the pattern recognition literature the term features is preferred”
(Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman, 2013, p. 9).
This chapter is structured as follows: First, the question what
makes a feature important is discussed, an overview of feature
selection is given, and it is explained in how far it makes sense
to rely upon such methods. Second, the main method used in
this chapter, information gain, is presented in detail, the em-
pirical analysis is conducted, and findings are discussed. Third,
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the idea of feature combinations is approached by introducing
decision trees. They serve as a thematic transition to Chapter 7,
which focuses on supervised machine learning with gradient
boosted trees and logistic regression.
6.2 feature relevance
In order to approach the problem of feature relevance, a dis-
cussion of its theoretical concept is important. It is difficult to
answer the question what makes a feature useful. From the per-
spective of e-commerce fraud prevention in the mail order busi-
ness, an intuitive definition might be as follows: A feature is
relevant if it helps better distinguish between fraudulent and
legitimate transactions. However, the question remains how a
metric could be defined that measures the ability to achieve this.
A possibly counterintuitive remark shall be given upfront:
Practical [machine learning] algorithms [. . . ] may benefit
from the omission of features, including strongly relevant
features. Relevance of a feature does not imply that it is
in the optimal feature subset and, somewhat surprisingly,
irrelevance does not imply that it should not be in the
optimal feature subset (Kohavi and John, 1997, p. 279).
It is even possible that features can be irrelevant when looked
at individually but useful when combined (Guyon and Elisseff,
2003). Kohavi and John (1997) state that, eventually, the optimal
feature set depends on the choice of the learning algorithm.
However, in general, algorithms usually perform better if
provided with relevant features only (Kohavi and John, 1997;
Witten, Frank, and Hall, 2011), and despite the aforementioned
possibly confusing exceptions, there is a rule stating that it is
generally favorable to reduce the amount of features. Liu (2010)
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mentions the following thought experiment: Imagine four bi-
nary features and the fraud status as the dependent variable
with values fraudulent and legitimate. Consequently, there are
only 24 = 16 possible instances, i.e. combinations of feature val-
ues. The set of all possible relations between the features and
the dependent variable is called hypothesis space. In the exam-
ple, the hypothesis space is 2(2
4) = 65, 536 because each of the
16 possible instances is mapped to either fraudulent or legitimate,
and thus, there are 216 distinct mappings.
Feature selection techniques can be assigned to three cate-
gories: embedded models, wrapper models, and filter models.
When feature selection is embedded, the machine learning al-
gorithm itself is able to evaluate features. Wrapper models ob-
serve the influence of features on the prediction quality of a
machine learning model, and filter models evaluate features
by only looking at the data (Liu, 2010). In addition to such ap-
proaches that are related to feature selection and focus on classi-
fier performance, of course, traditional descriptive statistics can
be computed in order to explore the features and understand
their influence on the fraud status.
One of the simplest approaches to determining feature rele-
vance is to just measure the frequency-based fraud ratios: For
example, an exact combination of values of the features par-
cel shop, new customer, and express delivery might apply to n
cases of which f are fraud; then, of course, the frequency-based
fraud ratio for P(fraud|parcel shop = true, new customer =
true, express delivery = true) is f/n. However, the problem
with this approach is that there are often insufficient or no
data available for such specific combinations of feature values.
Hence, other approaches are necessary.
With scheme-specific selection (wrapper models), “the perfor-
mance of an attribute subset [. . . ] is measured in terms of the
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learning scheme’s classification performance using just those
attributes.” (Witten, Frank, and Hall, 2011, p. 312). This means
that an algorithm is trained again and again but each time a dif-
ferent feature subset is used. Even though “[g]ood results have
been demonstrated on many datasets” (Witten, Frank, and Hall,
2011, p. 312), the approach is computationally expensive — it
requires up to 2m runs when an exhaustive search with m fea-
tures is performed (Witten, Frank, and Hall, 2011).
Another aspect is considered even more important: Using
wrapper or embedded models both requires knowledge about
machine learning algorithms in order to meaningfully interpret
results, but the thesis not only aims at automation of fraud pre-
vention through machine learning but also at providing self-
contained results about feature relevance.
With regard to filter methods, countless variants exist (He,
Cai, and Niyogi, 2006; Mladenic and Grobelnik, 1999; Witten,
Frank, and Hall, 2011). Which one to use seems to depend not
only on the application context but on personal preference as
well. The concept of confidence and support is used in asso-
ciation rule mining (Bayardo Jr. and Agrawal, 1999) and illus-
trates an important thought: With regard to fraud detection,
confidence represents the fraud rate and support is the relative
share of transactions to which the feature (rule) applies; note
that confidence converges towards the average fraud ratio in
the dataset the larger the support value becomes. On the one
hand, it is important to consider both confidence and support:
Even if the fraud rate of a specific pattern were close to 100%,
the overall impact would be low if the pattern were rare. On
the other hand, for classification of individual fraudulent trans-
actions, it does not matter how frequent a pattern is as long as
it is detected at all.
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In this chapter, information gain is used, which can be con-
sidered a filter method of feature selection. It can not only be
used to reduce the number of features prior to computationally
more intense feature selection (Witten, Frank, and Hall, 2011),
but it can easily be interpreted in an isolated way, i.e. the analy-
sis is not tied to a machine learning algorithm. This means that
companies interested in the information gain analysis can repli-
cate it even if they do not want to deal with machine learning.
In the next section, information gain is introduced, computed,
and evaluated.
Despite arguing that information gain is an appropriate mea-
sure for determining feature relevance, it also faces limitations,
which will be discussed later. One of them is that information
gain is computed per individual feature and thus does not con-
sider combinations of feature values. In order to overcome this
particular issue, a decision tree is trained at the end of this chap-
ter. This tree also provides a gentle transition to supervised ma-
chine learning, which is covered in Chapter 7.
6.3 information gain
6.3.1 Introduction
Information gain has wide applications in areas such as ma-
chine learning and information retrieval. It measures the de-
gree to which additional information reduces uncertainty. This
uncertainty, or data impurity, is called entropy in information
theory (Mitchell, 1997). From a mathematical point of view, in-
formation gain is the difference between two levels of uncer-
tainty.
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There are two concepts which must not be confused with
each other: attribute levels and classes. A discrete feature, e.g.
whether the order is sent to a parcel shop, has at least two
attribute levels (parcel shop = true and parcel shop = false).
Such a feature is then evaluated with regard to its ability to
distinguish between the classes fraudulent and legitimate. This
means that, in the case of fraud detection, there is only one
bucket of data at the beginning, which includes fraudulent and
legitimate transactions. The fraction of fraud within this bucket
is used to compute base entropy. The entropy when consider-
ing the parcel shop feature is then calculated using two buck-
ets (namely parcel shop = true and parcel shop = false), each
of which contributes with an entropy value that is weighted
according to the relative size of the bucket. This relation is il-
lustrated in Figure 6. In the example, the original dataset has
a (fictional) fraud rate of 7/16 = 43.75%. However, when the
dataset is split using the parcel shop feature, i.e. condition-
ing the dataset on the attribute values parcel shop = true and
parcel shop = false, the fraud rates of the two subsets are
6/8 = 75% and 1/8 = 12.5%. This represents an information
gain, because given the value of the parcel shop feature, the
uncertainty with regard to the fraud status is reduced.
In general, entropy yields maximum uncertainty for 50%.
Probabilities of 0% and 100% have no uncertainty because the
outcome can be predicted reliably. The formulas for entropy (H)
and information gain (∆H) are depicted below (Mitchell, 1997):
H = −p log2(p) − (1− p) log2(1− p) (1)
∆H = Horiginal −
n∑
i
wiHi (2)
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Figure 6: Visualization of how information gain can be used to esti-
mate feature relevance. The dataset on the left side is di-
vided into two groups, circles and rectangles, which repre-
sent two values of a binary feature, such as the parcel shop
variable.
In the entropy formula, p denotes the fraction of fraud.
For computation of information gain, the sum iterates over
all n value groups of a feature, e.g. parcel shop = true and
parcel shop = false. It weights the entropy per group according
to the relative size of the group, thus measuring the difference
between the old entropy before and the new value after the
potential split. The entropy curve for a binary class case is vi-
sualized in Figure 7. The graph shows that jumping from p to
1− p would yield no information gain due to the symmetry of
the function.
With regard to the example shown in Figure 6, entropy values
and information gain are calculated as follows: First, entropy
for the original dataset without any splits is computed.
Horig. = −
7
16
log2
(
7
16
)
−
(
1−
7
16
)
log2
(
1−
7
16
)
= 0.99
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Figure 7: Visualization of entropy H in a binary class case, such as
fraudulent and legitimate.
Then, entropy values for the individual buckets after the split
(conditioned dataset) are computed and weighted according
to their relative size. In this case, there are only two buckets
(parcel shop = true and parcel shop = false).
Hcond. =
8
16
(
−
6
8
log2
(
6
8
)
−
(
1−
6
8
)
log2
(
1−
6
8
))
+
8
16
(
−
1
8
log2
(
1
8
)
−
(
1−
1
8
)
log2
(
1−
1
8
))
= 0.68
Finally, information gain is computed as the difference be-
tween the two components.
∆H =0.99− 0.68 = 0.31
In the example above, an information gain of 0.31 is achieved,
because the original dataset has almost maximum entropy and
the resulting split achieves a major reduction in uncertainty for
both groups. The groups are equally important since they both
have the same size. Note that the upper bound of the entropy
value depends on the number of classes k. In this thesis, al-
ways only two classes are used (fraudulent and legitimate). Thus,
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values are bounded by zero and one. The upper bound is cal-
culated with log2(k), which may be derived from the entropy
formula.
6.3.2 Analysis
In the analysis, information gain is measured per feature, i.e.
the entropy of the original dataset is compared with the entropy
achieved when a given feature is used to split the data into sub-
sets. The computation is performed with the Jupyter Notebook
in Python using the library NumPy (Pérez and Granger, 2007;
Walt, Colbert, and Varoquaux, 2011).
Figure 8 shows the information gain values. Some of the fea-
tures had to be discretized, but since the choice of the discretiza-
tion technique influences the results, three conceptually dissim-
ilar techniques are applied. As stated earlier, entropy-based dis-
cretization tends to result in fewer bins than
√
n discretization,
and χ2 tends to produce more bins. In general, the noisier a
feature is, the higher the information gain values are that can
be achieved when more bins are generated. For example, con-
sider functions for which x is the feature’s value (e.g. the or-
der price) and y is the associated frequency-based fraud ratio
of that value. Then, if a function has ups and downs, it has
a non-zero information gain because the corresponding bins
that are created through discretization have different fraud ra-
tios. A horizontal line, in contrast, would yield no information
gain, because discretization would lead to identical bins with
the same fraud ratio in each bin. Filled circles ( ) indicate that
the feature has been discretized (e.g. account age), and empty
circles ( ) refer to natively discrete features (e.g. order origin).
Note that, per natively discrete feature, the information gain
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Figure 8: Information gain per feature, plotted with entropy-based
discretization, discretization with
√
n-sized bins, and
χ2-based discretization.
values are the same across the columns in the figure because
no discretization has been performed at all; thus, the informa-
tion gain value is just shown as it is.
6.3.3 Findings
Through qualitative analysis, Hinneburg (2006) suggests that
transaction properties exist which are associated with a higher
fraud risk, such as certain preferred payment methods, delivery
options, and demographic settings. Results show that informa-
tion gain values vary strongly across the feature set and that
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Figure 9: Fraud rate for features address distance and total price plotted
in percentile bins of 10%, i.e. each bin contains one tenth
of the data. The data have been ordered by value, i.e. with
regard to the total price, the bin [0; 10) contains the 10%
cheapest transactions.
there is slight variation among discretization techniques for at
least some of the variables. The five most important features are
total price, account age — which are both supported by Carneiro,
Figueira, and Costa (2017) —, address distance, browser, and par-
cel shop.
The highest information gain is obtained with regard to the
address distance combined with χ2 discretization. Figure 9
shows the distributions of the two features address distance and
total price, which may help understand the corresponding in-
formation gain values. The graph depicts non-cumulative per-
centile ranges on the horizontal axis and the fraud rate on the
vertical axis. For example, the lowest 10% of the feature address
distance, i.e. the distances between the invoice and the shipping
address, are associated with an average fraud rate of only 5.8%,
as shown by the leftmost blue bar in the graph. On the con-
trary, the median address distance is close to 30% fraud, which
means that half of the transactions have a fraud rate above and
the other half have a fraud rate below 30%. Such a high fraud
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rate may seem strange with regard to the e-commerce mail or-
der business, and such values will occur occasionally during
the rest of this chapter. Often, this is influenced by the fact that
fraud is overrepresented in the dataset because clearly legiti-
mate transactions are less likely to be selected for inspection,
and consequently, they are less likely to be labeled, leading to
an artificially high fraud ratio. However, even in relative terms,
30% fraud is still more than five times as much compared to
5.8%. In the third quartile of address distances, the fraud rate
returns to a lower level, eventually rising to 50% with regard
to the highest 10% of address distances that may cross country
borders. This strong variation with multiple ups and downs
explains the high information gain value; when the fraud rate
differences between the bins that are created during discretiza-
tion goes up, information gain also increases. One can suspect
that transactions with extremely low address distances includ-
ing a distance value of zero in which case the shipping address
equals the invoice address are likely to be legitimate because
criminals that steal accounts would probably send the products
to addresses far away from the original account owner. This as-
sumption, however, would need to be verified using additional
data mining techniques.
Similar to the address distance, the distribution of the order
price contains ups and downs, therefore emphasizing the effect
of χ2 discretization. At the lower end, the fraud rate ranges
between 22% and 28%, and at the 30th percentile, there is a
peak of 36%. The fraud rate then declines until the 100th per-
centile. This distribution may be counterintuitive: Why should
higher-valued transactions be associated with lower fraud rates
than lower-valued products? In contrast, Hinneburg (2006) ex-
plicitly states that criminals prefer small goods of high value
and manageable size. The reason for these results could be that
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new customers are required to provide at least a small prepay-
ment if the order prices of their transactions surpass a certain
threshold value. In other words, if new customers order expen-
sive goods, they will have to pay a partial amount in advance
(Anon, 2015a). Criminals would probably not do that. For crim-
inals, it is thus easier to commit a fraud by staying below that
critical value (the cut-off value is known to the author, but it
was requested not to publish it).
Regarding the parcel shop feature, the 54% of the transactions
which had not been sent to a parcel shop showed a fraud rate
of only 8%, whereas the other 46% that had been sent to one
had a fraud rate of 39%. It is assumed that parcel shops offer
the anonymity criminals seek because they are usually used by
numerous people. When a fraud case is detected, the associated
shipment address is usually marked as related to fraud, but
with regard to parcel shops, this would be impractical.
The account age starts with a high fraud rate of approxi-
mately 40% regarding the most recently created accounts and
then steadily decreases to 6% for the longest existing accounts.
Older accounts can seem more credible, because it is unlikely
that a loyal customer starts committing fraud. Therefore, it is as-
sumed that accounts of honest customers are involved in fraud
when they are stolen. In contrast, new accounts can system-
atically be created by fraudsters, which might be the reason
behind the importance of account age.
The order origin feature has a non-zero information gain be-
cause approx. 14% of the customers still order via phone and
such transactions are mostly non-fraud. This is an intuitive re-
sult because ordering via phone involves a more personal level
of communication and takes more time, thus possibly being
less attractive to criminals.
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Figure 10: Fraud rates per attribute value ( ) and frequency distri-
butions ( ) in percent. The fraud rates do not sum to one,
but the frequency distributions do.
The information gain value of the number of devices feature is
only significant due to the low fraud risk of transactions with
zero associated devices. This is the case if and only if an order
is placed via phone as explained above. Thus, the feature is a
bit deceptive because it makes almost no difference how many
devices are connected with an account as long as there is at
least one, which may indicate multicollinearity.
The browser feature is visualized in Figure 10(a): With regard
to the discrete features, the browser has a relatively high infor-
mation gain. It is shown that Chrome is used most often (23%
fraud, 34% usage), but the highest fraud rate is observed with
Firefox users (29% fraud, 25% usage). Significantly lower fraud
rates are associated with Opera users, but the low popularity
of Opera renders it insignificant with regard to the informa-
tion gain value (8% fraud, 1% usage). A strong positive impact
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on information gain is observed regarding Safari users (11%
fraud, 14% usage) and users of other, less common browsers
(5% fraud, 19% usage). The browser feature is difficult to inter-
pret, if a sound explanation exists at all. The Safari browser is
tied to Apple products, and owners of Apple products might
have higher incomes and thus be less likely to commit fraud.
Yet, a socio-demographic explanation like this would have to
be researched properly.
The operating system feature has one of the most interesting
distributions: Again, OS X users (i.e. Apple users) show a low
fraud rate of 8%, but only 5% of all transactions were issued
from OS X. Linux is used in less than 1% of the cases and has
an above-average fraud rate of 35%. 57% of the transactions are
associated with Windows users (except Windows XP) and have
an average fraud rate of 24%. Only 4% use Windows XP, but
this small fraction is fraud in 59% of the cases, and it is one of
the highest fraud rates found in the whole dataset.
Hinneburg (2006, p. 54) states that criminals prefer express
deliveries. However, the data at hand cannot confirm this claim.
In fact, the fraud rate associated with express shipments (16%)
is even slightly lower than the fraud rate corresponding to nor-
mal deliveries (20%), and the feature has one of the lowest in-
formation gain values. This can be confirmed by looking at Fig-
ure 10(b). Requesting to have the parcel delivered at a certain
day reduces the fraud rate more strongly, leading to a higher
entropy difference, but this affects so few cases that the cor-
responding weight (wi) is low, hence scaling down the contri-
bution to information gain. Hinneburg (2006) does not men-
tion such type of delivery at all (possibly specific-date delivery
was not available ten years ago). Regarding the difference be-
tween normal and express delivery, there are many possible
explanations: For example, Hinneburg (2006) could be gener-
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ally right and the sample used in this analysis is coincidentally
not able to confirm such results. Another explanation could be
that criminals might have learned that express deliveries are re-
garded as more suspicious than regular orders and have there-
fore adapted their behavior. No matter what the actual reason
is, the information gain value of the shipment type feature is
almost zero, and thus, the feature seems less relevant.
Figure 11 shows a heatmap for the feature order hour per
weekday. While the order hour already seems to be useful by
itself, it is even more meaningful when viewed as a matrix as
depicted in the figure. The figure shows that the highest fraud
rates are observed late at night during weekdays (particularly
Monday to Wednesday after midnight). Figure 12 complements
the fraud heatmap by depicting the relative transaction volume
per weekday and hour. Note that the values in Figure 12 have
been scaled such that the highest hourly transaction volume ob-
served in the data represents a value of 100, ensuring that both
heatmaps are consistent in terms of value range and coloring.
It can be seen that most transactions have been issued during
the day. The distribution provides evidence for the assumption
that the low (relative) fraud rates observed at the weekend do
not necessarily imply less fraudulent activity but could also be
the result of increased legitimate transactions.
Just like the shipment type feature, the features internet
service provider (ISP), smartphone, number of articles, new device,
known address, payment type, country, and customer age have in-
formation gain values of almost zero. In general, this has at
least one of the two possible reasons: First, if fraud rates differ
insignificantly between feature values — even with sufficient
support (i.e. relative frequency) —, information gain will be
low. Second, if fraud rates differ more strongly but one of the
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1a 2a 3a 4a 5a 6a 7a 8a 9a 10a 11a 12p
Mon 0 33 100 0 0 0 7 16 10 17 21 23
Tue 43 56 78 17 27 8 10 8 23 20 18 31
Wed 67 20 50 0 0 5 6 15 26 23 20 25
Thu 11 40 0 33 7 14 10 16 24 22 15 35
Fri 25 0 33 50 17 16 6 10 22 6 18 21
Sat 22 25 0 0 22 0 0 3 8 7 13 18
Sun 0 50 0 0 0 0 20 13 3 12 5 11
1p 2p 3p 4p 5p 6p 7p 8p 9p 10p 11p 12a
Mon 18 30 30 19 22 19 7 15 19 39 50 19
Tue 19 17 25 15 22 8 5 18 11 27 65 33
Wed 30 43 11 14 15 10 6 21 13 26 36 57
Thu 23 18 16 23 22 0 18 15 50 18 33 25
Fri 32 17 17 12 9 0 0 6 42 19 13 62
Sat 14 18 20 8 16 10 7 15 11 6 33 12
Sun 14 16 6 14 10 9 3 7 24 13 5 25
Figure 11: Heatmap per weekday and hour, with fraud rate values
shown in percent. The hours are left-inclusive, i.e. the value
7a includes all transactions from 6 a.m. to 7 a.m.
1a 2a 3a 4a 5a 6a 7a 8a 9a 10a 11a 12p
Mon 5 3 1 0 10 13 27 48 60 75 50 69
Tue 7 9 9 6 11 25 38 51 63 100 59 86
Wed 12 5 6 0 9 18 32 47 64 87 59 75
Thu 9 5 3 6 14 14 29 53 74 92 40 61
Fri 8 6 3 2 6 18 17 40 61 46 39 38
Sat 9 4 3 2 9 3 17 32 35 42 30 38
Sun 3 2 1 1 6 5 10 30 38 58 59 53
1p 2p 3p 4p 5p 6p 7p 8p 9p 10p 11p 12a
Mon 59 54 54 75 48 25 29 26 26 48 33 20
Tue 68 61 66 83 44 13 19 21 17 54 39 17
Wed 86 88 62 87 58 19 16 23 22 37 27 20
Thu 55 43 36 46 31 3 11 19 8 21 29 12
Fri 46 46 47 41 21 16 14 17 12 30 15 25
Sat 36 32 39 48 44 38 41 52 35 16 15 8
Sun 43 55 65 75 65 34 33 29 57 37 21 8
Figure 12: Frequency distribution of transactions. This heatmap
shows the relative volume of transactions per cell. Values
are not percentages; they have been scaled such that 100
represents the highest hourly transaction volume seen in
the data.
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feature values dominates all the others in terms of support, in-
formation gain will be low as well.
6.3.4 Limitations
Even though information gain offers a good overview of feature
relevance, the results of the analysis should be viewed with
regard to a couple of limitations. The first limitation is a general
restriction of information gain, and the second refers to how the
analysis was conducted.
The first aspect refers to the following idea: Think of a fic-
tional boolean feature stating whether the sun shone at the time
the order was placed. Further assume that fraud is committed if
and only if the day is cloudy. Then, the conditional probability
of fraud given a sunny day would be zero (P(fraud|sunny) = 0)
and the conditional probability for fraud given a cloudy day
would be one (P(fraud|cloudy) = 1). This setting could lead to
a high information gain, but it does not have to. Consider the
case in which the sun shines almost always: Although fraud
could perfectly be predicted, the weighting factor (wi) would
scale down the impact of cloudy days so that there would be
almost no information gain. This circumstance is not necessar-
ily a disadvantage of information gain, but certainly one would
have to ask whether this behavior is desired. On the one hand,
the given feature is a perfect predictor, but on the other hand,
it is only valuable with regard to a tiny amount of transactions.
In general, it is argued that information gain is not supposed to
find such corner cases but instead to rate the feature’s overall
ability to separate fraud from legitimate orders.
The other aspect to consider refers to the combination of fea-
ture values. With regard to information gain, all features are
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evaluated individually. However, reality is more complex. For
example, the fraud risk associated with new customers that
send expensive orders to a parcel shop might be disproportion-
ately higher than the corresponding individual risk values. As
mentioned in the introduction, feature combinations could turn
out to provide additional value like the multivariate visualiza-
tion in Figure 11 indicates. This concept will be addressed in
the next section.
6.4 decision trees
6.4.1 Introduction
As has been stated in the preceding section about limitations,
the information gain analysis examines features individually
and does not consider combinations of feature values. In this
section, the idea of feature combinations is implemented via
a decision tree; alternative techniques such as association rule
mining could lead to similar results (Witten, Frank, and Hall,
2011). In Chapter 7, two methods of supervised machine learn-
ing, logistic regression and gradient boosted trees, will be in-
troduced, which serve as classifiers for automated fraud detec-
tion and form the foundation for the utility-based perspective
in Chapter 8. Conceptually, gradient boosted trees build upon
the theory of decision trees. In this section, the theoretical back-
ground of decision trees is introduced, an instance is trained,
and the tree is evaluated and interpreted in order to estimate
the value of feature combinations compared to analyzing fea-
tures in an isolated way, such as done in the information gain
analysis.
6.4 decision trees 108
Decision trees have been applied to health care fraud (Li et
al., 2008), credit card fraud (Sahin, Bulkan, and Duman, 2013),
credit assessment (Chung and Suh, 2009), and automobile in-
surance fraud (Viaene et al., 2002). Therefore, it seems reason-
able that the method could work well in the e-commerce mail
order business, too.
From a theoretical point of view, Mitchell (1997, p. 52) states:
“Decision tree learning is one of the most widely used and prac-
tical methods for inductive inference. It is a method for approx-
imating discrete-valued functions that is robust to noisy data
and capable of disjunctive expressions.” This is another way
of stating that decision trees can learn rules based on discrete-
valued data that may contain errors. Such rules can represent
an arbitrary combination of feature values.
Several algorithms for decision trees exist (ID3, C4.5, and
CART), but as decision trees are a means to an end, the algo-
rithms are not described in detail. In general, decision trees
follow a divide-and-conquer approach (Witten, Frank, and Hall,
2011). “Nodes in a decision tree involve testing a particular at-
tribute” (Witten, Frank, and Hall, 2011, p. 64). For example, the
first node could — and, as the results show, will — split the
dataset into two subsets, one containing transactions issued
from freshly created customer accounts and one containing
transactions issued from more mature customer accounts.
In order to determine which attribute is most appropriate
for splitting, a performance metric such as information gain or
Gini impurity is calculated at each node until a stopping cri-
terion is met. The simplest stopping criterion is that there are
no more data to divide; others include a maximum tree depth
or ratios between frequencies of the attributes’ levels. After con-
struction of the tree, it can be pruned in order to reduce the risk
of overfitting (Mitchell, 1997). “If the number of coefficients is
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large relative to the number of training instances, the result-
ing model will be ‘too nonlinear’ — it will overfit the training
data” (Witten, Frank, and Hall, 2011, p. 224). This means that
the model is too specific, i.e. it does not generalize well. There-
fore, overfitting should be avoided.
Decision trees offer an attractive knowledge representation,
which can be visualized in a convenient manner. In addition,
the tree-based layout can easily be expressed as a set of rules.
6.4.2 Analysis
For the analysis, the python machine learning library scikit-
learn is used. The tree is built as follows: First, the algorithm
looks for the feature that creates the highest information gain,
which is the account age feature. With Figure 8 in mind, this
might be surprising because, although account age was among
the most relevant features, it did not clearly stand out. How-
ever, although the decision tree algorithm relies on information
gain in order to select which attribute is most valuable, features
are discretized in a slightly different way than shown above.
The algorithm tries every possible cut-off value, which leads to a
marginally different result than in the information gain analysis
and puts account age at the top of the list. Second, once the root
has been set, the data are split into two groups. Then, for each
group, the process is repeated until a tree of satisfying length
has been retrieved. In this case, the tree has only a depth of
three levels in order to generate well arranged rules. Figure 13
not only shows results but might also help understand the pro-
cess. In this analysis, the full dataset has been used for training
the tree, because this chapter aims at exploring and evaluating
the features. It may seem unusual not to reserve a fraction of
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the data for model testing, but the decision tree would be pe-
nalized compared to the information gain analysis if it were
trained using only a subset of the data. In contrast, in the fol-
lowing chapter, which aims at training prediction models, k-
fold cross-validation will be used in order to avoid overfitting
of the models (Segaran, 2007; Witten, Frank, and Hall, 2011).
6.4.3 Findings
The beginning of the tree is shown in Figure 13, plotted from
left to right. The first bifurcation splits the data according to
the account age. The upper branch contains the data associated
with accounts older than 4.5 days, and the lower branch con-
tains the complementary set. There are two metrics built into
the visualization: an arc above and an arc below each node (cir-
cle). The red arc represents the fraud rate, and the black arc
represents the relative share of the data. 100% corresponds to a
value of 180 degree. This is why the black arc is a semicircle —
the first node represents the whole dataset. The node is labeled
account age because the following split is performed with regard
to that feature. The average fraud rate with regard to the full
dataset is 18.9%, hence the red arc spans 0.189 · 180◦ = 34.02◦.
The figure shows just the first three levels of the tree — the
other features are hidden in deeper levels. However, one can
already find a combination of feature values (rule) with one of
the highest fraud rates of 75.6% discussed so far: It is the subset
of transactions that corresponds to the node labeled 6 in the
tree visualization and to which the following setting applies:
The account from which the order has been issued is not older
than 4.5 days; the order has been sent to a parcel shop; and it
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Figure 13: Decision tree with three layers with the fraud rate (red)
and the fraction of the data (black). 100% corresponds to a
value of 180 degree. Fraud rates (red) and relative frequen-
cies (black) are rounded.
has been issued from an unknown device, i.e. a computer or
mobile phone not yet registered with a fingerprint.
In contrast, one of the lowest fraud rates of 5.25% can be
found at the subset of transactions labeled 3 in the figure. The
corresponding rule is: The account associated with the transac-
tion is older than 4.5 days; the shipping address lies within
92.41km of the invoice address; and the transaction has not
been issued between midnight and 4:30 a.m.
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6.4.4 Limitations
In the previous sections, sharp decision borders, such as dis-
tinguishing between transactions with a distance greater than
92.41km between shipping and invoice address, or less, respec-
tively, may seem arbitrary. Yet, they are not — the decision tree
decided to choose such cut-off values with optimization of in-
formation gain in mind. Yet, a binary decision border may not
be the best fit for a natively metric feature such as the address
distance. Some types of decision trees support multiway splits,
i.e. splitting into more than two subsets per junction. However,
“[w]hile this can sometimes be useful, it is not a good general
strategy. The problem is that multiway splits fragment the data
too quickly, leaving insufficient data at the next level down.
Thus, one would want to use such splits only when needed.
Since multiway splits can be achieved by a series of binary
splits, the latter are preferred” (Hastie, Tibshirani, and Fried-
man, 2013, p. 311).
Decision trees impose a hierarchical structure on the data.
Thus, at least one feature — the account age in this case — is
always set. In contrast, in association rule mining, rules are de-
rived that do not necessarily share at least one common feature
(Witten, Frank, and Hall, 2011). The fact that decision trees rely
on a hierarchy does not have to be a disadvantage, though, as
long as the features assigned to the higher-level nodes are actu-
ally most important. The gradient boosted trees implemented
in Chapter 7 alleviate this problem by building more than just
one tree and by randomizing the design of the trees.
An important remark is that the fraud labels are overrepre-
sented in the dataset, which leads to possibly unrealistically
high fraud rates. This circumstance is problematic if the values
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Features with highest information gain:
• Total price
• Account age
• Address distance
• Browser
• Parcel shop
Key combinations according to decision tree:
• Old accounts, high address distances, not parcel shop
• Fresh accounts, not parcel shop, new device
• Fresh accounts, not parcel shop, old device
Strongest coefficients of logistic regression (cf. Chapter 7)
• Parcel shop
• Operating system: Windows XP
• Payment type: deferred payments
• Browser: other (lowers risk)
• Order origin: phone (lowers risk)
Table 5: List of key features according to information gain, decision
tree, and logistic regression.
are interpreted as estimates of actual probabilities. The issue
will be picked up again in Chapter 8.
6.5 conclusion
At the beginning of the feature analysis chapter, the concept
of feature relevance was introduced and motivated. A theoreti-
cal overview was given, and information gain was presented
first. Results showed that a subset of the available features
could serve as promising fraud risk indicators. Moreover, re-
sults showed that some of the features could possibly be dis-
carded, although feature relevance depends on the context, and
with regard to other algorithms, other sets of features could be
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relevant. Descriptive statistics were presented both numerically
and visually in order to interpret results. Following a discus-
sion of limitations, the idea of feature combinations was dis-
cussed, for which decision trees were introduced briefly. A sin-
gle tree was trained on the dataset and visualized in order to
point out the exploratory power of the tree and the set of rules
that can be derived from it.
Table 5 summarizes the key features with regard to informa-
tion gain, feature combinations of the decision tree, and coeffi-
cients of logistic regression. The latter results will be discussed
in detail in the next chapter, which deals with machine learn-
ing. The decision tree was the first touchpoint for supervised
machine learning, but as part of the information gain analysis,
it was purely used for descriptive purposes. In the next chap-
ter, two machine learning algorithms will be trained in order to
actually predict the fraud status of new transactions.
7
P R E D I C T I O N M O D E L
7.1 introduction
In Chapter 4, the fraud prevention process was examined from
a qualitative point of view, and in the chapters thereafter, the
quantitative dataset was introduced and the features’ ability to
help detect fraud was analyzed. Both the qualitative and the
quantitative research that has been conducted so far have a de-
scriptive character.
In contrast, this chapter deals with building a prediction
model that can estimate the fraud risk of future transactions on
the basis of the same dataset that has been used in Chapter 6.
In order to achieve this, machine learning is utilized, which “is
concerned with the question of how to construct computer pro-
grams that automatically improve with experience” (Mitchell,
1997, p. XV).
Machine learning is a subfield of artificial intelligence
(AI) concerned with algorithms that allow computers to
learn. What this means, in most cases, is that an algo-
rithm is given a set of data and infers information about
the properties of the data — and that information allows
it to make predictions about other data that it might see
in the future. This is possible because almost all nonran-
dom data contains patterns, and these patterns allow the
machine to generalize. In order to generalize, it trains a
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model with what it determines are the important aspects
of the data (Segaran, 2007, p. 3).
In the context of fraud detection, machine learning algo-
rithms can learn patterns frequently associated with fraud and
thus help identify suspicious cases. In the stricter sense, learning
refers to supervised methods (the distinction between super-
vised, unsupervised, and semi-supervised methods has been
addressed in the literature review in Chapter 2).
There are many different machine-learning algorithms, all
with different strengths and suited to different types of
problems. Some, such as decision trees, are transparent,
so that an observer can totally understand the reasoning
process undertaken by the machine. Others, such as neu-
ral networks, are black box, meaning that they produce
an answer, but it’s often very difficult to reproduce the
reasoning behind it (Segaran, 2007, p. 4).
Data mining, statistics, and machine learning are often not
clearly separated from each other. According to Witten, Frank,
and Hall (2011, p. 8), “[d]ata mining is a topic that involves [ma-
chine] learning in a practical, non-theoretical sense.” Regarding
the distinction between statistics and machine learning, Witten,
Frank, and Hall (2011, pp. 29 sq.) state:
In truth, you should not look for a dividing line between
machine learning and statistics because there is a contin-
uum — and a multidimensional one at that — of data
analysis techniques. Some derive from the skills taught in
standard statistics courses, and others are more closely as-
sociated with the kind of machine learning that has arisen
out of computer science. If forced to point to a single dif-
ference of emphasis, it might be that statistics has been
7.2 machine learning fundamentals 117
more concerned with testing hypotheses, whereas machine
learning has been more concerned with formulating the
process of generalization as a search through possible hy-
potheses. But this is a gross oversimplification: Statistics
is far more than just hypothesis testing, and many ma-
chine learning techniques do not involve any searching
at all.
The chapter is organized as follows: First, machine learning
is presented from a conceptual point of view. Second, algo-
rithms used in this thesis are discussed in greater detail. Third,
the machine learning procedure is conducted, and findings are
presented. Fourth, limitations of the chosen approach are dis-
cussed. Finally, the chapter closes with conclusions drawn from
the preceding findings.
7.2 machine learning fundamentals
7.2.1 Introduction
In machine learning, supervised, unsupervised, and semi-
supervised machine learning methods exist, as described in the
literature review in Chapter 2. In the following paragraphs, the
three strategies are revisited.
Supervised methods use reference labels, i.e. a ground truth
(fraud labels), to learn patterns from historical data. In contrast,
unsupervised techniques do not require such labels; they only
look at the transactions’ properties (even if labels were avail-
able). Clustering (Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman, 2013) and
outlier detection (Aggarwal, 2013) are examples for such un-
supervised learning techniques. In fraud detection, outlier de-
tection could identify transactions with suspiciously high or-
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der values. Also, sudden changes in buying behavior, such as
much more frequent orders, could constitute suspicious behav-
ior (Aggarwal, 2013). Semi-supervised machine learning com-
bines both strategies and is appropriate in a setting where both
strategies would not lead to the best results used by themselves
(Chapelle, Schölkopf, and Zien, 2010), for example when only
a subset of the data is labeled.
In this thesis, supervised techniques are used for two reasons:
First, fraud labels are available. Second, the aim of the analy-
sis is to predict the fraud status of future transactions. Find-
ing anomalies (outliers) could also indicate fraud, but learning
from fraud labels is a more direct inference than assuming that
anomalous behavior equals fraud. Of course, it could be valu-
able to extend the analysis with unsupervised methods in fu-
ture research. However, this extension would exceed the scope
of this thesis. The choice of specific supervised learning tech-
niques will be discussed later.
According to Mitchell (1997), most of these supervised learn-
ing problems can be characterized through four generic mod-
ules: a type of training experience, a target function, a rep-
resentation of the learned function, and a learning algorithm.
Mitchell (1997) explains these components by referring to a
chess game.
Regarding the training experience, a machine learning algo-
rithm can, for example, gather experience by playing against it-
self or against experts (Mitchell, 1997). In fraud prevention, the
former could be difficult to achieve since, in contrast to a game
like chess, there is no defined set of rules according to which
criminals create new fraudulent transactions. Thus, the algo-
rithm must learn through externally induced data such as the
fraud reference labels contained within the transaction dataset.
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predicted fraudulent predicted legitimate
fraudulent true positive (TP) false negative (FN)
legitimate false positive (FP) true negative (TN)
Table 6: Confusion matrix for binary fraud classification.
In chess, the target function can either evaluate the value of
a move to a new board state (a state is a description of every
chessman’s position on the board) or the new board state itself
(Mitchell, 1997). The difference is that the former approach con-
siders the change and the latter considers the status quo of the
game regardless of the move, i.e. other moves could have led to
the same state. Unlike in chess, however, where different moves
can lead to the same state and different states can precede the
same move, the problem is less complex in fraud prevention
because each move (either considering a transaction fraudulent
or legitimate) leads to one out of only four outcomes, depend-
ing on the actual fraud status of the transaction. This relation
is depicted in Table 6. Note that the confusion matrix is struc-
turally identical to the decision matrix (Table 1) in Chapter 2 —
the cells are just phrased differently. Therefore, the target func-
tion only measures whether the move was correct or not or, if a
fraud score is computed, how close it is to the real value (such
as 0 for legitimate and 1 for fraud).
The representation of the learned function is the entity that is
capable of making decisions after it has been trained. For exam-
ple, this could be an artificial neural network, a linear function
or a polynomial (Mitchell, 1997). With regard to fraud, it should
be possible to understand predictions in order to justify deci-
sions. While neural networks are black-box models and cannot
be understood on a per-case basis, predictions based on deci-
sion trees can be explained easily (Mitchell, 1997).
7.2 machine learning fundamentals 120
Finally, the learning algorithm must be chosen. It determines
how the target function is estimated. Mitchell (1997) mentions
gradient descent and linear programming as examples. There-
fore, the learning in machine learning can also be viewed as an
optimization of a target function.
Two different supervised machine learning methods are
trained and tested in this chapter: logistic regression and gradi-
ent boosted trees. The methods are conceptually dissimilar in
order to increase generalizability of results. As argued in the
literature review, supervised machine learning has proven its
effectiveness in various related applications. In addition, logis-
tic regression and random forests (a method similar to gradient
boosted trees) have been used by Carneiro, Figueira, and Costa
(2017) in order to build a model for credit card fraud detection
in the e-commerce mail order business. In the following, logistic
regression and gradient boosted trees will be introduced. Note
that the notation of the formulas introduced in the following
paragraphs has been modified in order to maintain a consistent
presentation and may therefore differ slightly from the original
sources with regard to what symbols are used and how indices
are placed.
7.2.2 Logistic Regression
Logistic regression is well known in both statistics and ma-
chine learning, and according to Ngai et al. (2011), it is the
most frequently used technique in financial fraud detection.
“The logistic regression model arises from the desire to model
the posterior probabilities of the [. . . ] classes via linear func-
tions [. . . ], while at the same time ensuring that they sum to
one and remain in [0,1]” (Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman,
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2013, p. 119). In particular, since there are only two classes
(i.e. K = 2), fraudulent and legitimate, the model is simpli-
fied because “there is only a single linear function” (Hastie,
Tibshirani, and Friedman, 2013, p. 119). Logistic regression ac-
cepts a vector of numeric feature values as input and yields
a value between zero and one in order to estimate the fraud
risk of a transaction. Logistic regression is implemented using
the Python package scikit-learn (Pedregosa et al., 2011), which
is actively developed and has 982 contributors at the time
of writing (https://github.com/scikit-learn/scikit-learn).
The logistic model is formulated as follows (Hastie, Tibshirani,
and Friedman, 2013):
Pr(G = k|X = xi) =
1
1+ exp(β0 +βTxi)
(3)
k class (i.e. fraudulent or legitimate)
xi feature vector of instance i
β0 intercept value
β variable coefficients
For logistic regression, Equation 3 depicts the representation
of the learned function (which is one of the four generic mod-
ules of learning problems mentioned above). Given a transac-
tion i with the feature vector xi, the probability that a transac-
tion is fraudulent is represented by Pr = (G = 1|X = x). In
order to actually compute such values, the parameters of the
logistic function β are needed. Obtaining such values is an op-
timization problem, which scikit-learn implements with the LI-
BLINEAR solver (Fan et al., 2008). The target function (another
component of the four generic modules) is defined as follows
(Fan et al., 2008; Hsieh et al., 2008):
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min
ω
1
2
ωTω+C
l∑
i=1
ζ(ω; xi,yi) (4)
ω model parameters (called β above)
C penalty term
xi feature vector of instance i
yi class of instance i, yi ∈ {−1,+1}
l number of instances
ζ loss function
The minimization consists of two parts: 12ω
Tω, which is the
regularization term (L2 regularization), and the term that con-
tains the loss function C
∑l
i=1 ζ(ω; xi,yi). The former, i.e. the
regularization term, punishes very large parameters in order to
avoid overfitting of the function. Note that ωTω is the sum of
the squares of the parameters. The latter term simply contains
the loss function, which is the following (Hsieh et al., 2008):
ζ(ω; xi,yi) = max(1− yiωTxi, 0)2 (5)
As Equation 5 shows, correct classifications yield zero loss,
and incorrect classifications yield a loss value that corresponds
to the difference between the actual (1 or −1) and the estimated
value (ωTxi). In order to reach the minimum of the target func-
tion, LIBLINEAR employs dual coordinate descent (Hsieh et al.,
2008), which is the learning algorithm — the final component
of the four generic modules of machine learning.
Logistic regression is chosen as a method due to its popular-
ity in machine learning. In addition, it will be possible to com-
pare results with those of Carneiro, Figueira, and Costa (2017),
who developed a model to detect credit card fraud in the e-
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commerce mailorder business and used logistic regression for
the same reason.
Using evaluation metrics independent of the algorithm, per-
formance of logistic regression will be measured and compared
to that of gradient boosted trees in the findings section of this
chapter. However, the coefficients that are specific to logistic
regression — and corresponding significance values — are pre-
sented in Table 7.
Most of the features are significant at a significance level of
α = 0.05. It could be assumed that a strong coefficient is cor-
related with the information gain value as both measures rep-
resent the influence of fraud. However, this does not have to
be the case: Analysis shows one of the largest coefficents for
orders that were made via phone call (-1.4308), but regarding
the information gain analysis, the order origin feature shows
only average values. A possible reason could be that most or-
ders are made online, and information gain considers this fact
when estimating feature importance, leading to a decrease of
relevance. In contrast, the coefficent for orders via phone mea-
sures the effect on the fraud rate only for phone orders, and it
is strong. This example shows that coefficients should be inter-
preted differently and provide additional insights besides in-
formation gain analysis. In general, the estimated coefficients
are consistent with the fraud rates measured per feature and
results of the information gain analysis.
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Feature coefficient p
Account age (years) -0.0904 0.00
Address distance (km) 0.0041 0.00
Browser [Chrome]
– Android 0.5815 0.48
– Firefox 0.1395 0.00
– IE -0.5293 0.41
– Opera -0.9984 0.05
– Safari -0.6370 0.00
– other -1.1354 0.00
Country is Germany -0.4115 0.00
Customer age -0.0051 0.00
Express shipment -0.1138 0.01
Known address -0.1448 0.86
New device -0.4701 0.22
Number of articles -0.0731 0.00
Order hour -0.0288 0.00
Operating system [Win., not XP]
– Android -0.0860 0.04
– iOS 0.2246 0.00
– Linux -0.0916 0.03
– Mac OS -0.3909 0.00
– Windows XP 1.5633 0.00
– other 0.3253 0.00
Order origin is phone call -1.4308 0.00
Parcel shop 1.2108 0.00
Payment type [invoice]
– credit card -0.4877 0.01
– rates 1.2843 0.01
Smartphone used -0.0726 0.00
Total price -0.0003 0.00
Likelihood Ratios LR+
at 5th percentile 12.32
at 15th percentile 12.01
at 25th percentile 8.01
Table 7: Coefficients of logistic regression and associated p-values.
Likelihood ratios are shown below. Since discrete features
have been dummy-coded, their reference values are given in
square brackets.
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For the logistic regression model, likelihood ratios are calcu-
lated. Positive likelihood ratio (LR+) is defined as sensitivity
divided by 1− specificity (Florkowski, 2008). In other words, it
is the ratio of two ratios: (1) The ratio of transactions considered
fraudulent that are actually fraud compared to all fraud cases
divided by (2) the ratio of legitimate cases considered fraudu-
lent compared to all legitimate cases. “The further likelihood
ratios are from 1 the stronger the evidence for the [target fea-
ture]. Likelihood ratios above 10 [. . . ] are considered to provide
strong evidence [. . . ].” (Deeks and Altman, 2004, p. 168).
Since fraud prevention departments process lists of trans-
actions ordered by the estimated fraud risk, likelihood ratios
are calculated for multiple positions in the list at different per-
centiles, which is shown at the bottom of Table 7. Regarding the
5 percent most suspicious transactions, LR+ is 12.32. Therefore,
regarding the transactions up to the 5th percentile, it is 12.32
times more likely to classify a fraudulent transaction as fraud
than to classify a legitimate transaction as fraud.
7.2.3 Gradient Boosted Trees
Tree-based models are quite different to common statistical pro-
cedures such as logistic regression. A single decision tree has
been presented in Chapter 6 in order to estimate the impor-
tance of feature combinations. However, decision trees as im-
plemented in Chapter 6 “can lead to difficulties when there is
noise in the data or when the number of training examples is
too small to produce a representative sample of the true tar-
get function. In either of these cases, this simple algorithm can
produce trees that overfit the training examples” (Mitchell, 1997,
pp. 66 sq.).
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In this section, gradient boosted trees are introduced, which
better deal with these possible issues and therefore provide
more robust solutions. They are implemented using the Python
package xgboost (DMLC, 2016). Like scikit-learn, it is actively
developed and has 259 contributors at the time of writing
(https://github.com/dmlc/xgboost).
Generally speaking, gradient boosted trees are ensembles of
trees. These ensembles are iteratively extended such that each
iteration improves the results of the current set of trees (Chen
and Guestrin, 2016). Each tree is built to complement the ex-
isting ensemble and may thus specialize in detecting certain
sub-patterns. Equation 6 is the representation of the learned
function, and it shows that the estimated score for a transac-
tion i is the sum of the Q additive functions, i.e. trees (Chen
and Guestrin, 2016):
yˆi =
Q∑
q=1
fq(xi) (6)
Q number of functions (trees)
fq instance q of the space of possible trees
xi feature vector of instance i
yˆi estimated score for instance i
The resulting values are not automatically probability es-
timates. However, such probabilities can be obtained by ap-
plying the logistic transformation, which is explained in the
xgboost documentation (http://xgboost.readthedocs.io/en/
latest/model.html).
Each function fq represents a single decision tree with
weights ω and the total number of leaves L. In order to find
the best ensemble, the following target function is minimized
(Chen and Guestrin, 2016):
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min
ω
Q∑
q=1
γL+
1
2
λωTω+
n∑
i=1
l(yˆi,yi) (7)
ω branch weights
γ, λ constants
l differentiable, convex loss function
yˆi estimated score for instance i
Minimization of the target function is performed with gradi-
ent descent of a second order derivative of the target function
(Chen and Guestrin, 2016). This procedure represents the learn-
ing algorithm and is the reason for gradient in gradient boosted
trees. The full procedure is documented by Chen and Guestrin
(2016).
7.2.4 Sampling with Cross Validation
The dataset as it has been prepared in Chapter 5 is sampled
with cross validation. In this section, it is explained what cross
validation is and why it is important. The prediction model de-
veloped in this chapter aims at best forecasting the fraud status
of future transactions, i.e. it aims at learning a concept (depend-
ing on the type of algorithm, this could be a set of rules) that
best detects fraud not only regarding the currently available but
also future, yet unseen data. In order to achieve this transfer
from historical to future data, performance of machine learn-
ing models should not be measured using the training dataset.
The reason is that it can contain errors (i.e. incorrectly assigned
fraud labels), and learning such errors decreases performance
in a real application but not regarding the training dataset. Con-
sider the following analogy: A student prepares for an exam
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and reads a textbook that contains a couple of errors. The stu-
dent completes the exercises in the textbook without any prob-
lems and probably feels quite confident about the upcoming
exam. However, he or she then receives a much lower grade
than expected because part of what the student had learned
was actually wrong. In machine learning, it is important to test
algorithms using another dataset than the one the model has
been trained with in order to reduce the error introduced by
generalization from a limited number of cases (i.e. the size of
the sample).
Therefore, using the training dataset for measuring perfor-
mance of machine learning models is insufficient (Russell and
Norvig, 2012). In order to estimate prediction quality, such
models have to be tested with transactions that have not been
used for training. One possible method to achieve this is to
simply split the dataset into training and test data. However,
doing so drastically reduces the amount of data available for
both training and testing, which can lower generalizability of
results. The sampling method k-fold cross validation alleviates
this problem by using each transaction both for training and
testing.
The standard way of predicting the error rate [i.e. the frac-
tion of false positives and false negatives] of a learning
technique given a single, fixed sample of data is to use
stratified tenfold cross-validation. The data is divided ran-
domly into 10 parts in which the class is represented in
approximately the same proportions as in the full dataset.
Each part is held out in turn and the learning scheme
trained on the remaining nine-tenths; then its error rate
is calculated on the holdout set. Thus, the learning proce-
dure is executed a total of 10 times on different training
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Figure 14: Visualization of 5-fold cross validation; the 10 transactions
(L for legitimate and F for fraudulent transactions) are iter-
ated over 5 times, and each time, another fraction is used
for training and the remainder is used for testing. In each
iteration, the full dataset is used.
sets (each set has a lot in common with the others). Fi-
nally, the 10 error estimates are averaged to yield an over-
all error estimate (Witten, Frank, and Hall, 2011, p. 153).
In the analysis, 10-fold cross validation is performed. The
process is also visualized in Figure 14 for k = 5 (which is eas-
ier to show). Other numbers of folds would have been possible,
of course, but Witten, Frank, and Hall (2011) state that there is
both theoretical and practical evidence that 10-fold cross vali-
dation yields the best results.
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7.3 findings
In order to assess performance of logistic regression and gra-
dient boosted trees for fraud detection, evaluation measures
have to be defined. Such a measure (also called metric in the
following) should be able to provide immediate insights about
an algorithm’s relevance with regard to fraud detection. How-
ever, not all measures are able to provide this. For example, the
coefficient of determination, R2, is computed for evaluation of
regression models, and it answers the question what fraction
of the observed variance is explained by the regression model
(Fahrmeir et al., 2007). Therefore, models with higher R2 values
are preferred. Although the metric can be used to choose from
competing models, it does not enable decision makers to under-
stand the immediate impact of the chosen model on the success
of their fraud detection activities. Thus, other metrics will be
introduced that allow decision makers to better interpret how
the use of an automated fraud detection model influences their
work. A detailed overview of various evaluation measures can
be found in Chapter A in the appendix. In this section, a brief
conceptual overview is provided, and the measures used in the
analysis are presented in detail.
Manning, Raghavan, and Schütze (2009) present two cate-
gories for evaluation measures, set-based measures and measures
for ranked retrieval. Set-based measures require classification of
transactions into distinct groups (sets). Then, relations between
these groups can be computed, such as the fraction of cor-
rectly classified (labeled) transactions. In contrast, measures for
ranked lists consider the order of such lists.
Logistic regression and gradient boosted trees both produce
ranked lists with estimated fraud probabilities. This means that
a transaction at position k in the list is considered more suspi-
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cious (i.e. more likely to be fraudulent) than a transaction at
position k+ 1. Ranked lists can be converted to sets: Carneiro,
Figueira, and Costa (2017) search a threshold-value to cut the
list into fraudulent and legitimate transactions, and these sets
can then be evaluated with set-based measures. For Carneiro,
Figueira, and Costa (2017), this is an appropriate strategy, be-
cause they develop an automated system which deals with the
most suspicious cases and the remainder is inspected manually.
Thus, it is inevitable to form such distinct groups in order to
assign transactions to either automated processing or manual
inspection.
However, as presented in Chapter 4, the fraud detection pro-
cess explored in this thesis always contains manual revision.
Fraud officers inspect transactions until their capacity is ex-
hausted. Consequently, it matters in which order transactions
considered fraudulent are inspected, and strict assignment into
groups (sets) seems inappropriate. The model developed in this
chapter aims at supporting that process by ordering transac-
tions according to the estimated fraud risk, indicating which
(potentially) fraudulent transactions should be inspected first.
Confusion matrices, the basis for many metrics (Shani and
Gunawardana, 2011), are introduced first, from which the mea-
sures used in this thesis will be developed. An example for a
confusion matrix is shown in Table 6. It depicts the four pos-
sible outcomes of classification given the true fraud status. For
example, if a fraudulent transaction is correctly predicted as
fraudulent, the outcome is a true positive. A perfect predic-
tion model would have only true positives and true negatives,
because all cases would be classified correctly. However, it is
almost impossible not to make any prediction errors in the
given context. In general, “[g]ood results correspond to large
numbers down the main diagonal and small, ideally zero, off-
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diagonal elements [of the matrix]” (Witten, Frank, and Hall,
2011, p. 164). From the four outcomes shown in the table, ad-
ditional metrics depicting relations between them can be com-
puted, such as precision at k, a measure for ranked lists extend-
ing regular precision, which is based on the confusion matrix.
Precision at k is regarded as the most important metric for algo-
rithm performance — arguments for this claim will be provided
below.
Regular precision is defined as the number of correctly de-
tected fraud cases (i.e. true positive cases) divided by the num-
ber of cases that are classified as fraudulent (Shani and Gu-
nawardana, 2011):
precision =
true positives
#(labeled fraud)
(8)
Then, precision at k is defined as the precision value for the
set of transactions up to the kth percentile of a ranked list:
precision at k =
true positives within kth percentile
#(labeled fraud within kth percentile)
(9)
Assume that an e-commerce mail order company is able to
inspect approximately k percent of its transactions, and using
a prediction model such as developed in this chapter, the com-
pany creates a ranked list ordered by the fraud risk. Ideally,
all transactions up to the inspection capacity (corresponding
to the kth percentile) should be fraud cases, or alternatively all
fraud cases contained in the dataset should be among the top k
percent of the cases presented. Hence, in this particular applica-
tion, precision at k is just the fraud ratio of all cases until the kth
percentile. The measure does not only describe the status quo
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but can also indicate an optimal degree of utilization because
one can plot a precision curve and understand how many fraud
cases different levels of inspection capacity could yield.
The precision curves for logistic regression and gradient
boosted trees are shown in Figure 15. Gradient boosted trees
slightly outperform logistic regression, but the more k increases
— moving down the lines to the right —, the less the differ-
ence between the two is. Eventually, when all transactions are
considered, it does not matter which algorithm is used for sort-
ing transactions and precision at k is the average fraud ratio of
the whole dataset. An advantage of precision as an evaluation
metric is that the relative number can be converted to an ab-
solute one in order to estimate the impact on a business (the
coefficient of determination was criticized for lacking this prop-
erty): For example, if the 2% most suspicious transactions were
reviewed, gradient boosted trees would yield a precision rate
of 85% (75% for logistic regression). Imagine that a company
processes 5,000 transactions per day; then, the top 2% corre-
spond to 100 transactions, of which approximately 85 would
be fraudulent (75 cases using logistic regression). In contrast, if
100 transactions were randomly sampled, only approximately
19 would be fraudulent because the fraud rate in the dataset is
19%.
Although precision at k is considered the most appropriate
metric regarding the fraud prevention process, two alternative
evaluation techniques will be discussed below. The first is the
Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve, which is shown
in Figure 16. “ROC curves depict the performance of a classi-
fier without regard to class distribution or error costs. They plot
the true positive rate on the vertical axis against the [false posi-
tive] rate on the horizontal axis” (Witten, Frank, and Hall, 2011,
p. 172). The former is the fraction of true positives compared to
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Figure 15: Precision at kth percentile.
all fraud cases; the latter is the number of false positives com-
pared to all legitimate cases (Witten, Frank, and Hall, 2011). The
best possible curve is closest to the upper left corner (Witten,
Frank, and Hall, 2011). The worst possible curve is a straight
line from the lower left to the upper right.
“To summarize ROC curves in a single quantity, people some-
times use the area under the curve (AUC) because, roughly
speaking, the larger the area the better the model. The area also
has a nice interpretation as the probability that the classifier
ranks as a randomly chosen positive instance above a randomly
chosen negative one” (Witten, Frank, and Hall, 2011, p. 177).
The AUC values for logistic regression and gradient boosted
trees are 0.85 and 0.9, respectively. The AUC metric summarizes
the whole ROC curve, and with regard to fraud detection, i.e.
in the case of limited inspection resources, only as many trans-
actions are of interest as can actually be inspected.
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Figure 16: ROC curves.
7.4 limitations
Before drawing conclusions from the results of the analysis, a
couple of aspects have to be considered. The mentioned limita-
tions refer to two areas: the choice of methods and their evalu-
ation.
First, as pointed out in Chapter 4, labels in the dataset are
created through manual inspection, and the process of deciding
which transactions are selected for inspection is based on expe-
rience of fraud officers (in addition, a fraction of the transac-
tions is selected randomly). This explains the remarkable fraud
ratio of 18.9% among the labeled transactions, although the
fraud ratio in e-commerce businesses is usually lower; for ex-
ample, CyberSource (2017) states a fraud rate of approximately
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1%, and Quah and Sriganesh (2008) refer to statistics by Gar-
ner that mention fraud rates between 0.8% and 0.9%. Thus,
the dataset is biased toward fraudulent transactions, and the
prediction model might therefore face an increased amount of
false positive results when evaluating new, unlabeled transac-
tions because the model would expect more fraud than actu-
ally exists in the dataset. In addition, some patterns might not
be detected simply because fraud prevention employees never
select the transactions that would help prediction models learn
them.
Second, the analysis relies on supervised learning methods.
Both methods, logistic regression and gradient boosted trees,
are well established in machine learning (Chen and Guestrin,
2016; Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman, 2013; Witten, Frank,
and Hall, 2011). Yet, unsupervised or semi-supervised machine
learning could allow to approach the problem from another per-
spective and lower the impact of the aforementioned selection
bias. For example, in contrast to automating the existing inspec-
tion process with supervised machine learning, unsupervised
methods such as outlier detection could help find new kinds
of anomalous patterns in the data and thus create new insights
(Aggarwal, 2013).
Third, in this thesis, precision at k heavily depends on class
imbalance, i.e. the high fraud ratio. This means that a high
fraud rate may correspond to generally higher precision val-
ues. Therefore, if multiple datasets with different fraud ratios
were to be compared with one another, precision would not be
an appropriate measure anymore. This is a hypothetical limita-
tion, though, because only one dataset is used in this analysis.
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7.5 conclusion
In this chapter, a prediction model based on supervised ma-
chine learning was developed. Supervised methods were pre-
ferred because the dataset contains fraud labels which are con-
sidered reliable, and they should be utilized for model training.
However, other techniques like unsupervised machine learning
methods could be used in future work in order to approach
the problem from another perspective. Various different super-
vised machine learning algorithms exist, but logistic regression
and tree-based models are among the most popular methods
used in other studies in related areas (Ngai et al., 2011).
With regard to evaluation of the prediction models, many
performance measures seem inappropriate because they do not
reflect the way fraud departments work. Two categories of eval-
uation measures, set-based measures and measures for ranked
lists, were introduced. It was explained that, facing limited in-
spection resources, a good model produces a ranked list that
positions the most suspicious cases at the top of the list. Results
were presented through the following measures: precision at k,
ROC curves, and the AUC value. The first metric, precision at k,
best fits the problem, although it makes comparison of multiple
datasets with different fraud ratios difficult. It was found that
both models perform well, with gradient boosted trees being
slightly ahead of logistic regression. Thus, the fraud probabil-
ity estimates needed in the following chapter are exclusively
retrieved from gradient boosted trees.
Results show that the variables presented in Chapter 6 are
useful and allow to create prediction models that are capable of
supporting fraud departments in preselecting suspicious trans-
actions. Until now, the prediction model simply aimed at de-
tecting fraud cases. However, e-commerce companies might be
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more interested in a reduction of the the actual financial dam-
age. In the next chapter, the fraud probability estimates pro-
vided by the prediction model will be used in conjunction with
sales price data and margin data in order to introduce an eco-
nomic perspective on fraud prevention.
8
U T I L I T Y A P P R O A C H
8.1 introduction
In the previous chapter, it was shown how two machine learn-
ing models (logistic regression and gradient boosted trees) have
been trained using historical transaction data, and these mod-
els are able to estimate the fraud risk of new transactions. Their
performance was evaluated with metrics often used in data
mining in general and for fraud detection in the e-commerce
mail order business by Carneiro, Figueira, and Costa (2017).
However, from an economic point of view, such measures are
regarded problematic: Even though less fraud is always better,
sometimes priorities must be set owing to a lack of inspection
resources. Consequently, it might sometimes be worthwhile to
tolerate a certain amount of minor fraud cases in order to focus
on a few cases that have a high financial impact. For exam-
ple, as mentioned in the literature review, a few stolen pairs of
socks should be accepted when a fraudulent transaction con-
taining an expensive smartphone can be detected and stopped
instead. Therefore, it is proposed to use performance measures
that reflect the financial impact of fraud cases instead of purely
count-based measures both for scoring and sorting of transac-
tions and for evaluation of the models. Torgo and Lopes (2011)
discussed a utility-based perspective on fraud detection using
artificial and foreign trade data. In this chapter, their ideas are
introduced, further developed, and applied to the context of
the e-commerce mail order business.
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The chapter is structured as follows: First, the work of Torgo
and Lopes (2011) is discussed, and their approach is reviewed
from a critical stance with the e-commerce mail order business
in mind. Based on the results of the review, a formalization
of the utility concept is tailored to the context of the thesis.
Third, the empirical analysis is presented. Finally, results are
discussed.
8.2 utility concept
8.2.1 Work of Torgo and Lopes
Torgo and Lopes (2011, p. 1517) state that “[i]nspection activ-
ities associated with [fraud detection] are usually constrained
by limited available resources. Data analysis methods can pro-
vide help in the task of deciding where to allocate these limited
resources in order to optimize the outcome of the inspection
activities.” The authors argue that, when an algorithm assesses
transactions, besides the estimated fraud probabilities, “the in-
spection costs and expected payoff if the case is confirmed as
a fraud” should as well be considered (Torgo and Lopes, 2011,
p. 1517). Their idea borrows concepts from utility theory and
emphasizes that the risk alone is an insufficient measure from
the perspective of profit-oriented companies.
It is important to note that Torgo and Lopes (2011) do not
focus on the e-commerce mail order business. Thus, possible
remarks are not criticisms per se but view their research from a
more specialized perspective.
Fraud detection involves two parts: An algorithm ranks trans-
actions according to a criterion, and fraud officers review the
list, inspecting the highest-ranked transactions first (Torgo and
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Lopes, 2011), regardless of whether transactions are ranked by
the estimated fraud risk or a utility metric. This scenario fits
the fraud prevention process described in Chapter 4 well.
In general, utility can — but it does not have to — represent
a financial value (Friedman and Sandow, 2011; Peterson, 2009;
von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1953). In the thesis, this is al-
ways the case for the sake of simplicity. Torgo and Lopes (2011,
p. 1518) propose the formula below:
E[Ui] = Pˆi · u(Bˆi − Cˆi) + (1− Pˆi) · u(−Cˆi) (10)
E[Ui] expected utility of transaction i
Pˆi estimated probability of i being a fraud
Bˆi estimated benefit of case i if confirmed fraudulent
Cˆi estimated inspection cost of case i
u(.) utility function
The formula covers two cases, which are weighted with the
estimated fraud risk: Either the transaction at hand is fraudu-
lent, in which case cost and benefit are considered (first part of
the equation), or it is legitimate, meaning that only the cost are
considered (second part of the equation). Please notice that the
formula assumes that the fraud status of a transaction is known
for sure once it has been inspected. This assumption aligns well
with how the fraud prevention process was described in the in-
terviews in Chapter 4.
All components of the equation are estimates: In this thesis,
the estimates for the fraud risk Pˆi come from the classifiers in
Chapter 7. The components Bˆi and Cˆi “are clearly application
dependent” (Torgo and Lopes, 2011, p. 1518) and require fur-
ther discussion. Thus, the utility functions u(.) in the equation
will be replaced with refined terms that are tailored to the prob-
lem faced in the e-commerce mail order business.
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With regard to the research problem, the estimated cost of
inspection can be considered constant for all transactions; this
assumption is inevitable for the empirical part because no data
about variable inspection cost are available, as it has been stated
in the interviews in Chapter 4. Even if the assumption were
false, it would be a simple task to add the inspection cost to the
formula.
In the formula, estimated benefits refer to the positive effect
that occurs when a fraud case is detected. In the e-commerce
mail order business, the benefit covers at least the sum of the
purchase prices of all items contained in the order. In addition,
the benefit could include parts of the value chain like cost of
logistics, operations, and service; to sum up, activities required
to deliver the order increase the benefit of a fraud case which
is detected before it is too late. It has been discussed in Chap-
ter 4 that fraud prevention is often performed while an order
is being processed, and the later a transaction is tried to be
canceled, the more expensive the cancellation becomes. There
are specific events like dispatching the order in the warehouse
that increase the cost of cancellation such that the cost function
takes the shape of a step function. It is difficult to estimate such
costs, and it is simpler to focus on the purchase price. Note that,
with regard to the benefit of fraud prevention, the sales price by
itself is irrelevant because it is a hypothetical value, which does
not reflect financial damage because it includes the merchant’s
profit margin as well.
8.2.2 Revised Concept
In this section, the remarks made in the previous section are
referred to in order to tailor the utility approach to the e-
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commerce mail order business. First, an essential conceptual
question is discussed. Carneiro, Figueira, and Costa (2017,
p. 100) conclude in their research: “We recommend the explo-
ration of other ways to choose the score threshold”. The authors
continue: “[A] cost-based performance measure could be used
in training the algorithm in order to further steer the learning
process towards the intended business outcome”. The authors
recommend to use such a cost-based performance measure for
training of the machine learning model itself. Then, the model
such as logistic regression or gradient boosted trees would not
only learn to differentiate between fraudulent and legitimate
transactions but also to consider the value of the transaction. In
this thesis, it is argued that such an approach introduces un-
necessary complexity to the problem. As long as the prediction
model yields estimated fraud probabilities, utility theory can
be used to implement an economic perspective. This strategy
allows to extend any existing model that produces estimated
probabilities. Therefore, the problem can be formulated as two
clearly separated subproblems, the prediction model that uses
machine learning (Chapter 7) and the utility approach (this
chapter). This thought also accords with the process view that
Torgo and Lopes (2011) hold.
As explained earlier, the inspection process is a classic deci-
sion problem (Peterson, 2009): An actor, the fraud officer, has
two choices — he or she can accept (a) or reject (r) an order
—, and the transaction has one of two states — it is fraudulent
(f) or legitimate (l). This decision problem leads to four possi-
ble outcomes, which are visualized in Table 8. Note that such
a matrix has first been presented in Chapter 2, and it has been
revisited for the purpose of algorithm evaluation in Chapter 7.
In Table 8, the cells are modified in order to consider the utility
terms associated with each outcome.
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fraudulent legitimate
accept A fraud case is labeled
legitimate by mistake, re-
sulting in ui(a|f).
A legitimate order is
processed, resulting in
ui(a|l).
reject A fraud case is success-
fully prevented, result-
ing in ui(r|f) = 0.
A legitimate order is re-
jected by mistake, result-
ing in ui(r|l) = 0.
Table 8: Outcomes of fraud classification with states fraudulent (f)
and legitimate (l) and acts accept (a) and reject (r).
For the four outcomes, the notation ui(choice|state) is estab-
lished. The problem resembles the formulation of the classifica-
tion task in Chapter 7, and it could be tempting to refer to the
outcomes as true positives, false negatives etc.; however, this is
avoided in order not to confuse the outcomes of the decision
problem with the outcomes of the classifiers.
If a transaction is rejected, its utility is assumed to be al-
ways zero because the items are not shipped at all or ship-
ping is canceled. This assumption might not be true, though:
Even if the cost of inspection are ignored — because they are
considered constant —, cancellation may be expensive if the
order is already being delivered. However, data about such
measures were not available; therefore, as a simplification, util-
ity of rejected transactions is assumed to be zero. The out-
comes that matter financially and vary per transaction are
ui(accept|fraudulent) and ui(accept|legitimate). In the former
case, the value of the purchase price is lost, and in the lat-
ter case, a successful sale is made and approximately the dif-
ference between the selling and the purchase price is earned.
This perspective focuses on the actual cash flow. It would also
be possible to set the utility values of the aforementioned two
outcomes to zero and instead assign ui(reject|fraudulent) and
ui(reject|legitimate) non-zero values. In this thesis, the first ap-
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proach is preferred because it allows to make statements about
the actual cash flow.
The formula below, Formula 11, is similar to the one pro-
posed by Torgo and Lopes (2011), but it takes a different per-
spective. It allows to answer the question: Given the fraud
status of a transaction, what would the financial impact be if
it were accepted? The two cases (accept, reject) are weighted
with the estimated fraud risk. Therefore, it is estimated that
Eˆ[Ui|accept] would be earned (or lost if negative) per accepted
transaction.
With the e-commerce mail order business in mind, the util-
ity functions u(.) are implemented as follows: For a transaction
composed of n items (i.e. products), the product of the sales
price Ski and the margin Mki is iterated over in order to com-
pute ui(accept|fraudulent) and ui(accept|legitimate). i and k
are indices, which refer to the kth item of the ith transaction.
The relation between risk and margin is visualized in Figure 17:
Given a constant sales price, the smaller the margin, the larger
the potential loss if a fraud case remains undetected. In contrast,
high margins alleviate the impact of fraud. The sales price acts
as a regular factor and scales the expected value.
Eˆ[Ui|accept] = (1− Pˆi) · ui(a|l) − Pˆi · ui(a|f) (11)
= (1− Pˆi)
n∑
k=1
MkiSki − Pˆi
n∑
k=1
(1−Mki)Ski (12)
Eˆ[Ui|reject] = 0 (13)
An interesting side effect of the notation is the following in-
sight: If a transaction contains exactly one item, the equation
can be simplified, and it is found that the margin has to exceed
the risk in order to observe positive expected utility:
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ui(a|f)
ui(a|l)
n∑
k=1
MkiSki
n∑
k=1
(1−Mki)Ski
Pˆi 1− Pˆi
Figure 17: Visualization of the influence of risk and margin on the
profit.
Eˆ[Ui|accept] > Eˆ[Ui|reject] = 0
⇔ (1− Pˆi)MiSi − Pˆi(1−Mi)Si > 0
⇔ MiSi − PˆiSi > 0
⇔ Mi > Pˆi
(14)
However, it could be overhasty to accept a transaction only
if a positive expected value is observed, although this strategy
seems to be optimal from a decision-theoretic point of view.
The consequences of misclassification are not covered by the
formulas because it is assumed that manual inspection always
precedes a rejection, and it is further assumed that manual
inspection does not lead to rejection of legitimate cases (i.e.
that no false positives exist). Automated processing, though,
could severely damage customer satisfaction and hurt compa-
nies’ reputation if honest customers were denied service.
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8.3 analysis
8.3.1 Introduction
The aim of the analysis is to compare the novel, utility-based
approach to fraud prevention with a traditional, risk-only ap-
proach. However, the utility-based approach should not sim-
ply be evaluated with a traditional performance metric: If it is
argued that profit-oriented companies should adopt a utility-
based perspective on fraud prevention, and if it is concluded
that, consequently, transactions should be ranked by expected
utility, then the quality of such a ranking should be measured
with a performance metric based on actual utility. In other
words: For ranking transactions, the traditional, risk-only ap-
proach and a utility-based approach are used. Then, the two
techniques are evaluated with both traditional measures and
with the financial impact of the fraud cases that have been pre-
vented through inspection based on the ranked lists. It is hy-
pothesized that, with regard to the utility-based evaluation, the
utility-based ranking will provide better results than the tradi-
tional, risk-only ranking. Hence, in order to conduct an unbi-
ased analysis, both approaches are evaluated with both evalu-
ation techniques, leading to four combinations of ranking tech-
nique and evaluation measure.
The analysis section is structured as follows: First, the process
is described in detail, and second, results are presented and
discussed. k-fold cross-validation is applied as in Chapter 7,
but in order to focus on the value contributed by the utility
approach, cross-validation will not be mentioned any further.
The full procedure is shown in Figure 18 and consists of two
main steps, the score computation step and the evaluation step.
The estimated fraud probabilities Pˆi form the starting point for
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Pˆi for n transactions
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Figure 18: Utility analysis flowchart.
both approaches. The full analysis has been conducted with
estimated fraud probabilities from both logistic regression and
gradient boosted trees, but results were quite similar, and since
the latter method performs slightly better than the former — as
shown in Chapter 7 —, results based on gradient boosted trees
are presented in this chapter.
For the traditional approach, the ranked list is just sorted
by Pˆi in decreasing order, i.e. the most suspicious transactions
come first. The traditional approach corresponds with the pro-
cedure presented in Chapter 7 and will be picked up again
when discussing the evaluation technique.
For the novel ranking approach relying on expected utility,
sales prices and product margins are needed besides the fraud
8.3 analysis 149
probability. The former are available as part of the dataset, but
the latter have to be estimated. Although product margins are
not available, category margins are estimated with the help of
census data (U.S. Census Bureau, 2014). Four categories with
the following margins are established: 45% for clothing, 27% for
electronics, 48% for luxury goods, and 36% for other product
types. Of course, margins may differ across companies. In or-
der to account for this, the margins are sampled from a normal
distribution that introduces an element of variation. Therefore,
the score computation step is designed as follows: First, the set
of transactions is duplicated q times. Second, for each group of
duplicated transactions, different margins are sampled from a
normal distribution N(µ = estimated margin,σ = 0.1). Setting
σ = 0.1 means a standard variation of 10 percentage points.
For example, with an estimate of 45%, one standard deviation
ranges from 35% to 55%. Note that the choice of σ is arbitrary
and depends on the desired maximum variation for a given
confidence level. Third, expected utility values are calculated.
Fourth, the enlarged dataset is partitioned into q groups of
size n/q such that each group contains all transactions once
and no duplicates. At the end, in contrast to the simpler tradi-
tional approach, not only one but q ranked lists are retrieved.
This allows to inspect sensitivity of the procedure by calculat-
ing a confidence interval (95%), showing the robustness of the
model. The confidence interval is computed by retrieving the
lower bound (2.5th percentile) and the upper bound (97.5th per-
centile).
In Figure 18, the two steps corresponding to this procedure,
duplication of data and sampling margin values from a nor-
mal distribution, are part of the score computation step because
they have to be conducted before expected utility values can be
calculated. However, the procedure is only performed in order
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to increase the explanatory power of the evaluation and not a
necessary component of the expected utility approach.
8.3.2 Evaluation of Utility
In the previous chapter, precision at k was introduced among
other evaluation measures. Precision at k ignores the economic
perspective, though. However, it can be enhanced to reflect util-
ity with minor changes. In order to achieve this, actual utility
of a transaction (in contrast to expected utility) needs to be de-
fined in the first place. Two cases are possible: Either a transac-
tion is detected as fraud, which means that it has correctly been
placed at the top of the ranked list and, consequently, the order
has been rejected, or it is a false positive and nothing happens.
In the former case, utility ui is defined as the vendor’s buying
price of the products ordered, which equals ui(a|fraud). The
value of the latter case is just zero.
ui =

ui(a|f) if transaction is a fraud case
0 if it is legitimate
(15)
Utility at k is then defined as the sum of the utility values ui
until the kth position, which allows to interpret utility at k as
the average value saved by the fraud prevention activity, given
the inspection capacity k.
utility at k =
1
k
k∑
i
ui (16)
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Figure 19: Precision at kth percentile.
8.3.3 Interpretation of Results
The two evaluation measures precision at k and utility at k have
been introduced, and therefore the empirical analysis is going
to be evaluated in the upcoming paragraphs. First, the two ap-
proaches, the novel and the traditional ranking, are evaluated
using traditional precision at k. This is shown in Figure 19. For
example, when inspecting the 2% highest-scored transactions,
the traditional ranking approach achieves a precision value of
approximately 85%: If there were 5,000 transactions, 2% reflect
100 cases, and 85 of such cases would be fraudulent. A couple
of aspects should be emphasized: There seem to be only slight
differences between the traditional and the expected utility ap-
proach, and the former seems to even outperform the latter.
However, this is not surprising as indicated at the beginning
of the evaluation section: Measuring expected utility with reg-
ular precision is unfair, because expected utility picks up the
elements margins and sales prices that the precision measure
does not consider. Therefore, the utility-based ranking should
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Figure 20: Utility at kth percentile.
be inferior to the traditional approach when relying on a tradi-
tional evaluation measure. It is interesting, though, that results
are worse only around approximately 5-10 percentage points.
Note that, eventually, the two curves converge (not shown in
the figure), because the more data are considered, the less the
order of the ranked list matters. Thus, both ranking algorithms
yield the same precision at 100%, which is simply the average
fraud ratio.
Figure 20 shows utility at k per transaction, again for both
approaches. In this case, expected utility yields much better
results. Exemplary values are presented in Table 9. The tradi-
tional approach remains fairly stable at e 380. In contrast, the
expected utility approach starts at extraordinary high levels (ap-
proximately e 1,400) and decreases, eventually converging to-
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kth percentile Traditional Utility-based Savings
2% 380e 710e 330e
5% 316e 502e 186e
10% 299e 373e 74e
Table 9: Average financial impact per transaction at different per-
centiles.
wards the traditional approach. The results show that, under
the assumption of limited inspection resources, significant sav-
ings could be achieved when a utility-based approach to rank-
ing transactions is implemented. For example, the graph states
that, if 5,000 orders were placed per day, and resources suf-
ficed to inspect the highest-ranked 2% (i.e. 100 cases), e 38,000
could be saved via the conventional ranking, but e 71,000 could
be saved using the expected utility ranking. Thus, potential
additional savings amount to e 33,000. This is also indicated
by the dotted black line which shows the difference between
the values of the two approaches. Of course, the values are
based on the underlying data. With regard to other datasets
and branches of trade, margins and sales prices could be differ-
ent. In relative numbers, at the beginning, the expected utility
approach yields a benefit of 300% compared to the traditional
approach. At the 10th percentile, it is still 25%.
8.4 limitations
The results presented in this chapter seem promising. There-
fore, it is important not only to interpret the results but also to
think about possible criticisms or drawbacks of the approach.
These are discussed in this section.
First, in the dataset, the transactions with the highest risk
were not those with the highest utility, which is why results
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of the two ranking techniques differ. This incongruity does not
have to hold for every dataset. Possibly, in other datasets, cor-
relation between risk and value might be higher, which would
decrease the superiority of the expected value approach over
the traditional technique.
Second, using cross-validation, a random subset of the
dataset was used to perform the analysis. However, the fraud
prevention departments inspect transactions on a daily basis.
If the temporal distribution of high-value and high-risk cases
differs, the surplus value of the expected value approach may
vary in both directions, meaning it could increase or decrease.
Third, margins could differ. Possible errors regarding the es-
timation of margins have been accounted for, and sensitivity
analysis shows little volatility. Nevertheless, one should keep
in mind that the margin would have to be adjusted if the analy-
sis were repeated with a dataset from another branch of trade.
Fourth, Elovici and Braha (2003) discuss a mathematical no-
tation that represents utility-based decisions under uncertainty
using matrix algebra, which can be projected onto the fraud pre-
vention problem. In general, matrix algebra could help bridge
the gap between the conceptual idea, mathematical notation,
and its software implementation. In this thesis, the code writ-
ten for the analysis has not been presented because it relies on
functional programming and cannot be interpreted easily.
Fifth, other costs could be associated with rejecting legiti-
mate transactions: When honest customers are denied service,
customers could become dissatisfied, and therefore their corre-
sponding customer lifetime value could decrease due to a loss
of trust. This represents another kind of costs which is con-
nected to classification errors.
Sixth, fraud is overrepresented in the dataset. A base rate
of 18.9% is rather unrealistic. Hence, since the estimated fraud
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probabilities rely on the fraud rates in the data, expected value
may be lower than the results presented in the analysis, and
thus, the difference between the utility approach and the tradi-
tional approach could decrease.
Seventh, some fraud prevention departments might face a
conflict of interest with regard to implementing the utility-
based approach. As mentioned in the interviews, sometimes
the sum of the sales prices of successfully prevented fraud
cases is used as a performance measure. On the one hand, this
increases the perceived impact of the fraud prevention work
because sales prices usually exceed utility values, but on the
other hand, the utility-based approach better represents the de-
partment’s contribution to profit. Therefore, such a conflict of
interest would have to be resolved before switching to another
performance measure like the utility-based approach.
Eighth, return ratios have not been considered in the analysis.
Returns reduce the profitability of legitimate sales, but they do
not reduce the damage from fraud because criminals usually do
not return their loot. Therefore, it may be assumed that a high
return ratio amplifies the importance of the utility approach
presented in this chapter.
Ninth, decision makers are sometimes risk-averse (Kahne-
man, 2012). In this case, maximization of utility is no longer
the primary goal. Given that each transaction resembles a play
of a repeatable game, companies are likely to prefer utility max-
imization, but it is important to note that, due to risk aversion,
even a rational decision maker could choose a different behav-
ior compared to what has been proposed in this chapter.
Finally, limitations that relate to the estimation of the fraud
probabilities as described in Chapter 7 apply to the analysis in
this chapter as well, because the estimated fraud probabilities
are used for the calculation of expected value.
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Although such aspects should be considered in future work,
the algorithm produces a ranked list that is manually examined
by fraud officers. Hence, since the algorithm aims at support-
ing the manual fraud detection process, the negative impact
of the aforementioned limitations is smaller than if the system
were allowed to block transactions considered fraudulent with-
out manual supervision.
8.5 conclusion
In this chapter, an economic perspective on the previous work
has been adopted. The estimated fraud probabilities — which
had been retrieved using gradient boosted trees —, margins,
and sales prices were used to compute results ranked by ex-
pected utility. The traditional and the novel approach were eval-
uated both with conventional precision at k and the proposed
measure utility at k. Results show that, under the assumption
of limited inspection resources, a substantial amount of money
could be saved if expected utility were used for ranking of trans-
actions instead of conventional fraud probability estimates.
9
C O N C L U S I O N S
9.1 introduction
Buyer fraud has become a prevalent problem in the e-commerce
mail order business: The financial importance of fraud is de-
scribed in Chapter 1 by referring to statistics about the e-
commerce market, reported crimes, and fraud rates. The im-
portance of the problem is underlined through the interviews
(Chapter 4) and the number of documented fraud cases in the
transaction dataset (Chapter 5).
In order to protect themselves against it, some companies run
fraud prevention departments where suspicious transactions
are inspected. However, almost no literature exists concern-
ing the questions how manual fraud prevention is performed,
which features can be used as effective fraud risk indicators,
how automated data mining can be realized in order to support
the fraud prevention process, and how economic principles can
be woven into decision making. The publications that focus on
the e-commerce mail order business touch individual aspects
of these questions at best. Therefore, this thesis addresses the
central research question how automated data mining can sup-
port profit-oriented B2C e-commerce mail order companies in
dealing with fraud.
In order to answer it, the thesis contains five parts that build
on top of one another. Chapters not mentioned in this overview
provide a theoretical background or serve to prepare the data
basis for the research. First, the current state of research in
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e-commerce mail order fraud detection and prevention is ex-
plored in the theoretical foundation presented in Chapter 2. A
conceptual data mining framework is introduced in order to
provide an overview of methods used for fraud detection and
in order to structure existing literature. Second, a small quali-
tative study presented in Chapter 4 investigates the fraud pre-
vention process by conducting interviews with experts from e-
commerce companies. Third, Chapter 6 shows how information
gain and a decision tree were used to estimate the importance
of features both individually and combined. Fourth, Chapter 7
documents how a predictive fraud detection model was devel-
oped in order to help fraud prevention departments focus on
the most suspicious cases by ranking transactions according to
estimated risk. Finally, a utility-based model is compared with
such traditional, risk-based orderings, and it is shown that sub-
stantial savings could be achieved through introduction of util-
ity presented in Chapter 8. While conclusions have been pro-
vided in each of these parts, this chapter focuses on highlight-
ing the contribution of the thesis to theoretical and practical
aspects of fraud prevention in the e-commerce mail order busi-
ness, critically reflecting upon the whole picture, and providing
an outlook for future work.
The chapter is structured accordingly. It starts with a de-
scription of the thesis’ contribution to theoretical knowledge
followed by a discussion of its contribution to professional prac-
tice. Then, topics of potential future work are discussed.
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9.2 contribution to knowledge
This thesis contributes to knowledge through the following key
aspects, which will be explained in detail below:
• The review of literature provides an overview of the cur-
rent state of knowledge regarding fraud prevention in the
e-commerce mail order business and may serve as a start-
ing point for researchers interested in this area.
• The interviews with fraud prevention experts from two
large mail order companies offer insights about the fraud
prevention process, which has rarely been covered in ex-
isting literature.
• The analysis of fraud risk indicators challenges and ex-
tends existing knowledge about feature relevance in the
e-commerce mail order business.
• The fraud detection model strengthens the evidence that
that logistic regression and gradient boosted trees are ap-
propriate techniques for predicting e-commerce mail or-
der fraud.
• The development of a utility-based approach adds a novel
perspective to fraud prevention in the e-commerce mail
order business.
The review of literature as the first key aspect showed that
Hinneburg (2006) first investigated fraud prevention in the e-
commerce mail order business in Germany from a qualitative
point of view and discussed when and how such fraud may
occur. Since then, research in related areas of fraud detection
such as insurance fraud, medical fraud, or credit card fraud
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in general has advanced through publication of various stud-
ies, but the e-commerce mail order business has mostly been
left out. In order to provide a contextual frame and to offer
a starting point for researchers interested in fraud prevention
in the e-commerce mail order business, this thesis provides an
overview of relevant publications.
Mentioned as the second key aspect, the interviews shed
light on the question what e-commerce mail order companies
regard as fraud and how they approach to detect and prevent
it. It has been demonstrated that fraud prevention can be per-
formed following and possibly combining various strategies;
data mining is only one of them. Some strategies focus on
true prevention, i.e. they prevent fraud from occurring at all
— instead of detecting and then canceling transactions that are
found to be fraudulent. For example, if only safe payment meth-
ods such as prepayment can be chosen, fraud becomes much
more difficult to commit if not even impossible. Other strategies
include consistency checks such as address verification services
or two-factor authentication (CyberSource, 2017). The former
strategy requires customers to use real addresses for invoicing
and delivery, reducing the amount of fake data. The latter strat-
egy requires customers to connect a second device such as a
mobile phone with their accounts, making authentication more
secure and account theft more difficult.
However, many of these strategies force all customers to pay
the price for extra security. Although measures such as prepay-
ment and two-factor authentication may make it more difficult
to commit fraud, they require additional effort from all cus-
tomers. Since only a fraction of transactions are fraud cases,
most of the time such methods only increase the necessary ef-
fort to place a legitimate order. Thus, companies face a trade-
off between smooth customer service and fraud prevention. As
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discussed in the interview with company B, additional services
that help reduce fraud are generally of interest given that they
are transparent, convincing, and that they outweigh associated
costs (Anon, 2015b).
Due to the problems associated with the strategies stated
above, in the e-commerce mail order business, it is common
practice to run fraud prevention departments (Anon, 2015a,b;
Carneiro, Figueira, and Costa, 2017; Hinneburg, 2006). Over
the years, computer-aided systems have been integrated into
the fraud prevention process more strongly. While Hinneburg
(2006) merely mentions their existence, today companies either
already use them or are interested in implementing such sys-
tems (Anon, 2015a,b; Carneiro, Figueira, and Costa, 2017). Nev-
ertheless, manual inspection continues to play an essential role
because companies hesitate to let computers alone decide on
the fate of e-commerce orders (Anon, 2015a).
Therefore, the fraud prevention process consists of two steps:
the selection of transactions to be inspected and the actual in-
spection of such transactions itself. In the interviewed compa-
nies, the fraud prevention process is more complex than stated
in some of the literature: Torgo and Lopes (2011) only refer to
manual inspection without modeling the process, and Carneiro,
Figueira, and Costa (2017) mention that the customer can be
called in order to find out the fraud status of a transaction.
However, the interviews showed that — at least in the compa-
nies A and B — fraud prevention employees can choose from a
variety of investigation strategies and multiple actions, includ-
ing but not limited to simply accepting or rejecting the transac-
tion.
Regarding the third key aspect, the performance of available
features was analyzed through computing information gain
and building a decision tree. Results show that certain features
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and also feature combinations stand out with regard to their
ability to separate fraudulent from legitimate orders. Hinneb-
urg (2006) states that fraud is more frequent among particular
socio-demographic groups, e.g. people with low income, unem-
ployed people, and asylum seekers. However, relying on such
patterns may raise ethical issues. In the interviews, rather prag-
matic features were emphasized such as whether a parcel shop
is used as the shipment address and whether the shipment ad-
dress differs from the invoice address. The companies A and
B both confirmed Hinneburg’s statement that expensive, small
goods which can easily be moved and resold are more likely to
be subjected to fraud than other article groups (Anon, 2015a,b;
Hinneburg, 2006). For feature analysis in this thesis, technical
features (e.g. operating system), transaction details (e.g. num-
ber of articles), and customer data (e.g. customer age) have been
used and yielded promising results. Through information gain
analysis, the five most useful features for fraud detection have
been identified as total price, account age, address distance, browser,
and parcel shop. By constructing a decision tree, it is possible to
analyze combinations of feature values, which by far achieved
the best distinction between fraudulent and legitimate transac-
tions. The features considered important for fraud detection in
the e-commerce mail order business overlap with those high-
lighted by Carneiro, Figueira, and Costa (2017). However, the
authors focus on credit card fraud, which is why the feature
sets differ from each other. On the one hand, this makes com-
parison of research results more difficult; on the other hand,
more diverse insights about feature importance can be gained
when multiple publications focus on different sets of features
each, offering a broader perspective to the reader who consid-
ers all of such publications.
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Various publications researched how data mining can sup-
port fraud detection in related areas, but during the last years,
only a single study has been published that deals with the e-
commerce mail order business: Carneiro, Figueira, and Costa
(2017) used credit card data for training logistic regression
and random forests to detect fraud. However, the question re-
mained open whether transaction-centered features could be
used for prediction as well, which is particularly important
when customers pay via invoice because in that case credit card
data is not available.
Referring to the fourth key aspect, logistic regression and
gradient boosted trees are used in this thesis because they
have proven their predictive power in many other applica-
tions. Results suggest that relying on features usually available
to e-commerce mail order companies achieves promising per-
formance, similar to that achieved by Carneiro, Figueira, and
Costa (2017) with credit card data.
With regard to the fifth key aspect, this thesis conceptually
enhances the value of machine learning for fraud detection in
the e-commerce mail order business by adopting an economic
perspective on the problem through the application of utility
theory. Such an approach had been proposed in general but
Torgo and Lopes (2011) but not yet brought to the e-commerce
mail order business.
The next section focuses the thesis’ contribution to profes-
sional practice. It will be explained how the empirical parts of
the thesis may influence practitioners to reflect upon and im-
prove their fraud prevention systems.
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Besides the insights discussed regarding the contribution to
knowledge, which is recommended to be considered by prac-
titioners, this thesis takes a holistic perspective on fraud pre-
vention in the e-commerce mail order business that may guide
practitioners towards a better understanding of fraud preven-
tion processes and towards a more business-driven, economic
perspective on data mining techniques. The central aspects of
contribution to professional practice are as follows:
• Investigation of the fraud prevention process at the inter-
viewed companies may help consider strengths and weak-
nesses of manual inspection, and it may help better under-
stand how the quality of fraud labels can be estimated.
• Feature analysis shows how the relevance of fraud risk in-
dicators can be determined and offers evaluation criteria
in order to decide which of them companies might want
to include into their evaluation.
• The fraud prediction model shows how established ma-
chine learning models can be applied to e-commerce mail
order fraud detection and how the work of fraud preven-
tion departments can be supported by partial automation.
• Utility analysis suggests that substantial savings can be
achieved when expected cost and benefit are used for
ranking of transactions instead of a purely risk-based ap-
proach.
The interviews as the first key aspect revealed that the fraud
prevention process can be more complex than it is often mod-
eled: While most quantitative fraud detection studies distin-
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guish between fraudulent and legitimate, and consequently rec-
ommend either rejecting or accepting a transaction, fraud pre-
vention strategies are much more diverse. Future data mining
models could become much more powerful by being able to
consider the whole spectrum of prevention strategies. For ex-
ample, customers for which a medium fraud risk is estimated
could automatically be required to use two-factor authentica-
tion or other techniques to identify themselves as the proper
owners of their accounts instead of being denied service di-
rectly. With such differentiation, appropriate anti-fraud mea-
sures could be assigned to the corresponding levels of risk dy-
namically and on a per-case basis, which would allow fraud
prevention departments to spend more time on investigating
the most suspicious cases. The interviews helped consider the
whole picture instead of only focusing on optimization of fraud
detection rates. To sum up, practitioners should not simply im-
plement a standalone fraud detection algorithm; instead, they
should evaluate existing as well as potential future anti-fraud
strategies in order to benefit most from the introduction of an
automated fraud detection system.
A major challenge is obtaining high-quality reference data,
because it is difficult to identify fraud cases clearly: The defini-
tion of the term fraud is not standardized across publications.
For example, Carneiro, Figueira, and Costa (2017) regard credit
card chargebacks as fraud, i.e. the occurrence of financial dam-
age is sufficient for the fraud verdict. In contrast, Hinneburg
(2006) states that a criminal intention is required for an activity
to be labeled fraudulent. The interviewed companies hesitated
to regard payment default as sufficient evidence for fraud be-
cause there can be various reasons behind it. Most importantly,
they want to avoid flagging customers with low creditworthi-
ness as criminals by mistake (Anon, 2015a,b). Hence, in order to
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find evidence for criminal intention, such as fake data or stolen
accounts, the fraudulent transactions considered in this thesis
have been subjected to a detailed investigation. The investiga-
tion of the fraud prevention process may help practitioners set
up guidelines that lead to high-quality reference data, which
are needed in every subsequent analysis.
Mentioned as the second key aspect, feature analysis not only
shows which features might be of interest in the e-commerce
mail order business, but it also supplies practitioners with tech-
niques about how to determine relevant features in their own
datasets. The latter aspect is even more important, because
fraud patterns most likely differ across companies of different
size, structure, and branch of trade. Knowing which features
best help separate fraudulent from legitimate orders allows
companies to compare costs and potential benefits of adding
certain features to their dataset and maintaining them — or re-
moving them from it.
For smaller e-commerce companies that have to deal with
fraud but do not want or are not able to implement a fraud
prevention system, knowledge about patterns indicating fraud
might suffice in order to reduce financial damage. Larger busi-
nesses, however, should rely on computer-aided systems in or-
der to deal with the large volume of fraud, partially automat-
ing the prevention process. As has been shown for two of the
largest e-commerce companies in Europe, the amount of trans-
actions to be inspected clearly exceeds available inspection ca-
pacity even though fraud prevention is performed in depart-
ments solely dedicated to that purpose.
Referring to the third key aspect, results of the machine learn-
ing part of the thesis suggest that established methods, such as
logistic regression and gradient boosted trees, can be used for
prediction of fraud cases. It is concluded that the choice of a
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machine learning algorithm is not the most essential decision.
Different algorithms have shown similar performance across
different publications and datasets, of course given that the al-
gorithm can deal with the data at hand. Therefore, practitioners
are encouraged to invest more time into obtaining an essential
understanding of processes and gathering the most helpful fea-
tures instead of horse-racing machine learning algorithms.
In this thesis, it is argued that choosing precision at k for
evaluation of model performance is most appropriate — con-
sidering only typical metrics for classifier evaluation. From an
economic point of view, however, such measures are regarded
problematic: For a company it might be sensible to accept a
certain number of fraud cases if the stolen products are rela-
tively cheap and instead concentrate on a few cases with a high
financial impact.
Therefore, representing the fourth key aspect, a more
business-driven approach is introduced by taking an economic
perspective. The idea is reflected through the introduction of
expected utility at k for ranking transactions and actual util-
ity at k for evaluation of results. It is shown that substantial
financial savings are possible if a utility-based perspective on
fraud prevention is taken. Practitioners may find the barrier to
include the utility-based approach to be relatively low because
such a computation can be added to any existing fraud preven-
tion systems that produces estimated fraud risk values.
To sum up, this thesis provides a framework that covers an
investigation of the fraud prevention process, multiple methods
of feature analysis, development of a predictive model, and the
introduction of an economic perspective on fraud prevention.
Practitioners may use any subset of the presented techniques to
strengthen the fraud prevention work within their companies.
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9.4 further work
This thesis contains qualitative and quantitative work, and
while it answers questions, it also raises new ones. This section
contains a discussion about which topics could benefit from
further research.
The qualitative part consisted of interviews with two large
B2C e-commerce mail order companies and served as a prepa-
ration for the quantitative part. The interviews show how in-
sightful qualitative analysis can be with regard to a topic that is
mostly approached with quantitative methods, and they show
how important it is to understand the fraud prevention process
when interpreting results of data mining. Therefore, two recom-
mendations are made: First, more qualitative research should
be conducted in order to increase generalizability of insights
about fraud prevention in the e-commerce mail order business.
For example, it could be explored to what extent fraud occurs in
smaller companies, companies with a focus on a specific range
of products (e.g. luxury goods or food), or companies in other
countries. Second, when conducting quantitative research, the
importance of preparatory qualitative inquiry should not be un-
derestimated.
Regarding the quantitative analyses, general recommenda-
tions for further work are presented first. Then, the individual
analyses are addressed. The original transaction dataset con-
tains hundreds of thousands of transactions, but only a few per-
cent contain the essential fraud labels. Transactions were mostly
chosen for inspection by experience and partially by random
chance. Therefore, further research could benefit from a trans-
action dataset constructed in a truly random way, which would
probably be reflected by a lower fraud rate closer to what has
been mentioned in the literature.
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For feature analysis, information gain and a decision tree
were used. Information gain provides a good overview of rel-
evance on a per-feature basis. The decision tree suggests that
feature combinations may be more powerful predictors, which
was also confirmed in the interviews. In the future, researchers
could further investigate alternative ways to evaluate such com-
binations.
The predictive model relies on supervised machine learning
methods. However, unsupervised or semi-supervised machine
methods could add value to fraud prevention: Unsupervised
methods, such as outlier detection, may detect anomalous pat-
terns. This would alleviate the dependency on labeled data.
Combining unsupervised and supervised techniques could re-
sult in utilizing the best of both worlds and is therefore a
promising topic of future work.
The utility analysis introduces an economic perspective on
fraud prevention in the e-commerce mail order business and
achieves promising results, which should be challenged in fu-
ture research. For example, product category margins were ex-
tracted from the literature and varied in order to account for
possible estimation errors, but product-based margins might
yield more precise results. In addition, other influences could
be considered by the utility function, such as the return rate,
which decreases the profitability of legitimate transactions. An-
other example is that honest customers might become disap-
pointed and buy elsewhere if they are mistakenly regarded as
fraudsters, which could also be considered in a utility model.
To sum up, potential areas for future research refer to ei-
ther better dealing with some of the limitations of this thesis
or extending promising concepts. Fraud prevention in the e-
commerce mail order business still offers many opportunities
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for insightful research that has direct implications for a finan-
cially relevant real-world problem.
9.5 conclusion
Multiple authors have underlined that a remarkable research
gap exists concerning fraud prevention in the e-commerce mail
order business and that the area deserves more attention. This
thesis contributes to closing the gap in several ways, which will
be described in the following.
In the literature review, the current state of research is ex-
plored, providing an overview of the fraud prevention problem
and existing approaches to solving it. Researchers interested in
the topic might consider the literature review a useful starting
point.
Results of the interviews of fraud prevention practitioners
help understand the fraud prevention process, not only laying
the foundation for the subsequent analyses but also discussing
the structural problems faced in fraud prevention. In addition,
the limitations of the dataset have been explored through the
interviews as well. Researchers investigating fraud prevention
in the e-commerce mail order business are encouraged to thor-
oughly understand the characteristics of their specific problem
setting prior to any quantitative analysis.
Information gain analysis and a decision tree demonstrate
that a careful selection of features is sensible because some
are much more useful than others. This may help companies
make better decisions when designing their fraud prevention
systems.
A prediction model has been developed that is able to iden-
tify fraud cases with satisfying performance. It strengthens ex-
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isting research, which advocates the use of machine learning
for fraud detection in the e-commerce mail order business. It is
also shown that, even though the application of the latest ma-
chine learning techniques in business applications is often ad-
vertised, the performance across methods is similar. This leads
to the conclusion that the choice of a specific learning algorithm
is not the greatest leverage for improving fraud prevention. In
contrast, choosing the right features and evaluating them with
the most appropriate metrics seems far more essential.
Utility theory is applied to the problem in order to reflect that
companies aim for profit maximization rather than for pure
fraud minimization. The evaluation of this approach shows that
substantial savings could be achieved if fraud prevention activ-
ities were guided by economic principles.
To sum up, companies facing fraud in the e-commerce mail
order business should focus on the features that were found to
be relevant in this thesis, and they should conduct their own
feature analysis in order to evaluate the relevance of features
specific to their dataset. Results should be used both for manual
inspection and development of an automated scoring system.
Scoring should be achieved through expected economic utility
rather than pure estimated risk.
Besides the questions this thesis answers, it raises many new
as well. As the experience of criminals grows, so must fraud
detection systems. The ongoing advance of strategies to com-
mit fraud necessitates continuous development of such systems.
Only when fraud detection systems are able to outplay even the
most innovative criminals fraud can successfully be prevented.
In order to achieve this, it is recommended to conduct further
research in three main areas arising from: First, the variation of
the contextual setting, investigating the differences of fraud pre-
vention across various branches of trade, companies of different
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size, and other countries. Second, the transition from computer-
aided systems with manual inspection to fully automated fraud
prevention. Third, further developing the utility-based perspec-
tive on fraud prevention by considering more data, such as cost
of order cancellation at different stages of delivery. This thesis
shall support other scientists to find a starting point for their
individual research subjects on fraud prevention, and it shall
provide practitioners access to a scientific approach in order to
deal with fraud.
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A P P E N D I X
A
E VA L U AT I O N M E A S U R E S
a.1 introduction
In the light of the research problem, some classifier evaluation
techniques seem more appropriate than others. Evaluation mea-
sures can be divided into two groups: set-based measures and
measures for ranked lists (Manning, Raghavan, and Schütze,
2009). Ranked lists can be converted to discrete data by using a
threshold value to divide the list into groups.
Because manual inspection is desired and therefore total au-
tomation is not required, and because such resources are lim-
ited, evaluation measures which are able to focus on the top
of the ranked list are preferred. The following metrics and con-
cepts are discussed below:
• confusion matrix (precision, recall, . . . )
• precision at k
• utility at k
• ROC curves
• Root Mean Square Error (RMSE)
• Mean Absolute Error (MAE)
• Mean Average Precision (MAP)
• Average Reciprocal Hit Rank (ARHR)
• Normalized Discounted Cumulative Gain (NDCG)
In order to discuss evaluation measures in a structured way,
criteria for their evaluation need to be defined. The following
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questions may be considered for differentiation: How does the
measure’s formula influence relevance values? Is the measure
appropriate for the research problem? Is the measure capable
of evaluating ranked lists? Does the measure support a notion
of cost-sensitivity or utility? Is it easily understandable?
Measures are drawn from multiple areas: statistics, machine
learning, information retrieval, and recommender systems. The
former two have been discussed throughout the thesis. In ad-
dition, information retrieval is considered because fraud pre-
vention can be seen as trying to retrieve relevant documents,
i.e. fraudulent transactions, from data. Recommender systems
are considered since fraud cases may be viewed as the relevant
transactions that shall be offered to the user, in this case the
fraud officer. Because there is no consistent formal style across
the different sources, if necessary, equations are adapted to the
fraud prevention problem using the notation below:
• k describes the kth position in a ranked list of transactions
• δ(k) is the estimated fraud class at position k, either 1 for
fraud or 0 for legitimate
• ρ(k) describes a relevance score between 0 and 1, e.g. an
estimated fraud probability at position k, i.e it is a contin-
uous version of δ(k)
• τ(k) is the actual fraud class at position k, either 1 for
fraud or 0 for legitimate
a.2 set-based evaluation measures
“In multi-class prediction, the result on a test set is often dis-
played as a two-dimensional confusion matrix with a row and
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δ(k) = 1 δ(k) = 0
τ(k) = 1 true positive (TP) false negative (FN)
τ(k) = 0 false positive (FP) true negative (TN)
Table 10: Confusion matrix for binary fraud classification.
column for each class. Each matrix element shows the num-
ber of test examples for which the actual class is the row and
the predicted class is the column. Good results correspond to
large numbers down the main diagonal and small, ideally zero,
off-diagonal elements” (Witten, Frank, and Hall, 2011, p. 164).
The four outcomes shown in Table 10 lead to additional metrics
that represent relations. Description of the metrics has been col-
lected from Manning, Raghavan, and Schütze (2009), Shani and
Gunawardana (2011), and Witten, Frank, and Hall (2011).
Precision, also called Positive Predictive Value (PPV), de-
scribes the fraction of correctly labeled fraud cases with re-
gard to all cases labeled fraud. Recall (sensitivity, True Posi-
tive Rate (TPR)) describes the fraction of correctly labeled fraud
cases with regard to all fraud cases. Whether precision or recall
is preferred depends on the problem context (Manning, Ragha-
van, and Schütze, 2009).
precision ≡ PPV = TP
#(labeled fraud)
recall ≡ TPR = TP
#(fraud)
(17)
An alternative to precision and recall is accuracy. Accuracy
considers both true positives and true negatives equally impor-
tant. Thus, it is the ratio of correct classifications regardless of
the label. Yet, in the case of fraud prevention, this is not ap-
propriate: The data are skewed, because the fraction of fraud
cases is small compared to the total number of transactions.
Hence, if accuracy were maximized when data are skewed, no
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cases would be labeled fraud anymore (Manning, Raghavan,
and Schütze, 2009).
accuracy =
TP+ TN
#(all transactions)
specificity =
TN
#(legitimate)
NPV =
TN
#(labeled legit.)
FPR =
FP
#(legitimate)
F =
1
α 1P + (1−α)
1
R
(18)
Likewise, specificity and Negative Predictive Value (NPV) are
not appropriate for fraud detection. Another single measure is
the F measure. Since the formula is less straightforward than
the formulas introduced above, the F measure is visualized in
Figure 21. It trades off precision versus recall and allows to em-
phasize one of them using the α value. The figure shows two
graphs; on the left side, recall is favored (α = 0.1), and on the
right side, precision and recall are balanced (α = 0.5). How-
ever, it sometimes makes sense to maintain multiple measures
instead of aiming at a single value (Manning, Raghavan, and
Schütze, 2009).
a.3 evaluation measures for ranked lists
The set-based measures can be converted into measures for
ranked lists. For example, precision at k can be considered an
extension of regular precision. Precision is defined as the num-
ber of correctly detected fraud cases (i.e. TP cases) divided by
the number of cases that are thought to be fraud (Shani and Gu-
nawardana, 2011), and precision at k is defined as the precision
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Figure 21: F values for combinations of precision and recall values.
value for the set of transactions up to the kth percentile (or the
kth transaction) of a ranked list:
precision at k =
TP within kth percentile
#(labeled fraud within kth p.)
(19)
With regard to the problem context, the application of preci-
sion at k is even simpler: All transactions up to the inspection
capability k should be fraud cases, or at least all fraud cases
should be among the top k cases presented. Hence, in this par-
ticular application precision at k is just the fraud ratio of all
cases up to k. Manning, Raghavan, and Schütze (2009) state
that precision can also be converted to R-precision, where a
perfect score of one is possible if all transactions in the subset
are labeled correctly. The concept of “at k” also allows to plot
precision-recall curves and ROC curves. Precision at k ignores
the economic perspective, though. This issue is addressed in
Chapter 8, where utility at k is introduced.
MAP is a single measure that deals with different information
needs (Manning, Raghavan, and Schütze, 2009). In information
retrieval, different search queries are usually meant to produce
different results. However, in fraud prevention, the query is al-
ways to identify fraud cases. Although the measure can still be
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Figure 22: Scores of discounted gains per relevance score and posi-
tion.
used, it solves a problem absent in fraud prevention. Thus, MAP
is not explained any further.
NDCG, short for Normalized Discounted Cumulative Gain,
is another single measure (Manning, Raghavan, and Schütze,
2009). It uses a relevance score (utility) that is discounted ac-
cording to k, i.e. transactions at the top of the list are weighted
stronger than those farther away. In fraud prevention, relevance
could differ across fraud cases, for example when considering
potential financial damage. The formula has been simplified,
omitting the part dealing with different information needs.
NDCG(k) =
n∑
k=1
2ρ(k) − 1
log2(1+ k)
(20)
Observing Figure 22, it becomes obvious that the farther
away from the top a transaction is ranked, the weaker the in-
fluence of its relevance score becomes. For example, approx-
imately, a relevance score of 0.5 at position 5 influences the
DCG as strongly as a score of 0.8 at position 10 while a score
of 0.8 at position 2 is twice as much as the latter. The method
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Figure 23: Individual scores obtained from RMSE and MAE per rele-
vance score and position.
of discounting a gain value resembles discounted cash flow in
economics. However, NDCG does not produce meaningful finan-
cial numbers, and therefore, other techniques are preferred to
consider the financial impact of fraud cases. An alternative is
ARHR, where each transaction’s utility is calculated by 1/k if
and only if the transaction is relevant, with k being its position
(Shani and Gunawardana, 2011).
Two of the most common measures of errors in statistics are
RMSE and MAE as introduced by Shani and Gunawardana (2011,
pp. 273 sqq.).
RMSE(k) =
√√√√1
k
k∑
n=1
(τ(n) − ρ(n))2
MAE(k) =
√√√√1
k
k∑
n=1
|τ(n) − ρ(n)|
(21)
Of course, instead of the relevance score ρ(k), the binary clas-
sification δ(k) could be used, which is a special case of the for-
mer. The square function of RMSE emphasizes the importance of
large errors. The difference between the two measures is shown
in Figure 23.
